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ABSTRACT  
In past decades, immigration policies in Latin America developed in stark contrast to 
other regions. Whereas most countries moved towards more restrictive policies, many 
Latin American countries liberalised their immigration policy frameworks and recently 
passed laws that expand individual rights in unprecedented ways. At the same time, 
migratory movements in Latin America are in flux, one of the most noteworthy recent 
developments being the increase in extra-continental immigration from Africa, Asia and 
the Caribbean. This PhD explores a reverse migration paradox inherent in the reciprocal 
causal relationship between immigration policy liberalisation and new south-south 
migration. The first paper uses a mixed approach of legal analysis and process tracing to 
show this paradox in the cases of Argentina, Brazil and Ecuador. It analyses the tension 
between liberal discourses and policies that invoke the universality of migrants’ rights and 
free human mobility, on the one hand, and the rejection of recently increasing irregular 
south–south migration on the other. Using a difference-in-difference design, the second 
paper tests the impact of Ecuador’s policy of visa freedom of 2008 on previously restricted 
countries in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean, and shows that immigration from these 
regions more than doubled. Qualitative findings confirm that visa freedom was the main 
determinant of migrants’ decision to move to Ecuador and further show great variance of 
migrant characteristics. The third paper is based on 35 in-depth interviews, which 
collectively demonstrate that perceived security threats of domestic and international 
political actors, which led to the partial reintroduction of tourist visa requirements for ten 
African and Asian countries by 2010, were closely intertwined with racism. Taken together, 
the three papers have important implications for the study of immigration policies, south-
south migration and the securitisation of migration.  
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PREFACE 
In a migrant detention centre in Mexico City I met 27-year-old Frank in May of 
2012. After leaving his home country, Cameroon, Frank had already spent over 
three years in Latin America and had travelled through twelve countries in his 
journey towards the US. Frank explained that he had been forced to leave his 
home community because of a violent family strife. He first travelled to Equatorial 
Guinea. In the port of Benito, Frank went aboard on a cargo ship towards South 
America as a stowaway, without knowing where exactly it would take him. After 
three weeks, he arrived in Chile. Frank only stayed in Chile for a couple of days 
and then crossed the border to Argentina. There, he had been told, life was easier 
for African migrants. Frank lived in Argentina for two years. He worked in a spoon 
factory and played soccer in a local club. Once he had saved enough money, Frank 
resumed his journey towards North America. He travelled from Brazil to 
Venezuela, where he stayed for one year and applied for refugee status. His 
application was denied. Frank continued his journey through Colombia to Central 
America. When traversing the rain forest of Darién, Frank and the three Cuban 
and two Cameroon nationals in his group went six days without eating. They were 
picked up by Panamanian officials and attended to in hospital. Once they 
recovered, they received official exit permits and resumed their journey up north. 
When crossing from Nicaragua to Panama, Frank was detained and robbed by 
Honduran officials. Frank spent two weeks in jail and was then released. He made 
it through Guatemala and crossed the border to Mexico, but was then detained by 
officials in Tapachula, close to the southern border of the state of Chiapas. In his 
journey from Cameroon to Mexico, Frank spent over $4,000 in people smuggling 
fees and bribes for officials. Frank crossed the Atlantic and all of the Americas 
without any legal documentation, paying people smugglers in each country for the 
next border crossing.  Frank had lived in Valencia, Spain from 2004 to 2006. He 
had entered the EU with a tourist visa, and would have liked to return to Europe, 
but was denied another visa (see Freier, 2013a p. 16). 
 
Two intriguing recent developments in Latin America are related to Frank’s story: first, 
increasing south-south immigration from Africa, Asia and the Caribbean and second, 
relatively permissive, or liberal Latin American immigration policies.  
 
I first noticed African migrants in the neighbourhood of Once, Buenos Aires, in 2008. 
Although surprised, I forgot about the phenomenon until I came across various newspaper 
articles about Africans reaching Latin America as stowaways while working for a liberal 
think tank in South Africa two years later. I was intrigued. My original PhD research 
proposal thus focused on contemporary African migration to Latin America, and in how 
far global immigration policies determined these flows. Very soon after, I realised that 
there was practically no established literature, let alone coded data on Latin American 
immigration policies. During the course of my exploratory research, I came across another 
puzzle: the surprisingly liberal immigration and refugee reforms in many Latin American 
countries. Confirming the relative openness of Latin American migration regimes became 
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a necessary first step to explaining the phenomena of increasing African migration 
towards Latin America. I started investigating immigration policy-making in the region, 
which took over my research agenda for some time. Embedded in my PhD project was the 
co-organisation of an international conference with the purpose of mapping new trends in 
migration and asylum policies and laws in Latin America.1 The selected publication of 
conference contributions forms a first volume critically examining the new liberalism in 
Latin American law and policy on migration and refugees (Cantor et al., 2015).   
Based on preliminary research on both immigration and refugee law reforms, I 
chose two positive cases (Argentina and Mexico) and one negative case (Ecuador) as 
qualitative case countries. I conducted three months of fieldwork in each of these 
countries and in total conducted 103 elite interviews with politicians, officials and NGO 
representatives in 2011 and 2012. My early research in Ecuador from June-August 2011 was 
conducted in collaboration with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and 
resulted in two reports on extra-continental migration to South America and Ecuador 
(Freier, 2013a, Freier, 2013b). The IOM office in Quito facilitated many of the elite 
interviews, which opened up time and resources in search of extra-continental 
immigrants. In total, I could conduct 58 interviews with African, Asian and Caribbean 
immigrants.  
When I set out to conduct my research in Argentina and Mexico in 2012, my 
research focus had shifted to explaining policy liberalisation. I concentrated my limited 
resources on conducting elite interviews with political actors and could only interview few 
extra-continental immigrants. The focus on Ecuador in this thesis is justified by it being an 
exceptional case regarding its policy of open doors, which offers a natural experiment to 
test the impact of policy liberalisation on new south-south flows, on the one hand, and 
presenting a paradigmatic case of the “reverse migration paradox” on the other. My 
comparative analysis of immigration and refugee policy liberalisation in Argentina, 
Ecuador and Mexico is ongoing.   
 
Looking back at this explorative and exciting research process in a nascent academic sub-
field, it is perhaps best summarised in Douglas Adams words: “I may not have gone 
[exactly] where I intended to go, but I think I have ended up where I needed to be.” 
 
 
 
                                                
1 The conference “A Liberal Tide: Towards A Paradigm Shift in Latin American Migration and Asylum Policy-
making?” took place in London on 18 March 2013 and was supported by the Economic and Social Research 
Council, the Study of the Americas, School of Advanced Study, and the Institute of Commonwealth Studies 
and Human Rights Consortium of the School of Advanced Study.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
WHAT THIS THESIS IS ABOUT 
  
This thesis explores two related recent phenomena in South America: the liberalisation of 
immigration policies and increasing extra-continental south-south migration. Since the 
1980s, Western governments have embarked on increasingly restrictive immigration 
discourses and policies, especially rejecting irregular immigration (Freeman, 1994, 
Guiraudon and Joppke, 2001, Durand and Massey, 2003, Cornelius et al., 1994, Czaika and 
de Haas, 2013, Ceriani Cernadas and Freier, 2015). This has led scholars to implicitly 
assume a global restrictive trend in immigration policies and law since the 1980s.  
 Governmental immigration discourses in many South American countries, however, 
have recently become increasingly liberal, with a clear emphasis on migrants’ rights and 
the promotion of free human mobility (Mármora, 2010, Ceriani Cernadas and Freier, 2015, 
Freier and Acosta Arcarazo, 2015). These discourses focus on the universality of migrants’ 
rights and on how these apply to all non-nationals irrespective of their national origin and 
legal status. Substantial policy liberalisation followed in some cases, albeit to varying 
degrees (Cantor et al., 2015, Freier and Acosta Arcarazo, 2015). Liberal immigration policies 
in South America are expansive regarding both access and rights. At first glance the region 
thus seems to defy the “numbers vs. rights” hypothesis, the trade-off between a host state’s 
openness in terms of access for migrants to its territory and the extensiveness of rights it 
grants to immigrants (Ruhs and Martin, 2008)a. As will be discussed below, I understand 
liberal immigration policy has ideologically rooted in social liberalism and as emphasizing 
migrants’ rights and the promoting increased free mobility.  
 A second noteworthy development in the region has been the recent increase in 
extra-continental south-south migration from Africa, Asia and the Caribbean. In April 
2010, the Special Committee On Migration Issues of the Organization of American States 
(Comisión Especial de Asuntos Migratorios, CEAM) convened a conference on extra-
continental migration in Washington, D.C.2 According to the conference report extra-
                                                
2 The forum on “Extra-continental Migration in the Americas” took place on 6 April 2010, OEA/Ser.G, CE/AM-
129/10 rev.2. 
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continental immigration to South America was “new and growing”, made up by “mixed 
migration flows” including economic migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, and 
characterised by largely irregular migration flows (CEAM, 2010). Although the conference 
suggested that the overall inflows of extra-continental immigrants were extremely small,3 
participants discussed how to impede them. It is very difficult to assess how large the 
phenomenon of extra-continental and largely irregular immigration to South America is. 
However, given its novelty and timely proximity to the trend in policy liberalisation, it 
raises the question of any reciprocal causal relationships between the two.  
 The existing migration literature has not sufficiently addressed the phenomena of 
the liberalisation of immigration policies and increasing extra-continental south-south 
migration in South America. Most generally, studies on international migration and 
migration policies continue to be characterised by a geographic “south-north” bias. Here, 
the term “south” refers to comparatively less developed regions and countries 
concentrated in the southern hemisphere, and the term “north” refers to more developed 
regions or countries, concentrated in the northern hemisphere.  Although this conceptual 
differentiation is heuristically useful and thus applied in this thesis, the south-north 
terminology is misleading in that it does not fully correspond to historic and geographic 
realities, and bears the risk of the normative naturalisation of a developmental divide 
between the two hemispheres. 
 An extensive literature exists on the determinants and consequences of migration 
to Western liberal democracies and the determinants and effects of their policies and 
laws. South-south migration and trends in migration and law- and policymaking outside 
Western liberal democracies are only beginning to be appreciated (De Lombaerde et al., 
2014). Related to this geographical bias is the lack of studies analysing immigration policy 
liberalisation. The political migration literature focuses on explaining policy change 
towards increased restrictiveness in major Western immigrant receiving countries, or the 
“migration paradox” of the gap between restrictive discourses and policies (Boswell, 2007).  
                                                
3 For example, in 2009 and 2010, Mexican officials detained 2042 African nationals compared to 126,079 
Central Americans. Nevertheless, with only 1.84 per cent Africans made up the second largest group of 
detainees after Central America (98.23 per cent), see CEAM 2010. Migración Extracontinental en las 
Américas. Washington D.C.: Comisión Especial de Asuntos Migratorios–CEAM. 
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The existing scholarship on migratory movements in South America mirrors this 
south-north bias. Most studies analyse the south-north migration corridor that runs from 
Central America through (and to) Mexico and onwards to the United States and Canada, 
particularly in terms of North American migration law and policy (Donato et al., 2010). A 
much smaller group of scholars have explored the phenomenon of South American 
migration to Western Europe (e.g. Pellegrino, 2004, Kubal et al., 2011, McIlwaine, 2011). 
Scholarship examining south-south migration dynamics within and to South America is 
predominantly comprised by the reports of international organisations (e.g. Pellegrino, 
2003, Gurrieri et al., 2013, Córdova Alcaraz et al.). 
Immigration law and policymaking in the region is a topic that has been especially 
marginalised thus far. Although scholarship on South American migration policy has 
picked up momentum in recent years (Pizarro, 2001, Anguiano and Peña, 2007, Novick, 
2008, Castillo, 2010, Ceriani Cernadas, 2011, Faúndez, 2011, Garcia Zamora and Gainza, 2014, 
Cantor et al., 2015), existing studies tend to be descriptive (e.g. Garcia Zamora and Gainza, 
2014 ) or normative (e.g. Castillo, 2000, Novick, 2008), or are conducted under the heavy 
influence of dependency theory, which still has a strong influence on the social sciences in 
South America today (Massey et al., 1998). Attempts to assess the impact of migration 
policy on migrant populations and migratory movements within the region are especially 
scarce (for an example see Perera and Velázquez, 2013).  
A nascent literature on Latin American immigration policies suggests a trend 
towards policy liberalisation in the region and argues that, despite significant variation in 
the quality and magnitude of immigration policy reforms, the new outlook on migration, 
which brings the individual migrant and human rights into the centre of policymaking, 
implies an important ideological paradigm shift in the region (Cantor et al., 2015). The 
right to migrate that is now enshrined in Argentine, Bolivian, Ecuadorian and Uruguayan 
migration laws and in various regional declarations symbolises this new approach to 
migration management. 
Ceriani and Freier (2015) show that the gradual teardown of the criminalisation of 
migration, which was the dominant paradigm of immigration control during the military 
dictatorships, as well the implementation of alternative measures to detention and 
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deportation, and the guarantee of the right to due process amount to significant policy 
liberalisation in some countries. Likewise, the extension of social rights to immigrants, 
and the introduction of regularisation programmes are important aspects of policy 
liberalisation. On a regional level, international declarations and agreements regarding 
migrants’ rights and the free circulation of people, although varying in depth and scope, 
support domestic policy liberalisation. At the same time, in most countries in the region 
policies and practices with a selective and instrumental outlook on migration 
management coexist with these liberal advances. These include out-dated normative 
frameworks, or reforms that never went beyond initial stages. In many countries, at least 
some political actors continue to see migration as a problem or even a threat to the 
economy, national security, sovereignty or national identity (Ceriani Cernadas and Freier, 
2015). 
 
Research Questions 
 
In the light of the south-north bias of the literature that focuses on the determinants and 
impact of restrictive immigration policies, this thesis addresses the following research 
questions: 
  
1. Is there coherent liberalisation in South America’s immigration policies or do 
inconsistencies prevail between discourses and policy and how can these be 
explained?  
2. What has been the impact of immigration policy liberalisation on the increase of 
extra-continental south-south flows?  
3. How can we understand the political reactions to the (unintended) consequence 
of increased extra-continental south-south flows?  
 
The lack of empirical and theoretical work on South American immigration policy and 
south-south migration calls for such an exploratory inquiry. Answers to these questions 
are important not only for our understanding of contemporary South America but also to 
improve the theorization of migration politics in countries in the global south more 
generally. As many other southern states, countries in South America lie at the crossroads 
of migration, serving as both a destination and a source of regional and intercontinental 
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migrants. Regarding political discussions on migration, these nations play an interesting 
role, as they grapple both with questions of sovereignty and xenophobia, and with 
normative concerns regarding the treatment of migrants in the context of the reception of 
their citizens abroad.  
 The thesis speaks to different, albeit related literatures. Paper One speaks to the 
literature that seeks to explain immigration policies. It discusses political economy 
(Freeman, 1995), neo-institutionalist (Cornelius et al., 1994, Joppke, 1998b) and 
constructivist theoretical (Bonjour, 2011) approaches and suggests combining 
constructivist and rationalist approaches in the analysis of immigration discourses, policy 
and law making, implicitly suggesting a critical realist approach. Paper Two makes a 
contribution to the literature on the (political) determinants of migration flows, and more 
specifically the newly emerging literature on the impact of tourist visas as an immigration 
control policy (Neumayer, 2011, Bertoli and Fernández-Huertas, 2013), as well as to 
emerging literature on south-south migration (Dumont et al., 2010, UNDESA, 2012). Paper 
Three speaks to the literature on racial selectivity in immigration policies and the 
securitization of migration (Joppke, 2005, Faist, 2006, Bourbeau, 2011, FitzGerald and 
Cook-Martín, 2014). 
 
METATHEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
 
The Critical Realist Approach 
 
“[T]he philosophy of social science is not optional… [and] social ontology is not optional either; 
meta-theory is not an unwanted distraction from the ‘real’ research... Every researcher brings 
his/her ontology to the investigation of any topic. This can be implicit or explicit, but it is one or 
the other because all research conceptualizes the social – or any part of it – in a particular way, 
welcoming certain concepts and ignoring or rejecting others, viewing causality from a specific 
perspective and presenting the results accordingly” (Archer, 2016). 
 
This PhD applies a critical realist approach to the study of immigration policy in South 
America. Critical realism emerged as a two-fold critique against empirical realism 
(positivism) and transcendental idealism (constructivism), arguing for the necessity of a 
structured and differentiated ontology. The philosophical movement’s central works 
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include Bhaskar’s “A Realist Theory of Science” (Bhaskar, 1975) and “The Possibility of 
Naturalism” (Bhaskar, 1979), and the works of Margaret Archer including “Culture and 
Agency: The Place of Culture in Social Theory” (Archer, 1988)and “Realist Social Theory: 
The Morphogenetic Approach” (Archer, 1995).  
Being realist about ontology establishes that things exist apart from our 
experience and knowledge of these things.  Critical realism thus stresses the need to 
separate epistemology from ontology. This distinction between the transitive (the 
changing knowledge of things) and the intransitive (the relatively unchanging things 
which we attempt to know) is a central assumption of critical realism (Bhaskar, 1975). 
“[A]gainst the implicit ontology of the empiricists and idealists, critical realism hopes to 
establish a structured and differentiated account of reality in which difference, 
stratification and change is central. In short, critical realism argues for ontology, and for a 
new ontology. Critical realism thus attempts to steer between the Scylla of naive realism 
on the one hand, and the Charybdis of idealism on the other”.4  
Critical realism pursues the examination of the interaction among structural, 
cultural, and agential powers without resorting to reductionism, the incorporation of 
social complexity and emergence, and the utilization of systemic thinking in an open, 
dynamic manner. Rather than rejecting causality as a solely positivistic concern, critical 
realism seeks to determine causality by identifying and comparing multiple 
interpretations of social contexts, structures, and events (Gold, 2011). Social relations are 
understood as always building on a material dimension and as conditioned by causal 
powers. This means that social forces which may be beyond the comprehension of social 
actors can nevertheless impact their lives. As a result, the researcher cannot carry out in-
depth research by only focusing on the agents’ understanding of these relations, but needs 
to assess the adequacy of this understanding by analysing the causal mechanisms which 
are not usually directly observable at an empirical level. Causality thus lies between the 
(direct) causality of positivism and causality in realism, where human agency is 
considered the ultimate causal factor, albeit limited by structural and cultural constraints 
(ibid.). 
                                                
4 https://roybhaskar.wordpress.com/what-is-critical-realism/ 
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In terms of its actual application, it has to be pointed out that critical realism is a 
meta-theory with purely philosophical origins, and a concrete critical realist methodology 
has yet to fully be developed (Iosifides, 2011). Nevertheless, there is consensus that a 
critical realist approach to social research favours mixed methods and methodological 
triangulation.  Crucially, critical realism promotes the detachment of methods from 
ideology, i.e. the ostensible link between quantitative methods and positivism and 
between qualitative methods and various versions of interpretivism, constructionism, and 
relativism. At the same time, critical realism rejects the strictly micro perspective that was 
formerly characteristic of qualitative social science, and seeks to link structure, culture, 
and agency to reach an understanding of the interplay of micro and macro forces. Critical 
realism thus shares many values, goals, and techniques with other contemporary 
formulations of qualitative methodology, such as the implementation of multiple 
methods, the use of ethnographic investigation for the development and refinement of 
theory, and a willingness to generalize from qualitative materials. Quantitative data and 
discourse analysis is regarded as useful but not as self-sufficient means for conducting 
social research. Accordingly, critical realism endorses methodological triangulation (see 
Gold 2011).  
In sum, the key assumptions of critical realism are threefold: First, an objective 
reality exists, which consists of structures, processes and objects. Second, any conceptual, 
interpretive, or ideological understanding of that world is subject to bias, or limited by 
ideology. Third, the actions of social and political key actors reproduce and transform 
socio-political structure, which in turn shapes actors’ intentional agency (Lewis, 2002). 
Critical realism thus provides a framework to simultaneously investigate structural 
causalities and individual interest-based responses to these structures, avoiding purely 
volunteeristic or purely deterministic explanations. Finally, rather than emphasizing 
political neutrality, critical realism embraces political and ethical values in the defence of 
the socially and politically disadvantaged and oppressed.  
Iosifides (2011) advocates for the application of critical realism to migration 
studies. He sees the need for a more holistic methods to study migration, and migration 
policies, and argues that “[i]n contrast to positivism and relativism alike, critical realism 
 20 
allows us to be both scientific and critical regarding social reality in general and 
migration-related social realities in particular” (Iosifides, 2011 p. 235). In particular, 
Iosifides is troubled by the question of agency and culture within existing interpretive 
approaches, especially the standard macro approaches that see population movements 
responding to relatively simple push and pull factors or being mechanical pawns within 
world systems theory. Iosifides argues that macro-theories tend to rely on historical 
processes and social relations as determining population movements, whereas micro-
theories theories excessively emphasize the role of individual agency. In between, 
complex meso-level theories, which include transnationalism and theories of social 
capital either remain historically ill-defined, or neglect structural power inequalities. He 
thus proposes applying critical realism to migration studies to account for the prevalence 
of existing social structures in addition to human and individual agency. 
Iosifides (2011) distils 16 guidelines on how to conduct realist qualitative research 
from the literature. These include: taking into full account the interpretation and 
perspectives of social agents; linking discourses to non-discursive material, social, 
relational or ideational realities; focusing on agents’ intentions and the unintended 
consequences of their actions; focusing on agents’ networks, social standing and recourses 
that make certain actions possible; locating agent’s experiences in structural or cultural 
contexts; engaging in theoretical dialogue and immanent critiques of alterative theoretical 
frameworks; asking ‘why’ questions; placing emphasis on social complexity and 
considering processes such as social embeddedness and path dependency; being critical, 
locate relations of power asymmetries, exploitation and domination; engaging in micro-, 
meso- and macro-analyses; using multiple sources of primary and secondary data 
(Iosifides, 2011 p. 144-146).  
 
METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The Duality of Migration Flows and Policy  
 
Given the incipient state of research on South American immigration policies, this PhD 
casts light on a number of questions related to different stages of the immigration policy 
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cycles. The project asks whether or not and to what extent there is empirical evidence for 
the liberalisation of immigration policies in South America and how this paradigm shift 
can be explained. The PhD also takes a closer look at the case of Ecuador to assess the 
impact of policy liberalisation on immigration rates, and subsequent restrictive political 
reactions. The different papers consider policy outputs, policy implementation and policy 
outcomes and thus treat immigration policy as both independent (X) and dependent 
variable (Y). The concept of the policy cycle is useful in order to clarify the relationship 
between the different questions the PhD addresses.  
 
The Policy Cycle as Heuristic Template 
 
There are many different ways of dividing the policy cycle, and the usefulness of its stages 
as a heuristic has been subject to critical debate (Sabatier, 1999). It is important to clarify 
that the policy cycle does not offer a theoretical or analytical model that guides the 
selection of my research questions and variables. I rather understand it as a basic 
background template and a device to structure empirical material in an incipient field of 
research and to clearly differentiate between policy outputs, implementation and 
outcomes. The different stages of the policy cycle provide a useful background template 
against which to organize questions about the characteristics, determinants and effects of 
the policy process. It is crucial to clearly distinguish between policy outputs, 
implementation and outcomes, as they relate to different phases of a policy cycle. The use 
of the terms output and outcome is ambiguous, both outside and inside of academia, and 
across disciplines, which leads to misunderstandings and skewed debates as in the case of 
the question of the effectiveness of immigration policies discussed in Paper One.  
 Most generally, I understand outputs as the measures taken to address a problem, 
whereas outcomes refer to what difference these outputs make. One could argue that 
outputs include policies and laws and their implementation. In his adaptation of system 
theory to political science, Easton indeed defines “outputs” as “binding decisions, their 
implementing actions and [...] certain associated kinds of behavior,” while outcomes are 
“all the consequences that flow from [...] the outputs of the system” (Easton, 1965 p. 351). It 
is useful to further differentiate between outputs and implementation as this allows us to 
 22 
differentiate a number of questions regarding the formulation and passing of policies and 
their operationalization, which would be obscured by lumping outputs and 
implementation together in the same category. 
 Cairney (2011) divides the policy cycle into six stages: 1. agenda-setting, 2. policy 
formulation, 3. legitimation, 4. implementation, 5. evaluation and policy maintenance, 6. 
succession or termination. In the agenda setting stage problems or issues that require 
government attention are identified. The policy formulation stage entails the 
identification of goals and objectives, the estimation of the effects of solutions and of 
policy costs. In the legitimation phase, not included in most policy cycle models, the 
endorsers of a policy seek support through consultation with interest groups, referenda 
and legislative or executive approval. As a result a policy, decree or legislation is passed – 
the policy output. In the implementation phase, a ministry or department receives 
resources such as legal authority, staffing, training and money to translate the policy on 
paper to carry out the policy as planned. In the ideal typical evaluation phase, the 
bureaucrats assess the extent to which the policy was successful, if it was implemented 
correctly and had the desired effect – i.e. they assess the policy outcome. Based on this 
evaluation, in the final stage of policy maintenance, succession or termination, 
bureaucrats and politicians decide whether a policy is continued, modified or 
discontinued. These ideal typical stages do not always evolve, nor do they develop in clear-
cut sequences but are constantly entangled. The policy negotiation process plays out at 
local, regional, national, inter- and supranational levels, in the areas of governmental, 
parliament, the administration and civil society. Political actors inside and outside of 
institutions influence the policy process based on myriad and often conflicting interests 
and ideas, and “rather than being the main objective of political action, policy-making 
frequently results as a by-product of politics” (Jann and Wegrich, 2006 p. 56). Figure 1 
shows how policy output and outcome relate to the policy cycle. 
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Figure 1: The Policy Cycle 
 
 
Source: Based on Cairney’s Policy Cycle (2011: 34)  
Used with permission of the author  
 
Perhaps due to its interdisciplinary character, the confusion in migration studies regarding 
the conceptual differentiation between migration politics, policy outputs, policy 
implementation, and policy outcomes is especially stark. Hollifield first applied the 
output-outcome dichotomy to the immigration literature: he understood the formal 
regulations on immigration as the policy outputs and migration stocks and flows as policy 
outcomes (Hollifield, 1986). While the different stages of the policy cycle are concerned 
with policy output as the dependent variable, the policy outcome impacts the policy cycle 
in between the implementation and evaluation stages. Of course, immigration policy 
outputs, implementation and outcomes are often intimately related. For example, 
immigration policies have an impact on migration flows, although these are also 
determined by other migration determinants such as economic push and factors, and 
importantly, by individual human agency. At the same time, immigration levels impact 
the nature of a country’s immigration policies. As pointed out by Hollifield & Wong, we 
thus need to develop research questions and objectives in relation to migration’s duality 
as both cause and consequence (Hollifield and Wong, 2013a). 
 Recent research projects have summarized some of the big questions that relate to 
the different stages of the immigration policy cycle. Regarding the nature of immigration 
Policy Outcome 
Policy Output 
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policies, it has been asked whether there has been a significant increase in the 
restrictiveness of policies, whether some areas of immigration have become more 
restrictive than others, and whether patterns of openness and restrictiveness can be 
detected across groups of countries (Gest et al., 2014). Treating policy as a dependent 
variable, it has been asked what explains the modes of politics, who are the consequential 
political actors involved in migration policymaking, what interests are at play and what 
determines these interests, and what role political institutions play in mediating between 
the state, the broader political sphere, and society (see Hollifield et Wong 2013). These 
questions address migration politics and policy outputs.  
 Regarding migration policy as an independent variable, the prominent question that 
spans across academic disciplines is whether and how immigration policy outputs impact 
migration outcomes. This literature focuses on the issue of states’ capacity to control 
migration flows (Andreas, 1998, Brochmann, 1999, Gibney, 2004, Guiraudon and Joppke, 
2001, Statham and Geddes, 2006, Hollifield et al., 2016). Most of the discussions have 
evolved around the so-called “gap hypothesis”—the gap between the states’ intention to 
adopt restrictionist immigration policy and the actual results of the policy—and its 
corollary question of whether the state can control unwanted migration (Cornelius et al., 
1994). As Paper One discusses, this “gap hypothesis” rests on the ambiguous understanding 
of policy outputs and outcomes (Czaika and de Haas, 2013). Indeed, quantitative evidence 
suggests that immigration and refugee policies significantly shape international migration 
patterns (Thielemann, 2006, Ortega and Peri, 2009, Mayda, 2010). 
 How do my research questions relate to the policy cycle? The first question “Is there 
coherent liberalisation in South America’s immigration policies or do inconsistencies prevail 
between discourses and policy and how can these be explained?” focuses on the 
implementation phase of the policy cycle, but also touches on agenda setting and policy 
formulation. The second question “What has been the impact of immigration policy 
liberalisation on the increase of extra-continental south-south flows?” addresses the impact 
of policy output out the outcome of increasing intra-continental south-south migration 
and thus falls in between the implementation and evaluation stage of the policy cycle. The 
third question “How can we understand the political reactions to the (unintended) 
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consequence of increased extra-continental south-south flows?” speaks to the second half of 
the policy cycle and the stages of policy evaluation, and maintenance, succession or 
termination. Questions One and Three treat immigration policy output as the dependent 
variable. Question Two treats policy as the independent variable and tests its impact on 
the policy outcome of immigration flows. 
 
Case Selection 
 
Why does this thesis discuss the cases of Argentina, Brazil, and Ecuador? Given the 
exploratory nature of this PhD, Paper One rests on diverse case selection and Paper Two 
and Three focus on Ecuador as an extreme case. Paper One explores the paradox between 
liberal discourses on the universality of migrants’ rights and free human mobility, on the 
one hand, but the rejection of recently increasing irregular south–south migration from 
Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean, on the other. As pointed out by Seawright, the selection, 
and case analysis in case study research is necessarily intertwined, especially in 
exploratory work. The diverse case method requires the selection of cases which are 
intended to represent the full range of values characterising X, Y, or some particular X/Y 
relationship (Seawright and Gerring, 2008). Based on preliminary research, we selected 
the three cases for Paper One on variation in Y, the discursive gap between the 
liberalisation of political discourses on migration and immigration policies in the light of 
universality of migrants’ rights and free human mobility. This design works from the 
premise that the possibility for causal inference in small-n study is maximised through 
selection of cases with variance on the response variable. The differences in the policy 
outputs across countries and case-studies allow the researcher to examine the relative role 
of the posited explanatory variables (George and Bennett, 2005 p. 250). Within-case  
variance  of  this  kind  can  also  minimise selection bias, often a concern in small-n, most 
similar comparisons (Collier et al., 2004).   
The (former) presidents of all three countries embarked on liberalised 
immigration discourses. However, the three cases show substantial variation in the degree 
to which legislative and policy change followed discursive immigration policy 
liberalisation. Argentina presents the smallest gap between discourse and policy 
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liberalisation. It’s 2004 immigration law, which moved from the logic of criminalisation 
and expulsion to the rational of legalisation and integration, represents the most 
comprehensive and progressive immigration reform in South America, which proclaims 
the “right to migrate”. However, in relation to this proclaimed right to migrate: only those 
having entered Argentina legally have the right to stay, which de facto excludes 
immigrants from non-visa free origins in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean. Brazil presents a 
slightly larger gap with less pronounced discursive policy liberalisation, which is not 
captured by the country’s outdated and securitized 1980 immigration law. Nevertheless 
the National Immigration Council (Conselho Nacional de Imigração, CNIg) exercised 
some leeway to develop policies in line with a less restrictive and securitised vision of 
international migration, in regularising Haitian immigrants. Ecuador presents the largest 
gap between especially outspoken, populist social liberal migration rhetoric and policy 
reform. The ideals laid out in Correa’s discourse were mirrored by the 2008 Constitution, 
which stipulates the right to migrate, and the (short-lived) policy of visa freedom of 2008. 
However, visa freedom was reversed with the small increase of flows of migrants from 
Africa and Asia. Also, the continued criminalisation of irregular migration through the 
secondary migration legislation in force since 1971 amounts to significant incoherence 
with these discursive ideals.  
The three countries under analysis, also share important common traits. Apart 
from comparable colonial histories and presidential governmental systems, in all three 
cases, legislative migration frameworks were adopted during the military dictatorships of 
the 1970s and 1980s, which were mainly concerned with population control as embedded 
in the state’s security agenda. Most importantly, they share comparable “immigration 
pressures”: they are among the countries in the region that have experienced the largest 
immigration and/or asylum flows in past decades ((IOM), 2010). These flows are mainly 
composed of citizens from other South American countries.. At the same time, all three 
countries have recently experienced increasing irregular south–south immigration and 
refugee inflows from Africa, Asia and the Caribbean (Freier, 2013c). Despite these recent 
movements, the foreign born populations in the case countries do not represent a large 
percentage of the total population. Last but not least, these countries experienced 
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considerable emigration waves since the 1980s and 1990s, which were accentuated during 
the first years of the 21st century (IOM, 2010b). 
Although Ecuador presents the largest discursive gap, the Correa administration 
passed significant policy liberalisation on the constitutional level and in the realm of its 
tourist visa policy. Based on these findings, papers Two and Three analyse Ecuador as an 
extreme case of (discursive) policy liberalisation and policy gaps. The extreme case has 
been selected because of its severe or unusual value on the independent (X) or dependent 
(Y) variable of interest. At first glance, this method seems to violate the principle of not 
selecting on the dependent variable (King et al., 1994, Brady and Collier, 2004). However, 
the extreme case does not claim to represent a population, but rather is a purely 
exploratory method, in an open-ended fashion, which “often serves as an entrée into a 
subject, a subject which is subsequently interrogates with more determinate (less open-
ended) methods (Seawright 2008 p. 302). Paper Two addresses the impact of policy 
liberalisation on south-south immigration from outside the region. It takes advantage of 
the quasi-experiment of Ecuador’s extreme policy of universal visa freedom, i.e. the open 
borders of 2008 to test the impact of the opening of borders of a South American country 
on previously restricted countries in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean and shows that 
immigration from these regions more than doubled. Paper Three addresses the question 
in how far racism and perceived security threats of domestic and international political 
actors constrain immigration policy liberalisation in Ecuador in the context of these new 
extra-continental inflows. The paper analyses the partial reversal of Ecuador’s extreme 
policy of open doors, i.e. the annulment of all tourist visa requirements in 2008, for ten 
African and Asian countries by 2010.  
 
 
Research Methods 
 
This thesis adopts a mixed-methods approach of different qualitative and quantitative 
methods. “Critical methodological pluralism”, as promoted by critical realism, 
understands the differences between quantitative and qualitative methods not as 
ontological and epistemological but as related to different characteristics and dimensions 
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of research objects (e.g. whether there are measurable or non-measurable). Quantitative 
methods are not indispensable because they are the right or more ‘scientific’ way to trace 
causal relationships but because certain aspects of social phenomena are measurable and 
ought to be measured to enhance our understanding of social reality. They show more or 
less stable empirical patterns within specific time and space boundaries, and invite the 
social researcher to “go deeper” and elucidate specific causal factors. Theoretically 
informed, qualitative-intensive research is necessary to throw light on internal social 
relations and their interaction with other contextual or contingent factors and to uncover 
causal mechanism of which quantitative methods are oblivious (Iosifides, 2011). 
The methods used in this thesis include qualitative legal analysis, process tracing, 
and a difference-in-difference design. Given their respective focus on universality and 
specificity, there is reason to believe that quantitative and qualitative approaches together 
heighten the possibilities for causal inference (Brady and Collier, 2004, Iosifides, 2011). In 
Paper Two, combining mixed methods into a single study allows us to capitalise on the 
complementarity of both methods – large-sample quantitative data to establish the 
overall effects, e.g. of policy on migration flows, and in-depth qualitative data to reveal the 
mechanisms underlying those effects (Lieberman, 2005). 
The main method applied in the thesis is process tracing based on original 
interview data with politicians, NGO and IO representatives and migrants, media coverage 
of relevant events and speeches, and existing secondary sources. Process tracing allows 
the researcher to establish qualitatively the “causal chain and causal mechanisms” 
between independent variable[s] and the outcome of the dependent variable (George and 
Bennett 2005, 6). The method invites us to use a range of qualitative sources gained 
through secondary academic material, archival and government documents, as well as 
interviews to formulate and test hypotheses (Gerring, 2004, George and Bennett, 2005). 
Process tracing can further potentially address problems of endogeneity and confounding 
variables when outcomes of interest share dynamic, as opposed to static, relationships 
(Hollifield and Wong, 2013a). In the spirit of critical realism, the analysis of interviews took 
into consideration both the interpretation, meanings and perspectives of the interviewees, 
juxtaposing these with additional non-discursive evidence.  
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Paper One and Three focus on the analysis of interviews with politicians, NGO and 
IO representatives, i.e., on elite interviews. An “elite” is a “a group of individuals, who hold, 
or have held, a privileged position in society and, as such, as far as a political scientists is 
concerned, are likely to have had more influence on political outcomes than general 
members of the public” (Richards, 1996 p. 199). This definition of elites clearly includes 
senior bureaucrats, politicians of ministerial ranking and members of Congress and 
Parliament, all of whom were interviewed. However, it presents less of a justification for 
interviewing NGO and IO representatives. Notwithstanding their relative disadvantage 
compared with “conventional” elites, these interviewees had an impact on immigration 
policy-making in the case of Argentina, and to a lesser degree in Ecuador. In both cases, 
they had closely observed the policy-making process of immigration policy liberalisation, 
and in the case of Ecuador, restrictive reactions to extra-continental newcomers, and thus 
acquired specialist knowledge of underlying processes.  
In the selection of elite interviewees I did not aim to gain a representative sample 
of all actors involved in policy liberalisation, but rather tried to select those who had been 
most relevant in the policy-making processes (Tansey, 2007 p. 770).  Preliminary research 
prior to fieldwork and key informants helped identify the first interviewees. This strategy 
was supplemented by a snowballing method based upon recommendations from 
interviewees once fieldwork had begun. This approach was particularly important to 
identify interviewees who had been central in the policy-making process without 
displaying a dominant public profile (ibid.). Paper Three, as discussed below, includes the 
analysis of interview data with new extra-continental immigrants in order to confirm the 
impact of visa freedom on their decision to migrate to Ecuador.  
Paper One explores the paradox between liberal discourses on the universality of 
migrants’ rights and free human mobility, on the one hand, but the rejection of recently 
increasing irregular south–south migration from Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean, on the 
other. It adopts a mixed methodological approach of different qualitative methods to the 
comparative analysis of immigration policies in Argentina, Brazil and Ecuador. It uses 
legal analysis and process tracing to explore the paradox between liberal discourses on the 
universality of migrants’ rights and free human mobility, on the one hand, but the 
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rejection of recently increasing irregular south–south migration from Africa, Asia, and the 
Caribbean, on the other.  
Process tracing largely rests on primary sources such as presidential and 
ministerial discourses and 70 in-depth interviews with politicians, officials and 
representatives of NGOs and IOs in the three case countries and on limited secondary 
sources such as the existing literature on migration policymaking in the case countries. 
The legal analysis traces legislative change regarding migrant regulation and includes 
constitutional changes, federal laws and policy decrees and how these relate to the 
political immigration discourses of each case country. I conducted all interviews in 
Argentina and Ecuador (see Appendix), whereas my co-author conducted the interviews 
in Brazil. The interview process in Argentina and Ecuador followed a list of semi-
structured questions. As these questions differed from interview to interview, individual 
questions are not included in the Appendix to this thesis. The development of these 
questions was itself informed by significant preliminary research based on process tracing 
and legal analysis. The average time was one hour. With the permission of the 
interviewees, all interviews were recorded. Both in the cases where interviews were or 
were not recorded, detailed interview notes were also made. All interviews were 
transcribed to ensure that the full interview content was captured accurately and to 
improve the reliability of analysis. 
Paper Two assesses the impact of policy liberalisation on south-south immigration 
from outside the region. This paper uses mixed quantitative and qualitative methods. 
First, it takes advantage of the quasi-experiment of Ecuador’s extremely liberal policy of 
universal visa freedom of 2008 to test the impact of the opening of borders of a South 
American country on previously restricted countries in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. 
The quasi-experimental study design follows a difference-in-difference design, where the 
trend of monthly entries by citizens of nationalities not affected by the policy change 
provides a counterfactual for estimating the impact of the open access policy on south-
south migration. Complementary qualitative findings and descriptive statistics on 
migrants’ motivations and characteristics fulfil three additional purposes. First, they 
confirm the migratory motivation of south-south entrants. Second, they probe the impact 
 31 
of the perception of increasingly restricted access to economically more attractive 
northern countries on the decision to move to Ecuador. Third, they more broadly help us 
understand not only how many migrants but who was attracted by Ecuador’s visa freedom.  
These qualitative findings are based on field research that was conducted in Quito, 
Ecuador, between May and August 2011 and included interviews with 58 African, Asian 
and Caribbean immigrants. In total, information on approximately 80 immigrants was 
gathered in an accompanying survey. Interviews with immigrants were conducted at 
various sites to ensure a more representative sample of the different migratory situations 
and legal statuses: the Ministry of the Interior; waiting rooms of the provincial 
headquarters of the Immigration Police in Pichincha (Province of Quito); the Directorate 
of Refugees (Dirección General de Refugiados); the Nigerian congregation of La Iglesia 
Remedia Cristiana de Dios in Quito; and the neighbourhoods of La Florida, Santa Clara and 
La Mariscal. Although migrant populations were hard to reach, interviews and surveys 
with migrants avoided snowball sampling (Berg, 2004) and were conducted at various sites 
to ensure a more representative sample of the different migratory situations and legal 
statuses. Given the exploratory nature of the research on migrants’ motivations and 
characteristics, interviewees were selected only on grounds of nationality and also include 
migrants that reached Ecuador before universal visa freedom was implemented in 2008 
(see Appendix, Table 11). Only eleven of these interviews were recorded and transcribed, 
as the majority of immigrants felt uncomfortable with the idea of having their testimonials 
taped. The interview process followed a list of semi- structured questions related to the 
case studies. As these questions differed from interviewee to interviewee, individual 
questions are not included in the Appendix to this thesis. I translated all direct quotes 
used in the paper myself. 
Paper Three addresses the question of how far racism and perceived security 
threats of domestic and international political actors constrain immigration policy 
liberalisation in Ecuador in the context of these new extra-continental inflows. The paper 
relies on process tracing and the analysis of 35 in-depth interviews with politicians, 
government officials and representatives of international organisations and NGOs. The 
literature that shows the (racialised) securitisation of migration focuses on discourse 
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analysis of newspapers, laws, policy documents and official statements by politicians and 
officials (Ibrahim, 2005, Johnson, 2009, Bourbeau, 2011, Hammerstad, 2014). Qualitative 
interviews have the distinct advantage of revealing not only how political agents talk 
about the relationship between immigration policies, (alleged) security concerns and 
racist prejudice, but how they make sense of these discourses and how these 
understandings shape strategies of reconciling discursive policy gaps. Furthermore, 
interviews were especially important to detect covert racist motivations in Ecuador’s 
tourist visa policy, as these constitute “norms and cognitive schemas in policy-making that 
are not often formally articulated” (Cook-Martín and FitzGerald, 2010).  
The empirical research included 35 interviews conducted with 21 Ecuadorian 
politicians and government officials and 14 representatives of international organisations 
and NGOs in Quito, Ecuador, in July and August of 2011 (see Appendix, Table 13). These 
open-ended, semi-structured in-depth interviews lasted between 30 minutes and two 
hours. Officials representing the different ministries and government departments 
involved in immigration policy-making and management included: the Ministry of the 
Exterior (Cancellaría)5; the Ministry of Interior (Ministerio del Interior); the Ministry of 
Justice, Human Rights and Culture (Ministerio de Justicia, Derechos Humanos y Cultos); the 
National Police (Policía Nacional) and its National Migration Directorate (Dirección 
Nacional de Migración, DNM); and the National Secretary of Migrants (Secretaría Nacional 
del Migrante, SENAMI) 6 . Representatives of international organisations and NGOs 
included the UNHCR, IOM, Asylum Access and Jesuit Refugee Service (see Appendix for list 
of all interviews). All of these interviews were recorded and transcribed. Interviews were 
generally open-ended and conversational in style, and the content of interviews depended 
largely on the work and expertise of the interviewee. The interview process followed a list 
of semi- structured questions related to the case studies. As these questions differed from 
interviewee to interviewee, individual questions are not included in the Appendix to this 
thesis. I translated all direct quotes used in the paper myself. 
 
                                                
5 In 2014 the Ministry was renamed Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility (Ministerio de Relaciones 
Exteriores y Movilidad Humana). 
6 SENAMI was integrated into the Foreign Ministry in 2013. 
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KEY DEFINITIONS 
 
The papers of this PhD make use of a number of key terms, which demand previous 
discussion and definition. In particular, the thesis identifies populist liberalism, 
understood as populist social liberal immigration policies, in South America. In order to 
clarify the meaning and relevance of this categorization, the following section discusses 
the concepts liberal immigration policies, liberalism, populist liberalism, populist social 
liberal immigration policies, policy liberalisation and discursive liberalisation.  
 
Liberal Immigration Policy  
 
Most generally speaking, immigration policies are “rules and procedures governing the 
selection, admission, and deportation of foreign citizens” (Brochmann 1999, 9), especially 
of non-nationals intending to remain and/or work in the country. Although many scholars 
differentiate between immigration and integration policies, with the former defining the 
conditions of entry and the latter those of settlement (Meyers, 2000 p. 1246), together they 
shape the legal conditions for migrating to a destination. In this thesis, I apply a broad 
definition of immigration policy and analyse relevant policy regarding both access and 
integration policies as enshrined in domestic legislation, the constitutional level, and 
international regional law.  
What counts as liberal immigration policy has not gone uncontested in the 
literature. Many immigration scholars implicitly understand liberal immigration policies 
as propelling an open stance on immigration and as non-discriminatory in ethnic terms, 
however, more often than not, without providing a definition of the terms “liberal” or 
“liberalism” themselves. For example, Kim declares that “political liberals” generally 
embrace policies that reduce both citizenship- and ethnicity-based discrimination 
because the principles of “political liberalism” advocate that all human beings be treated 
as equally as possible, without reference to race, gender, national origin, or religion. Kim 
equates “liberal” approach to immigration with adjectives such as “civic” and “inclusive,” 
while she calls differential treatment based on ethnicity as “ethnocentric,” “nationalistic,” 
and “exclusive” (Kim, 2008 p. 577), without offering a definition of liberalism itself. 
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There is more consensus on liberal immigration policies being non-discriminatory 
than on them promoting free movement of people. Indeed, exactly what liberalism in 
immigration policies entails is unclear. Hollifield distinguishes between “economic” and 
“political” liberalism in Western liberal democracy, which he sees as pushing immigration 
policies in opposite directions (Hollifield,1992, 2004). He theorizes that “political liberals” 
actually support restrictive immigration policies, while “economic liberals” support open 
immigration policies to increase the supply of cheap labour (Hollifield, 1992, 2004). He 
further theorizes that regarding integration of immigrants already present in a liberal 
state, “political liberals” would support policies that ensure more rights for immigrants 
(inclusive), while “economic liberals” would support policies that involve less regulation 
on how immigrants are treated. Building on John Ruggie’s “embedded liberalism”, 
Hollifield further argues that domestic, “rights-based liberalism” has undermined effective 
immigration controls in Western states (1992). This led Hollifield to identify a much cited 
“liberal paradox” (Hollifield, 1992, Hollifield, 2004). 
 
Since the end of World War II, international economic forces (trade, investment, and migration) 
have been pushing states towards greater openness, while the international state system and 
powerful (domestic) political forces push states towards greater closure. This is a liberal paradox 
because it highlights some of the contradictions inherent in liberalism, which is the 
quintessentially modern political and economic philosophy and a defining feature of globalization. 
(2004 p 886) 
 
Hollifield mentions two “liberal principles”, free trade and respect for fundamental human 
rights, but without discussing the nuances and decisive differences between different 
strands of political liberalism and clearly differentiating between liberalism as a political 
ideology and liberal democracy as a political system. Joppke argues the “liberalness of 
liberal states” leads states to accept “unwanted migration”, mentioning “legal and moral 
constraints” without defining “liberalness” and differentiating between ideology and 
democratic state organization. The lack of clarity on whether liberalism or liberalness 
refers to the governmental system of Western liberal democracies or to liberal ideology 
has led to misunderstandings in the debate on the affinities between racism and 
liberalism, and liberal democracy (Cook-Martín and FitzGerald, 2015, Joppke, 2015). 
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One philosophically grounded liberal proponent of open borders is Joseph Carens, 
who departs from Rawls’ work to support his argument for unrestricted borders. Carens 
applies the concept of the original position and the veil of ignorance that Rawls developed 
in the context of societies within nation-states to question what justice in the 
management of international migration entails (Carens, 1987). Reviving the notion of a 
social contract, Rawls argues that justice consists of the basic principles of government 
that free and rational individuals would agree to in a hypothetical situation of perfect 
equality. The original position and the veil of ignorance stipulate the theoretical situation 
in which a group of individuals, ignorant of their own position and opportunities in 
society and life, would develop the rules of social life. Given their ignorance about their 
own social, economic, and historical circumstances would make them agree on equal 
rights and opportunities (Rawls, 1971). Although Rawls himself assumed a closed society 
for the purposes of his theory, Carens argues that it is equally useful for thinking about 
justice in international migration management. He argues that in the international 
system, one’s birthplace has a great impact on one’s opportunities in life. From behind the 
veil of ignorance we would thus all opt for open borders and free movement (Carens, 
1987). 
Although Caren’s argument is theoretically sound, he claims that his 
argumentation goes back to liberalism without defining the concept and addressing the 
fact that there is substantial disagreement amongst liberals about how open liberal 
immigration policies should be (Meilaender, 1999). Indeed, understanding liberalism in 
immigration policy as an open and non-discriminatory stance towards migration has not 
remained uncontested. Hafner argues that liberal theories can support both free and 
restricted migration, depending on whether liberalism is understood as an ideology 
providing principles for domestic policy or as a universal standing (Hafner, 2016). He refers 
to John Isbister who argues against Carens, claiming that there are liberal arguments for 
border controls such as the responsibility of a country to meet the needs of its own 
disadvantaged citizens before the needs of disadvantaged foreigners, and the threat 
unlimited immigration poses to the most disadvantaged residents of receiving countries 
(Isbister 2000, 632-634).  
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Revisiting Liberalism 
 
The confusion about what constitutes liberal immigration policy goes back to the lack of 
conceptual clarity about what exactly constitutes liberalism as political ideology. It is thus 
essential to take a closer look at the range of liberal ideology. There are many varieties of 
liberal thinking that have developed over time, and often in parallel (Freeden and Stears, 
2013). Freeden and Stears (2013) argue for conceptualizing political ideology as a 
framework composed of a number of political concepts, which vary in importance and 
whose meaning is contested within the ideology. According to this approach, liberalism 
should thus be understood as an umbrella concept that covers many and often 
significantly diverging ideas, for example regarding the desirable size of government. 
According to van de Haar (2009) it is possible to capture liberalism as a political ideology 
which rests on four main characteristics, being:  
 
• individualist, in that it asserts the moral primacy of the person against the 
claims of any social collective 
• egalitarian, in as much as it confers on all men the same moral status and 
denies the relevance to legal or political order of differences in moral worth 
among human beings 
• universalist, affirming the moral unity of the human species and according a 
secondary importance to specific historic associations and cultural forms 
• meliorist, in its affirmation of the corrigibility and improvability of all social 
institutions and political arrangements (van de Haar, 2009 pp 1) 
 
 
Drawing on Freeden, van de Haar distinguishes between core, adjacent and peripheral 
concepts, which together make a unique set of political ideas, such as the larger liberal 
family (van de Haar, 2015). While some of the individual concepts overlap, there is 
significant variation between the frameworks. Van de Haar argues that the most 
important ideological divides in liberalism lie between classical liberalism, social 
liberalism and libertarianism and develops a liberal ideological framework, or liberalism’s 
morphology of core concepts. Classical liberalism originated from the eighteenth century 
Scottish Enlightenment, especially in the writings of David Hume and Adam Smith. It is 
also associated with thinkers such as Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman 
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and James Buchanan. Social liberal thought originates in the writings of John Stuart Mill 
and social liberals are liberals in the contemporary American sense. Since the 1970s John 
Rawls has been the major sources of intellectual inspiration for social liberals. Like social 
liberalism, libertarianism originates from the nineteenth century, for example in the 
writings of Lysander Spooner, Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner (ibid.). 
The concept of liberty is central to all three liberal variants, but as reflected in 
Isaiah Berlin’s famous divide between positive and negative liberty, the concept has 
different meanings. Negative liberty can be defined as “the freedom from interference by 
others,” whereas positive liberty as “the freedom to fully enjoy one’s rights and liberties” 
(Berlin, 1958). Classical liberalism and libertarianism rest on a negative conception, 
whereas social liberalism rests on the positive meaning of liberty, which usually demands 
more government intervention. Libertarians criticize classical liberals for allowing the 
state to grow too large and believe that the strict protection of individual natural rights to 
life, liberty, and property ensures a just society. For many libertarians, there is no such 
thing as a stable nation state, as secession is a rightful way for people to form new political 
entities (van de Haar, 2015).  
 
Table 1: De Haar’s “Morphology of Liberalism” 
  Classical 
Liberalism 
Social 
Liberalism 
Libertarianism 
Core 
concepts 
Negative freedom, realistic view 
of human nature, spontaneous 
order, limited state 
Positive freedom, positive 
view of human nature, social 
justice as self-development, 
extended state 
Negative freedom, realistic view 
of human nature, spontaneous 
order, natural law including strict 
defense of property rights 
Adjacent concepts Natural law, rule of 
law/constitutionalism 
Modern human rights, rule 
of law and neutral state, 
social contract (Mill: 
utilitarianism) 
Minarchism: minimal state, rule 
of law 
Peripheral concepts Social justice, strict defense of 
property rights, democracy, 
utilitarianism 
Property rights, spontaneous 
order 
Social justice 
Source: Edwin van de Haar, 2015 
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Social liberals reject libertarian and classical liberal ideas because they allow a 
world full of social injustice. In the pursuit of social justice and in order to ensure equality 
of opportunities, social liberals ascribe a larger role to government to redistribute income 
to ensure widely-accessible education and a welfare system that takes care of the more 
vulnerable members of society. Social liberals believe in universal human rights that 
individuals do not leave at home when they cross borders. They also believe in the 
importance of international organizations and in the utopia of world peace based on their 
positive conception of human nature. The concept of modern human rights law thus 
figures most prominently in social liberalism (ibid.). Van de Haar (2015) further lists the 
main ideological viewpoints on matters of international relations.  
 
Table 2: Liberalism and International Relations 
 Classical Liberalism Social Liberalism Libertarianism 
Nation as limit of individual sympathy Yes No No 
State as prime actor in world politics Yes No No 
International governmental 
institutions/regimes 
No Yes No 
Can war be eliminated? No Yes Yes 
Does trade foster peace? No Yes Yes 
Source: Edwin van de Haar, 2015 
The different weighting of core, adjacent and peripheral concepts and different 
viewpoints on international relations hold important implications on how the different 
strands of liberalism view migration policy. Individual freedom is the main classical liberal 
and libertarian goal and is seen as best preserved by protecting classical human rights, the 
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rule of law, and reliance on spontaneous ordering processes in society, such as the free 
market (van de Haar, 2015). It thus seems to follow that free human mobility serves the 
ideal of individual freedom for both classical liberals and libertarians. Libertarians indeed 
believe that governments may not forbid citizens from leaving a country, nor may 
governments forbid foreigners from entering, except in special circumstance, usually 
regarding the safety or protection of property rights of the receiving society (Brennan, 
2012). Classical liberalism, however, sees the nation as the “outer limit” of meaningful 
human sympathy  (van de Haar, 2015). Thus, Ibister’s argument that restricting migration 
can be called liberal is consistent with classical liberalism. Social liberalism and 
libertarianism on the other hand promote free human mobility, albeit based on different 
ideological premises and with different ideas of what state involvement in managing 
migration should entail. Social liberals are likely to promote a right to migrate within the 
international states system and see governments as obliged to safeguard the (human) 
rights of migrants, whereas libertarians’ belief in free human mobility is linked to their 
disregard for nation states and government intervention.  
 
Populist Liberalism versus Populist Social Liberal Policies 
 
This thesis identifies populist social liberal policies in South American immigration 
policies, understood as policies that are ideologically routed in social liberalism and at the 
same time make use of populist discourses. Paper One, published in International 
Migration Review in 2015, uses the term “populist liberalism” to describe such populist 
social liberal policies. My conceptualization of the term needs to be clearly delimited from 
Leaman’s (1999) discussion of “populist liberalism” in South America, which he defines as 
a project of “economic liberalism” (entailing deregularisation, privatisation, price 
liberalisation, and labour marginalisation) that aimed to bring about a transformation of 
the Argentine statist-protectionist political economy under Menem. As its main 
characteristics he lists a multi-class populist support base and a charismatic and hyper-
presidential leader. Leaman further simultaneously defines populist liberalism as an elite-
constructed discourse and a new ideology, which “emphasize[s] leadership more than 
institutions, glorifie[s] grand transformation rather than incremental change, stresse[s] 
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economic efficacy more than political representation and participation, and elevate[s] 
liberty over equality and solidarity” (Leaman, 1999). Rather than a new ideology, Leaman 
describes affinities between neo-populism and neoliberalism which other have identified 
as common in Latin America (Weyland, 2003).  
Given the variances of liberal political ideology discussed above, the term 
“populist liberalism” lacks conceptual clarity. Although I used the term in Paper One, 
moving forward I will rather refer to populist social liberal policies. Also, rather than 
evoking “populist social liberalism” as an ideology, I understand populist social liberal 
policies as using populist discourses and ideologically drawing on social liberalism. Here, I 
follow Aslanidis (2016) who promotes the concept of “populist frames” as “the systematic 
dissemination of a frame that diagnoses reality as problematic because ‘corrupt elites’ 
have unjustly usurped the sovereign authority of the ‘noble People’ and maintains that the 
solution to the problem resides in the righteous political mobilization of the latter in order 
to regain power” (Aslanidis, 2016 p. 99). As will be further discussed in the conclusion, the 
conceptualization of populism as discursive framing avoids the inconsistency of the 
ideological definition as promoted by Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013), and at the 
same time includes the strategic implications that many authors have discerned in 
populist politics (Aslanidis, 2016).  
 
Policy Liberalisation 
 
In this thesis I understand policy liberalisation in migrant management as all relevant 
policy changes towards social liberal policies, i.e. more openness, increasing migrants’ 
rights and promoting increased free mobility. These changes can occur on the 
constitutional level, in domestic immigration legislation, and in the areas of visa and 
regularisation policies. With discursive liberalisation I refer to the qualitative change in 
political discourses, which, in South America, have shifted from securitized associations of 
immigration to the proclamation of universally welcoming all immigrants, irrespective of 
their origin and migratory status. 
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A LOOK AT WHAT FOLLOWS 
 
Paper One “Turning the Immigration Policy Paradox Upside Down? Populist Liberal Policies 
and Discursive Gaps in South America” explores the paradox between liberal discourses on 
the universality of migrants’ rights and free human mobility, on the one hand, but the 
rejection of recently increasing irregular south–south migration from Africa, Asia, and the 
Caribbean, on the other. The paper applies a mixed methodological approach of legal 
analysis and process tracing to explore the extent to which recent immigration policies in 
South America constitute a liberal turn, or rather a reverse immigration policy paradox of 
officially welcoming but covertly rejecting irregular migrants. Based on the comparative 
analysis of Argentina, Brazil and Ecuador, the study identifies populist social liberal 
immigration policies in South America.  
Paper Two “The Importance of Access Policies in South-South Migration: Ecuador's 
Policy of Open Doors as a Quasi-Experiment” addresses the impact of policy liberalisation 
on south-south immigration from outside the region. The paper argues that the interplay 
of short-stay visas of northern and southern countries is a key determinant of 
intercontinental south-south migration. It takes advantage of the quasi-experiment of 
Ecuador’s extremely liberal policy of universal visa freedom of 2008 to test the impact of 
the opening of borders of a South American country on previously restricted countries in 
Asia, Africa and the Caribbean and shows that immigration from these regions more than 
doubled. Complementary descriptive statistics and qualitative findings furthermore 
confirm the importance of visa freedom in the context of the perception of increasing 
policy closure of preferred northern destinations and highlight great variance in the 
characteristics and agency of intercontinental migrants who were attracted by Ecuador’s 
policy of open doors. 
Paper Three “Open Doors (for almost all): Ecuador’s Tourist Visa Policy between 
Populist Social Liberalism and Racialised Security Concerns” addresses the question of how 
far racism and perceived security threats of domestic and international political actors 
constrain immigration policy liberalisation in Ecuador in the context of these new extra-
continental inflows. The paper analyses the partial reversal of Ecuador’s extreme policy of 
open doors, i.e. the annulment of all tourist visa requirements in 2008, for ten African and 
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Asian countries by 2010. The government justified this partial policy reversal as security 
policy in reaction to an increase in south-south flows from new extra-continental origins. 
Qualitative research reveals that alleged security concerns were closely intertwined with 
ethnic prejudice of domestic and international political actors. The Conclusions 
summarise the empirical contributions of the thesis, as well as the theoretical and 
normative implications of the study’s results, and presents some ideas for future research.  
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1 
TURNING THE IMMIGRATION POLICY PARADOX UPSIDE DOWN?                           
POPULIST LIBERALISM AND DISCURSIVE GAPS IN SOUTH AMERICA 
 
A paradox of officially rejecting but covertly accepting irregular migrants7 has long been 
identified in the immigration policies of Western immigrant receiving states. In South 
America, however, a liberal discourse of universally welcoming all immigrants, 
irrespective of their origin and migratory status, has replaced the formally restrictive, 
securitised and often ethnically selective immigration rhetoric. This discursive 
liberalisation has found partial translation into immigration laws and policies, but 
contrary to the universality of rights claimed in their discourses, governments reject 
recently increasing irregular south–south migration from Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean 
to varying degrees. This paper applies a mixed methodological approach of legal analysis 
and process tracing to explore in how far recent immigration policies in South America 
constitute a liberal turn, or rather a reverse immigration policy paradox of officially 
welcoming but covertly rejecting irregular migrants. Based on the comparative analysis of 
Argentina, Brazil and Ecuador, this study identifies South American “populist liberalism” 
in the sphere of migration, and discusses its implications for migration theory. 
 
 
 
                                                
7 Irregular Migration “is movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and 
receiving countries… From the perspective of destination countries it is entry, stay or work in a country 
without the necessary authorisation or documents required under immigration regulations. From the 
perspective of the sending country, the irregularity is for example seen in cases in which a person crosses an 
international boundary without a valid passport or travel document or does not fulfil the administrative 
requirements for leaving the country”, IOM 2011. Glossary on Migration. International Migration Law Series, 
25. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The literature on immigration policies has long identified a substantial policy gap, or 
paradox, of “accepting unwanted migration” (Joppke, 1998b, de Almeida, 2009)  among 
Western immigrant receiving states. Since the 1980s, Western governments have 
embarked on increasingly restrictive immigration discourses, especially rejecting irregular 
immigration, while at the same time accepting the entry and residence of substantial 
numbers of migrants who remain in their territory without authorisation (Freeman, 1994, 
Guiraudon and Joppke, 2001, Durand and Massey, 2003, Cornelius et al., 1994, Czaika and 
de Haas, 2013).  
At first sight, South American countries seem to represent a unique phenomenon 
of a reverse paradox. During the past 15 years, the governmental immigration discourses – 
that is, the “text and talk of professional politicians or political institutions, such as 
presidents... and other members of government, parliament or political parties, both at the 
local, national and international levels” (Van Dijk, 1997 p.12)8 in the region – have become 
increasingly liberal, with a clear emphasis on migrants’ rights and the promotion of 
universal human mobility (Mármora, 2010, Ceriani Cernadas, 2011). In contrast to Europe 
and the US, where governmental discourses clearly distinguish between desired “legal” 
and undesired “illegal” immigration, South American politicians and civil servants stress 
the universality of migrants’ rights that apply to all migrants, regardless of their national 
origin and legal status. At the same time, however, South American countries are 
concerned with recent, albeit very small, increases in so-called “extra-continental 
immigration” from countries in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean, and seek to impede these 
inflows to varying degrees (Freier, 2013c). Does the liberalisation of governmental 
immigration discourses amount to the reverse immigration policy paradox of officially 
welcoming all immigrants but rejecting certain nationalities in practice? Or has there in 
                                                
8 In political science, discourse is seen as a form of political action. “Indeed, most political actions (such as 
passing laws, decision making, meeting, campaigning, etc.) are largely discursive. Thus, besides 
parliamentary debates, bills, laws, government or ministerial regulations, and other institutional forms of 
text and talk, we find such political discourse genres as propaganda, political advertising, political speeches, 
media interviews, political talk shows on TV, party programs, ballots, and so on”, see VAN DIJK, T. A. 1997. 
What is Political Discourse Analysis? Beglian Journal of Linguistics, 11, 11-52., p.18. 
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fact been a liberal turn in South American immigration policy-making?  
An analysis of Argentina, Brazil, and Ecuador shows that legislative and policy 
reforms somewhat mirror the liberalised immigration discourses of governments, as 
showcased in the unprecedented incorporation of the “right to migrate” in Argentinean 
and Ecuadorian legislation – Ecuador’s path-breaking policy of visa-free access and 
Argentina’s new approach to the regularisation of irregular migrants. Nevertheless, also 
detectable are substantial gaps between liberal discourses and their translation into laws 
and policies. Recent reactions to increasing extra-continental south-south migration fall 
especially far from governmental rhetoric. The finding that these three countries do not 
actually fully implement the perhaps elusive universal right to migrate, that is, the de facto 
opening of borders through universal visa-free travel coupled with regularisation 
mechanisms, is perhaps not so surprising. The tensions between the unprecedented 
liberalisation of South American governmental immigration discourses, but varying 
degrees of legislative and policy reform, and a possible reverse immigration policy paradox 
in the field of irregular immigration are nevertheless worthy of exploration.  
The paper makes three important contributions. First, it advances the debate on 
immigration policy paradoxes and policy gaps by showing the reverse scenario from what 
has been considered “a standard outcome” across Europe (Geddes, 2008 p. 350), that is, 
that governmental immigration discourses are more restrictive than immigration policies. 
Second, it progresses theories addressing the determinants of immigration policies by 
exposing shortcomings and suggesting necessary amendments for their applicability to 
predominantly migrant sending countries. Third, on an empirical level, the study 
improves knowledge of immigration policy-making and legislation in South America, a 
region that has undergone notable change in the past decade and takes a pioneering role 
in liberal immigration reforms, but remains surprisingly understudied.  
Identifying developments in immigration policy-making outside Western liberal 
democracies has substantial value for the purpose of theory building. It is essential to test 
the applicability of theories so far developed for Western liberal democracies, especially 
when considering the geographical bias of migration literature. Mirroring the general 
focus of migration studies on south-north flows, the literature on immigration policies has 
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concentrated on Western immigrant receiving states, specifically the US, France, Germany, 
and the United Kingdom (Bonjour, 2011). Given the fact that more than 40 per cent of all 
international migration is made up by south–south flows, the neglect of immigration 
policies beyond Western liberal democracies is a significant omission.  
This paper’s first section discusses the relevant literature on immigration policy 
paradoxes and policy gaps. The second part introduces the case countries – Argentina, 
Brazil and Ecuador, and the paper’s methodological approach. The third section analyses 
the liberalisation of governmental immigration discourses in the case countries. Section 
four explored to what extent these discourses have translated into legislative and policy 
change. Section five tests the consistency between the liberalisation of immigration 
discourses and policies based on state reactions to recent extra-continental south–south 
immigration. The final section concludes with implications for immigration policy theory 
and avenues for future research.  
 
IMMIGRATION POLICY PARADOXES 
 
The debate on immigration policy paradoxes has developed over the last 20 years 
(Hollifield, 1992, Cornelius et al., 1994, Joppke, 1998b, Castles, 2004, Boswell, 2007, 
Hollifield and Wong, 2013b) and offers three significantly different definitions. Hollifield 
(1992) first identified a “liberal paradox” in immigration policies based on international 
economic forces pushing states towards openness, while the international state system 
and domestic political forces push towards greater policy closure. Cornelius, Martin, and 
Hollifield (1994) and Castles (2004), on the other hand, conceive the immigration paradox 
as the failure of states to effectively control immigration. A third group of authors 
understands the immigration paradox as the gap between what politicians say and do 
(Joppke, 1998b, Boswell, 2007). 
Hollifield’s theory of a “liberal paradox” in immigration policies builds on political 
economy, whereas Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield, Castles, Joppke, and Boswell are 
concerned with the policy-making process and its impact on immigration flows. 
Substantial confusion about different types of policy gaps underlies the controversial 
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debate about what constitutes the immigration policy paradox. For the sake of conceptual 
clarity, it is crucial to distinguish between three types of gaps. (1) “Discursive gaps” 
describe the discrepancy between the objectives stated in official discourses and policy 
outputs, or legislation and policies on paper; (2) “implementation gaps” measure the 
disparity between official legislation and policies and their implementation; and (3) 
“efficacy gaps” describe the extent to which policies actually determine policy outcomes, 
such as migration flows (Czaika and de Haas, 2013 p. 494).  
Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield’s (1994) and Castles’ (2004) prominent 
conception of the immigration policy paradox as a “control gap” thus describes an 
“efficacy gap”. Although influential, their argument has been weakened by resting on the 
truism of discrepancies between any policy goal and policy outcomes (Bonjour, 2011). The 
main problem with efficacy gaps theories is that they equate political discourses with 
policies, and compare what politicians say about their policy goals to policy outcomes 
(immigration rates), “without taking into account the political processes and hidden 
agendas that lead to various discursive and implementation gaps along the way” (see 
Geddes, 2008 p. 350). It is vital to distinguish among governmental or policy discourses, 
policy outputs (legislation and policies) and policy outcomes (immigration rates) because 
each constitute a different phase of the immigration policy cycle.  
The most significant immigration policy paradox thus far described by the 
literature is the discursive gap between restrictive political rhetoric and relatively liberal 
immigration laws and policies in Western liberal immigrant receiving states (Boswell, 
2007, Bonjour, 2011). Instead of asking “why immigration policies fail” (Castles, 2004), other 
authors have asked “why liberal states accept unwanted migration” (Joppke, 1998b). The 
startling gap does not lie between restrictive political discourses and persisting 
immigration, which is erroneously interpreted as the ineffectiveness of restrictive 
immigration policies, but rather in the difference between restrictive discourses and 
relatively permissive policies and laws.  
In the case of Europe, such a discursive gap in dealing with irregular immigration 
is widely acknowledged (Cornelius et al., 1994, Freeman, 1995, Joppke, 1998b). Mirroring 
anti-immigration public opinion (Freeman, 1995), governments throughout Europe have 
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embarked on restrictive and securitised discourses of rejecting irregular immigration since 
the 1980s (Huysmans, 2000, Cholewinski, 2007). This restrictive rhetoric has been 
widespread both at national level (Boswell, 2008, Geddes, 2008) and at EU (EU) level 
(Baldwin‐Edwards and Kraler, 2009 p. 103-106). Although such restrictiveness is mirrored 
in the adoption of several measures that criminalise irregular migration, i.e. through more 
stringent border controls, carrier sanctions or expulsion (Cholewinski, 2007), European 
governments at the same time implement large-scale regularisations.9  
This paper explores how far the reverse paradox exits in South America. Despite 
the fact that survey evidence suggests similarly or even more protectionist public 
opinion, 10  governmental immigration discourses in South America have become 
exceptionally liberal. To answer the question whether a liberal turn took place in South 
America in both immigration discourses and policies, or whether the region presents the 
reverse paradox of officially welcoming all immigrants but rejecting certain nationalities 
in practice, this paper analyses discursive gaps in the immigration policy-making of the 
three case countries. Implementation and efficacy gaps are not the primary focus in the 
present analysis. Although it is often argued that the actual implementation of policies is 
more important than their promulgation, policy implementation is extremely difficult to 
measure. Therefore, official policies and laws are often used as a proxy for implemented 
policy (Czaika and de Haas, 2013).  
To analyse any gaps between immigration discourses and policies, we must first 
define immigration policies. On the most basic level, they are “rules and procedures 
governing the selection, admission, and deportation of foreign citizens” (Brochmann, 
1999) into a state’s territory, especially of non-nationals intending to remain and/or work 
in the country. Although many scholars differentiate between immigration and 
integration policies (Meyers, 2000), there is significant overlap. For example, liberal 
                                                
9 For example, more than five million third-country nationals in the EU were regularised between 1996 and 
2007, see BALDWIN‐EDWARDS, M. & KRALER, A. 2009. Study on Practices in the Area of Regularisation of 
Illegally Staying Third-Country Nationals in the Member States of the EU. Vienna: ICMPD., pp.31-36. 
10 The comparison of survey data from the European Social Survey (2002–2003) and Latinobarometro (2002) 
shows that at the time when immigration discourses started to change in South America, South American 
respondents were more concerned about losing their jobs to immigrants than Europeans.  
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integration policies, such as regularisation programs, may attract immigrants and 
compensate for restrictive access regulations. In this paper, we thus apply a broad 
definition of immigration policy and, without applying a set benchmark for policy 
liberalisation, compare relevant policy changes on the constitutional level, in domestic 
immigration legislation, and in the areas of visa and regularisation policies, to the political 
immigration discourses of each case country.  
 
IDENTIFYING A REVERSE IMMIGRATION POLICY PARADOX IN SOUTH AMERICA 
 
This paper applies a mixed methodological approach of legal analysis and process tracing 
(King et al., 1994, Mahoney, 2012). It is based on 70 interviews with government officials 
and local experts working in academia, think tanks and NGOs (see Appendix, Table 9), as 
well as the evaluation of official documents, academic sources and reports of international 
organisations. The analysis distinguishes between governmental discourses (oral and 
written) and official laws and policies. The discussion of discourses is based on the 
evaluation of official documents, government declarations and interviews.  
We then analyse a selection of legislative reforms and policies that have occurred 
in the three countries, including ratifications of international conventions and agreements, 
reforms at the constitutional level, immigration laws, implementing regulations and 
decrees, and regularisation programs. Given the difficulty to detect overall trends toward 
restrictiveness and liberalism in immigration policies (Czaika and de Haas, 2013), it is 
essential to identify regional developments and policy gaps in specific immigration policy 
areas. We thus focus on policies that manage irregular immigration and further test the 
consistency.  
The three countries under analysis, Argentina, Brazil, and Ecuador, share certain 
common traits. First, they are among the countries in the region that have experienced the 
largest immigration and/or asylum flows in past decades (IOM, 2010b). These flows are 
mainly composed of citizens from other South American countries, and have led to the 
adoption of regional migration initiatives at the level of the Andean Community, Mercado 
Común del Sur or Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), and most recently Union of 
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South American Nations (UNASUR). At the same time, all three countries have recently 
experienced increasing irregular south–south immigration and asylum inflows from Africa, 
Asia and the Caribbean (Freier, 2013a). Despite these recent movements, the foreign-born 
populations in the case countries do not represent a large percentage of the total 
population.11 Second, these countries experienced considerable emigration waves since 
the 1980s and 1990s, which peaked during the first years of the 21st century (OAS, 2011). 
Finally, in all three cases, legislative migration frameworks were adopted during the 
military dictatorships of the 1970s and 1980s, which were mainly concerned with 
population control as embedded in the state’s security agenda.  
Despite these similarities, Argentina, Brazil and Ecuador also represent distinct 
cases of policy liberalisation. Whereas Argentina has implemented the most 
comprehensive and progressive immigration reform, Brazil and Ecuador have taken more 
hesitant or contradictory steps to modernise their legislative frameworks, presenting 
larger gaps between their discourses, on the one hand side, and laws and policy on the 
other. We will emphasise the Argentinean case in the paper as it is the only of the three 
countries to adopt a comprehensive new immigration law since 2004. Furthermore, 
Argentinean immigration reform is known to have influenced developments in 
immigration policymaking at a regional level (Ceriani Cernadas and Morales, 2011, 
Margheritis, 2011).  
 
A DISCURSIVE PARADIGM SHIFT 
 
In contrast to the increasingly tough immigration discourses in many Western liberal 
democracies since the 1980s, in which governments promise to crack down on irregular 
immigration (Huysmans, 2000, Bigo, 2002), the reverse development has taken place in 
                                                
11 According to the 2010 Census, there were 1,805,957 foreign-born nationals in Argentina representing 4.5 per 
cent. In Ecuador there were 181,848 or 1.2 per cent of the total population, see CERIANI CERNADAS, P. & 
MORALES, D. 2011. Argentina: Avances y Asignaturas Pendientes en la Consolidación de una Política 
Migratoria Basada en Los Derechos Humanos. In: BERNARD, A. (ed.). Buenos Aires Centro de Estudios 
Legales y Sociales. In Brazil there were around 1.5 million or 0.8 per cent in 2010, see IOM 2012. Perfil 
Migratorio Ecuador. Geneva: International Organization for Migration (IOM). 
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South America. In the 1970s and 1980s, South American military dictatorships tried to limit 
population movements as a means of political control with complete disregard for 
migrants’ rights (Schindel, 2006, Durand and Massey, 2010). Although the last military 
dictatorships in the Southern Cone subsided in the 1990s, the official immigration 
discourses remained securitised, restrictive and often openly racist (Oteiza and Novick et 
al., 2001, Albarracin, 2003, Domenech, 2009, Ceriani Cernadas, 2011, Bastia and vom Hau, 
2013).  
In the past 15 years, however, a liberal tide has swept across South American 
immigration discourses, with an unprecedented focus on migrants’ human rights 
(Mármora, 2010, Ceriani Cernadas, 2011). This discursive paradigm shift is also apparent in 
various regional documents such as the declarations of the consultative process South 
American Conference on Migration (SACM), which reflect a “consensus against the 
criminalisation of (undocumented) migrants” (Hansen, 2010 p. 26). In fact, it may be 
argued that South America, through the declarations of both the SACM and national 
governments, is the region with the most progressive discourse worldwide in terms of the 
recognition of universal migrants’ rights, including those in an irregular situation.  
In Argentina, a more liberal discourse took shape after Néstor Kirchner won the 
presidential election in 2003. Having himself been a persecuted victim of the last 
dictatorship, he left no doubt that human rights, including migrants’ rights, were central 
to the agenda of his new government (Nicolao, 2008, Maurino, 2009). This discursive shift 
must be understood against the backdrop of the increasing cooperation between 
historically strong civil society organisations, for whom migration reform had long been a 
priority issue, and the first Kirchner administration (Bonner, 2005, Ceriani Cernadas and 
Morales, 2011). Kirchner won the 2003 presidential election with only 22 per cent of the 
vote after his opponent Carlos Menem declined to run for the required second round. 
Kirchner was in need of political allies and embarked on a human rights discourse, 
thereby seeking the support of the civil society.  
In addition, the massive increase in emigration after the 2001 financial collapse12 
led the government’s commitment to reforming their immigration policy in order to set an 
                                                
12 More than 200,000 Argentineans left the country in the period 2000–2003, see p. 211 and 252 IOM 2010a. 
Perfil Migratorio Brasil. Geneva: International Organization for Migration (IOM). 
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example for the kind of treatment they expected from European governments (foremost 
Spain) for Argentinean nationals (Nicolao, 2008, Maffia, 2010). In fact, the rejection of 
North American and European immigration policies, especially the Returns Directive13 (to 
be discussed below), became an important element of Argentina’s liberalised immigration 
discourse (Acosta Arcarazo, 2009). Such critique went in hand with calls for political 
solidarity and reciprocity. In the context of substantial Argentinean emigration to Spain 
after the 2001 economic crisis, Kirchner’s administration repeatedly called on Spain to 
remember Argentina’s historic solidarity with hundreds of thousands of Spanish 
emigrants at the turn of the 20th century, and to regularise Argentinean immigrants based 
on the logic of historical reciprocity.14 
While Néstor Kirchner’s discourse focused on migrants’ rights in the context of 
emigration, his successor (and wife) Cristina Kirchner went even further and discursively 
constructed historic immigration analogies between former European states and more 
recent regional and extra-continental immigration. When implementing the regulation of 
the 2004 Immigration Law in 2010, she publically declared a historic continuity between 
European immigration and newer waves of Latin American and Asian immigration to 
Argentina. This shift in Argentina’s immigration discourse is especially interesting because 
racism in form of aspired “whitening” of the population had been critical to Argentinean 
immigration policies since the mid-19th century (Bastia and vom Hau, 2013).  
Christina Kirchner embarked on an increasingly polemic, populist position. For 
example, she rejected the re-emergence of xenophobic sentiments in “so-called developed 
countries” in the context of the financial crisis and described Argentina as part of a 
worldwide, morally superior, avant-garde in immigration policymaking.15  Intriguingly, 
official statements of the formally often openly racist National Directorate for Migration 
(Dirección Nacional de Migraciones, DNM) (Albarracin, 2003) also started to follow this 
rationale. In January 2013, State Secretary for Migration, Martín Arias Duval confirmed the 
                                                
13 DIRECTIVE 2008/115/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 16 December 2008. 
The Directive governs a broad range of issues, in particular an obligation to return irregular migrants, their 
treatment during expulsion proceedings, entry bans, procedural rights and the grounds and conditions for 
detention. 
14 http://www.lanacion.com.ar/532881-proyectan-en-el-gobierno-un-acuerdo-migratorio-con- españa. 
15 http://www.migraciones.gov.ar/pdf_varios/periodico/periodico_201005.pdf.  
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DNM’s commitment to safeguarding migrants’ rights, comparing the motivations and 
vulnerability of south–south immigrants from the Dominican Republic and Senegal not 
only to European immigrants to Argentina at the turn of the 20th century, but to 
Argentineans who had left the country in the aftermath of the 2001 economic crisis. 16 
Similarly, though with less political salience, migration re-emerged as an 
important political issue in Brazil in the context of increased emigration since the early 
2000s. Brazil had historically been a destination for migrants until the 1960s (Póvoa and 
Sprandel, 2010), but shifted to become a country of emigrants during the 1980s. The 
reduced number of immigrants in the country meant that immigration was mostly absent 
from the public debate for the following twenty years. However, the number of Brazilians 
abroad increased dramatically from around 2 million in 2002 to approximately 3 million in 
2008 (IOM, 2010a p. 40). It is within this context of emigration that Brazil became more 
vocal in its defence of its nationals abroad, notably following Brazilians’ expulsions from 
the US and impediments to enter Spain, which attracted intense focus in the domestic 
media (Braga Martes and Gonçalves, 2008).  
During the adoption of the legislation establishing a regularisation procedure in 
2009, President Lula da Silva vehemently criticised restrictive immigration policies in 
Europe and the US as inadequate. At the same time, he stressed Brazil’s comparatively 
liberal approach to immigration and the country’s respect for the human rights of 
migrants. Da Silva also presented Brazil as a country that was proud of its immigration 
history and emphasised the need to be “generous with human beings from any part of the 
world who would like to live [in Brazil] and . . . build a future”.17 The emphasis on migrants’ 
rights can also be seen in the 2010 proposal for an immigration policy plan by the National 
Immigration Council (Conselho Nacional de Imigração, CNIg) 18  and in the official 
statements of its President Paulo Sergio (de Almeida, 2009).  
Lastly, both Argentina’s and Brazil’s commitment to reforming their immigration 
                                                
16 http://www.migraciones.gov.ar/accesible/?mostrar_novedad=1755.  
17 Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, durante cerimônia de sanção da lei que 
anistia estrangeiros em situaçãoirregular no Brasil. Ministério da Justiça– Brasília-DF, 02 de julho de 2009, 
available at http://www.imprensa.planalto.gov.br/.  
18 Proposal from the Conselho Nacional de Imigração: Política Nacional de Imigração e Proteção ao(a) 
Trabalhador(a) Migrante.  
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laws are also related to the regional integration process in the context of MERCOSUR, in 
which both countries competed for ideological “post-neoliberal regional leadership” 
(Margheritis, 2012). Argentina has historically been the most important destination 
country for regional migration and therefore has taken the lead in the formulation of more 
progressive and social immigration policies (Nicolao, 2008). In both countries, migration 
and human rights have become part of the political and social agenda their governments 
promote both at home and abroad (Margheritis, 2012).  
The Ecuadorian governmental migration discourse, which was equally 
constructed based on concerns about the treatment of emigrants in the US and Spain, 
surpasses Brazil and Argentina in its “anti-imperial” tone. Migration and specifically 
emigration become priority issues in the populist political discourse of President Rafael 
Correa since his electoral campaign of 2006. Similar to Argentina, migrants’ rights were a 
main theme in the construction of an identification platform for his political movement 
Patria Altiva I Soberana (PAIS) (Margheritis, 2011 p. 207). In the context of Ecuadorian 
mass emigration after the economic crisis of 1999, Correa was well aware that migrants’ 
rights and US -American and European closure towards Ecuadorians were highly effective 
topics when he stood in the 2006 presidential election.19 
In his campaign, Correa promised that he would lead a “migrants’ government” 
and after his ascension to power, the political migration discourse started to be framed 
around human rights (Margheritis, 2011 p. 207). In 2008, Correa renamed the European 
Returns Directive the “Directive of Shame”.20 Around the same time, the Ecuadorian 
Foreign Ministry published an open letter signed by Correa addressing “all Ecuadorian 
citizens of the world,” in which he invited emigrants to return home, lamented that the 
policies of past governments forced them to leave their “beloved home country” and 
criticised the discriminatory immigration policies of northern receiving countries. The 
letter also touched on immigration policies in declaring that there were no “illegal citizens, 
                                                
19In the so-called “emigration stampede” (estampida migratoria) that followed the economic crisis of 1999, 
close to 140,000 Ecuadorians emigrated to the US and some 320,000 to Spain until 2005 BERTOLI, S., 
MORAGA, J. F.-H. & ORTEGA, F. 2011. Immigration Policies and the Ecuadorian Exodus. The World Bank 
Economic Review, 25 (1), 57-76.  
20 http://www.ecuadorinmediato.com/index.php?module=Noticias&func=news_user_view&id=83481&umt=
presidente_correa_critica_falta_voluntad_regional_para_protestar_contra_ directiva_retorno.  
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only practices that violate the rights of persons” and that Ecuador, as it demanded rights 
for its citizens abroad, promoted these same rights for immigrants in Ecuador. Just days 
before the European Parliament approved the Returns Directive in June 2008, Correa 
further claimed that he would “do away with the invention of the 20th century of 
passports and visas”.21 
In sum, governmental migration discourses in Argentina, Brazil, and Ecuador 
shifted from closure and securitisation to emphasise migrants’ human rights, non-racism, 
and non-criminalisation. These often polemic and populist liberal discourses developed in 
the context of emigration and diaspora policies in strong counter position to restrictive 
immigration rhetoric in the US and Europe. South American governments demanded 
solidarity and political reciprocity, and the regularisation of their nationals.  
Although the specific political context of liberalised immigration discourses has 
been South American emigration to Western liberal democracies, proclaimed values of 
the universality of migrants’ rights and the necessity for regularisation measures have fed 
back into the country’s immigration discourses based on the logic of coherence and 
political reciprocity. Governmental immigration discourses in the case countries thus 
developed in the context we define as “populist liberalism”; the popular support for 
migrants’ rights in connection with mass emigration led to the concurrent liberalisation of 
immigration discourses.  
 
LEGISLATIVE AND POLICY LIBERALISATION  
 
Placing a special focus on the policy field of irregular immigration, this section analyses in 
how far the liberalisation of governmental immigration discourses in the case countries 
translated into legislative and policy change. Regarding the international legal framework, 
there have been some important steps affecting migrants in an irregular situation. Both 
Argentina (2007) and Ecuador (2002) ratified the 1990 United Nations’ (UN) International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their 
                                                
21  Agencia EFE, June 12, 2008, http://www.hoy.com.ec/noticias-ecuador/correa-elimina-el- visado-a-los-
extranjeros-297707-297707.html.  
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Families. Even more importantly, the entry into force of the MERCOSUR Residence 
Agreement in 2009 transformed the migration regime for South American migrants. The 
Residence Agreement provides that any national of a MERCOSUR or associate member 
state22 may reside and work for a period of two years in another member state if they have 
a clean criminal record. This temporary permit may then be transformed into a 
permanent one, provided an individual has enough resources to sustain him or herself in 
the territory of the host state.  
 
Argentina’s New Law and the Right to Migrate 
 
In Argentina, the 1981 law,23 popularly named after the country’s infamous dictator Jorge 
Rafael Videla, significantly curtailed the rights of migrants, especially those in an irregular 
situation. Irregular migrants could be detained and expelled without judicial oversight, 
and there was no maximum detention period established by law before expulsion took 
place (Ceriani Cernadas and Morales, 2011). This restrictive approach, coupled with the 
very few possibilities that the law offered for regularisation, kept large numbers of 
migrants – mainly from neighbouring countries – in an irregular situation.  
Undocumented immigrants lacked basic social rights such as health care or 
education. Furthermore, there was a widespread obligation for civil servants in hospitals, 
schools, administrative authorities or notary publics to denounce migrants in an irregular 
situation. Even citizens who helped irregular immigrants out of philanthropic reasons 
were subject to a fine (Mármora, 2004). In line with a previous tradition of regularisation 
programs (Sassone, 1987), the first governments after the country’s return to democracy 
approached the situation of substantial irregular immigrant populations with the 
adoption of two large-scale regularisation procedures in 1984 and 1992, which benefited 
136,000 and 224,000 migrants, respectively (Pacecca and Courtis, 2008). However, these 
regularisations did not mark a shift in Argentina’s restrictive immigration policies. 
Although counterintuitive, regularisation programs can be part of restrictive immigration 
                                                
22 MERCOSUR includes Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and, since 2012, Venezuela. Surinam and 
Guyana are also associate states to the MERCOSUR but have not yet ratified the Residence Agreement. The 
Associate States, which benefit from the agreement, include Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru.  
23 Decreto Ley 22.439/81, Ley General de Migraciones y Fomento de la Inmigración.  
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policies when they are used to “wipe the slate clean and begin afresh” (Massey, 2007 p. 312), 
possibly employing even more restrictive measures. In fact, the Videla Law was not 
repealed, and its decrees of 1980s and 1990s, rather than softening some of its most 
restrictive provisions, compounded the limited rights of migrants.24  
The 2004 Argentinean Immigration Law25 on the other hand, represented a 
remarkable paradigm shift towards policy liberalisation – a liberal turn which did not 
seem likely at the time (Mármora, 2004). Indeed, as late as 1999, and amidst widespread 
xenophobic governmental discourse, a draft law was proposed which would have 
deepened the discrimination against non-citizens (Oteiza and Novick et al., 2001, 
Domenech, 2009). The most noteworthy innovation in Argentina’s 2004 migration law 
consists in the recognition of the right to migrate as essential and inalienable to the 
person. According to Article 4, Argentina guarantees this right on the basis of the 
principles of equality and universality, which at the time of its adoption did not exist in 
any other legislation, although subject to the conditions established in the law as Article 5 
emphasises.26 
In our view, the situation of migrants in an irregular situation is an excellent case 
to test the meaning of this provision. If in fact a true right to migrate exists, those who, for 
one reason or another, irregularly reside in the country should have ample possibilities to 
regularise their status. The understanding of the obligation and suitability of facilitating 
the acquisition of regular status is well entrenched in the law and its implementing 2010 
regulation. Article 17 of the Immigration Law establishes that the government shall 
provide the adoption and implementation of measures aiming at regularizing the 
migratory status of non-nationals.27 In line with this, regularisation has taken place 
through two different procedures: two specific regularisation programs and a general 
regularisation mechanism. We understand regularisation programs as procedures, which 
run for a limited period of time and target-specific categories of non-nationals in an 
                                                
24 See Decretos 1434/87, 1023/94 and 1117/98.   
25 Ley de Migraciones 25,871. The law is regulated by Decreto 616/2010.   
26 Article 5 Law 25,871 reads as follows: “The state will secure the conditions guaranteeing an effective equal 
treatment so that foreigners can enjoy their rights and fulfil their obligations, as long as they satisfy the 
conditions established for their entry and permanence in accordance with the laws in force” (authors’ 
translation). 
27 Article 17 Decreto 616/2010.  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irregular situation. By contrast, regularisation mechanisms are procedures that are 
enshrined in the law without a time limitation and from which any non-national in an 
irregular situation may benefit (Baldwin‐Edwards and Kraler, 2009 p. 8). 
There have been two regularisation programs in Argentina. The first one benefited 
non-MERCOSUR migrants in 2004,28 whereas the second one, known as “Patria Grande,” 
anticipated the entry into force of the MERCOSUR Residence Agreement in 2009. Patria 
Grande developed in various steps. Article 23(l) of the 2004 Immigration Law provides 
that nationals of MERCOSUR, Bolivia and Chile can obtain a temporary residence based 
on citizenship criteria. This was later extended to the nationals of the other associate 
member states: Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia.29 Nationals of these countries who entered 
Argentina before April 17, 2006 were able to regularise their situation whereas those who 
entered after that date could directly benefit from the citizenship criteria in the law and 
obtain a temporary residence permit.30 
As mentioned earlier, regularisation programs had already been previously 
adopted in Argentina and have been extensively used in other countries in the EU 
(Baldwin‐Edwards and Kraler, 2009) and South America. However, the Kirchner 
administrations’ public endorsement represents an important contrast to other 
regularisation agendas. In the EU, regularisation programs have been notoriously absent 
in governmental discourses of national and common immigration policymaking and can 
in fact be considered a political taboo (Baldwin‐Edwards and Kraler, 2009, Walters, 2010). 
Indeed, following the 2005 Spanish regularisation (Sabater and Domingo, 2012) and 
especially during at the EU’s French presidency in 2008, there were strong attempts, albeit 
unsuccessful, to forbid regularisation programs at EU level (Collett, 2008). 
A more general regularisation mechanism is the second approach Argentina’s 
immigration law provides to irregular immigration. In the EU, many member states used 
them in the past or currently incorporate them into their immigration laws (Baldwin‐
Edwards and Kraler, 2009). There are however crucial differences between the European 
and Argentinean model. In the European case, the conditions for regularisation usually 
                                                
28 Article 17 Decreto 616/2010.   
29 Disposición Dirección Nacional de Migraciones 29.929/2004, September 17, 2004.  
30 See Disposici_on DNM 53.253/2005, Disposici_on (DNM) N° 14949/2006.  
 59 
include a certain length of residence, which may need to be combined with a job offer, 
family ties or humanitarian grounds. The most significant EU legislation in the area of 
immigration, the Returns Directive, allows member states to provide third-country 
nationals with a residence permit for compassionate, humanitarian or other reasons. 
However, since the main purpose of the Directive is the termination of the illegal stay, the 
alternative mostly employed is the expulsion of the migrant in an irregular situation 
(Acosta Arcarazo, 2011). 
The Argentinean legislation on the other hand, is ground-breaking by dramatically 
shifting the balance from expulsion to regularisation. Irregular immigrants can only be 
detained to prepare their expulsion for a maximum period of 15 days and only after a 
judicial process with various possibilities for appeal.31 The law further provides that once 
the irregular situation of a migrant is established, the National Migrations Directorate is 
under the obligation to request him to regularise and to provide a period for that purpose 
of between 30 and 60 days.32 This obligation is a distinctive attribute of the Argentinean 
law when compared with the EU. During that period, migrants may invoke one of the 
regularisation requirements under Article 23 of the law, out of which the one most applied 
is having a binding employment offer. In contrast to regularisation mechanisms in Europe, 
length of residence is not a decisive element. The law’s mechanism reads well with the 
declared right to migrate.  
With its 2004 immigration law, Argentina opted for a new strategy, moving from 
the logic of criminalisation and expulsion to the rational of legalisation and integration. 
This is also evident in the law’s social provisions as irregular migrants now have the right 
to education and health care. Moreover, the staff in educational facilities or hospitals are 
no longer obliged to inform the authorities about immigrants’ irregular situation but shall 
rather guide them toward regularisation.33  
However, in relation to the proclaimed right to migrate, the law has an important 
flaw, which impedes certain migrants from obtaining legal residence. Article 29 sets out 
that those having entered Argentina clandestinely do not have the right to stay. The 
                                                
31 Article 70 Ley de Migraciones 25,871 and Decreto 616/2010.   
32 See Articles 61 of the Ley de Migraciones 25,871 and Decreto 616/2010. 
33 Articles 7 and 8 Ley de Migraciones 25,871 and Decreto 616/2010. 
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burden of proof falls onto the migrant who has to certify his regular entry, for example as a 
tourist, to regularise his status (Morales, 2012 p. 336). Although Argentina’s legislative 
reform largely mirrors its liberalised immigration discourse, and indeed presents a 
substantial liberal turn in the country’s immigration policy-making, a discursive policy gap 
exists between the promised universal right to migrate and its translation into law, which 
in practice only applies to immigrants with visa-free access to Argentina.  
 
Brazil’s Hesitant Approach to Migration Reform  
 
Brazil’s immigration law, in force since 1980,34 was adopted in less than three months 
under an urgent procedure by the former military dictatorship. It places strong emphasis 
on national security (IOM, 2010a p. 53, CDHIC, 2011 p. 15) and has a utilitarian approach to 
immigration linked to national development and the shortage of specialised labour. The 
law has been severely criticised because of its bureaucratic nature and the difficulties to 
obtain secure residence status (Sbalqueiro Lopes, 2009). Indeed, it provides very few 
avenues for regular immigration and no mechanisms for regularisation. There are 
provisions on deportation for irregular entry, overstay and working without permission 
(Articles 57–64 Law 6815). These provisions are, however, not applicable to irregular 
immigrants married to a Brazilian or having Brazilian children. With regard to social rights 
for those in an irregular situation, the 1988 Constitution grants access to health care, 
education and the reception of outstanding salaries (Sbalqueiro Lopes, 2009 p. 469).  
Brazil has not yet reformed its 1980 migration law, which in some respects 
contradicts the 1988 Constitution (CDHIC, 2011). A legislative proposal for a new 
immigration law (Projeto de Lei 5655) reached Congress in 2009 but falls short of what 
would be expected from the government’s liberal discourse. In fact, it takes as its 
backbone the current legislative framework, and in some respects, it is even more 
restrictive. For example, with regard to naturalisation, it extends the number of years that 
a migrant has to reside in Brazil from four to 10. The proposed bill has been in Congress 
since 2009 without being adopted, and there have been two new proposals in 2014; one by 
                                                
34 Law 6.815/1980 and Implementing Regulation Decree 86715/81.  
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a commission of experts established by the Ministry of Interior, and one by a Senator,35 
currently being discussed in the Senate.  
Nevertheless, ministerial orders of the CNIg have softened the 1980 law during the 
last 15 years. The CNIg is dependent on the Ministry of Labor and is composed by 
representatives of different ministries and civil society, unions, and business 
confederations. It is responsible for formulating Brazil’s immigration policy and for 
adopting ministerial orders complementing the immigration law. These are hierarchically 
inferior to the law, and hence cannot contradict it, but rather define policy in areas not yet 
regulated. This legislative capacity represents a peculiarity of the Brazilian legal system. 
The CNIg’s work has led to the partial liberalisation in central issues of Brazil’s 
immigration policy, such as family reunification, renewal of residence permits or access to 
regular status. The law’s opposition to non-highly skilled immigration, however, limits the 
CNIg’s work. The CNIg has made significant liberal policy proposals, not yet adopted, such 
as a new immigration policy plan or the recommendation to ratify the UN Migrant 
Workers Convention. Agreeing on immigration policy priorities would be essential before 
passing new legislation, but there is internal disagreement between the Ministries of 
Interior and Labour and the Presidency’s Strategic Affairs Secretariat, on what such policy 
should entail (Ventura and Illes, 2012). 
The CNIg also supported the 2009 regularisation program, by which 45,000 
migrants obtained residence (de Almeida, 2009). This was Brazil’s fourth regularisation 
procedure after previous ones in 1981, 1988, and 1998 granted legal residence to around 
115,000 non-nationals (CDHIC, 2011). The procedure provided two-year residence permits, 
which could be renewed and transformed into permanent residence under certain 
conditions, notably having regular employment, exercising a profession or having 
sufficient financial resources.36 Brazil also adopted a bilateral agreement with Bolivia in 
2005, by which around 20,000 Bolivians regularised their situation (de Almeida, 2009 p. 24). 
With the internal adoption of the MERCOSUR Residence Agreement in 2009, Bolivians 
have the right to work and reside in Brazil. In short, although Brazil’s outdated 
immigration law does not capture its open political discourse on immigration issues, the 
                                                
35 Projeto de Lei do Senado (PLS) n_ 288, de 2013, do Senador Aloysio Nunes Ferreira.  
36 Portaria Ministério da Justiça– MJ n_ 1700, 28.07.2011, D.O.U.: 29/07/2011.  
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CNIg has had some leeway to develop policies in line with a less restrictive and securitised 
vision of international migration.  
 
Ecuador’s Constitution and Contradictory Legal Regime  
 
In Ecuador, the legislative migration framework in force since 197137 constitutes another 
example of a largely restrictive, and in comparison with the liberalised discourse, 
“outdated” approach that criminalises migrants in an irregular situation and limits their 
rights (Arcentales Illescas and Garbay Mancheno, 2012). The law provides for no 
regularisation mechanisms, not even when an irregular immigrant has children with 
Ecuadorian citizenship (Arcentales Illescas and Garbay Mancheno, 2012 p. 34). 
Furthermore, there are very few avenues to obtaining a regular residence permit for non-
skilled or self-employed workers (Hurtado Caicedo and Gallegos Brito, 2013). Against the 
background of the significant number of Colombians residing in Ecuador in vulnerable 
situations – including an estimated 90,000 with rejected asylum applications (Hurtado 
Caicedo and Gallegos Brito, 2013 p. 11) – the law’s restrictiveness resulted in an increasing 
number of migrants in an irregular situation.  
 The 1971 law favours deportations and administrative authorities enjoy wide 
powers during the expulsion procedure with few possibilities for redress, which has led to 
various instances of collective expulsions (Benavides Llerena et al., 2007 pp. 57-58). 
Detention before expulsion in prisons or in overcrowded detention centres is a 
widespread practice (Benavides Llerena et al., 2007 pp. 59-62, Hurtado Caicedo and 
Gallegos Brito, 2013 p. 20). Moreover, according to Article 37 of the Migration Law, those 
migrants who, having been expelled, re-enter into the territory without a valid 
authorisation, may be imprisoned between six months and three years. Finally, irregular 
migrants face obstacles in accessing basic rights such as payment of outstanding salaries, 
education and health care (Hurtado Caicedo and Gallegos Brito, 2013).  
                                                
37 There were two different pieces of legislation adopted in 1971: Ley de Extranjería (Aliens Law) adopted by 
Supreme Decree D.S. 1897, R.O. 382, 30-12-1971, codification 23, R.O. 454, 4-11-04; and Ley de Migración 
(Migration Law) adopted by Supreme Decree D.S. 1899, R.O. 382, 30-12-1971, codification 006, R.O. 563, 12-04-
2005.  
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To date, Ecuador has not reformed its 1971 migration law. Efforts to develop a 
comprehensive “Law of Human Mobility” covering immigration, emigration, transit, 
return migration and asylum, are ongoing within the Vice-Ministry of Human Mobility, 
formerly known as the National Secretariat of Migrants (SENAMI), and are supported by 
international actors, such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the 
UN Committee on the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers. Meanwhile, the 
liberalisation of the governmental migration discourse has found representation at the 
constitutional level and in Ecuador’s visa policy.  
The 2008 Constitution enshrines Ecuador’s commitment to define and implement 
migration policies that will support migrants’ universal rights, combat discrimination, and 
even promote the ideal of universal citizenship. Article 9 lays down the same rights and 
obligations for Ecuadorians and non-nationals and Article 40, following the Argentinean 
example, recognises the right to migrate and provides that no human being will be 
considered as an illegal due to their migratory status. In turn, Article 416 invokes the 
concept of universal citizenship as a guiding principle for Ecuador’s international relations. 
The constitution generally uses an anti-imperial, post-colonial discourse and “advocates 
the principle of universal citizenship, the free movement of all inhabitants of the planet, 
and the progressive extinction of the status of alien or foreigner as an element to 
transform the unequal relations between countries, especially those between North and 
South” (Article 416). Finally, Article 11 imposes a prohibition to discriminate on several 
grounds, including the ethnicity, origin, and migratory status of a person.  
Ecuador’s constitution represents significant innovation in comparative 
perspective, as it is the first constitution in the world in which the right to migrate is 
enshrined. Theoretically, it transforms the government’s control over the relationship 
between territory and population by deconstructing the link between rights and 
citizenship, as well as the assumption that individuals automatically renounce rights 
when migrating (Arcentales Illescas and Garbay Mancheno, 2012 p. 7). This approach to 
migrants’ rights goes even further than other proposals on post-national membership 
(Soysal), since judges, administrative authorities and civil servants shall directly apply the 
constitution and international human rights treaties even if the individuals concerned do 
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not expressly invoke them (Article 426). These constitutional ideals, however, are severely 
limited by the outdated legislative framework.  
The constitution’s prohibition of the criminalisation of irregular migrants obliges 
the state to adopt regularisation measures (Arcentales Illescas and Garbay Mancheno, 
2012 p. 31). However, the Correa administration has offered few possibilities for 
regularisation. In 2010, it provided two regularisation programs that only benefited 
approximately 300 Venezuelans, 400 Haitian and 650 Cubans (Arcentales Illescas and 
Garbay Mancheno, 2012 pp. 47-49). Although Ecuador has signed permanent migratory 
agreements with the countries from which most of its immigrants originate, Peru and 
Colombia, the agreement with Colombia has not yet been implemented. Finally, it took 
Ecuador five years to implement the MERCOSUR Residence Agreement in April 2014. This 
should, if properly implemented in practice, solve the situation of Colombian and 
Peruvian nationals who, together with nationals from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay now have the right to reside and work in Ecuador.38 However, the 
high fees imposed to obtain the temporary ($US230) and permanent ($US350) residence 
permits act as a deterrent considering that the minimum monthly wage in Ecuador is 
$US340.  
Recent changes in Ecuador’s visa policy, on the other hand, seemingly reflected 
the president’s liberal discourse. On June 20, 2008, Ecuador adopted a policy of open 
borders, withdrawing visa requirements for all countries in the world. This unprecedented 
policy of universal visa freedom, implemented by presidential decree, allowed any 
foreigner to enter Ecuador’s territory for up to 90 days. The official goals of this policy were 
twofold: one was to encourage tourism, the other to implement the principle of universal 
citizenship. This policy reads well with the constitution’s declaration of the right to 
migrate. However, to extend the permitted stay of 90 days, the individual needs to apply 
for a residence permit. The limited possibilities for obtaining a permit, as provided by the 
current legal regime, has led to a further increase in the number of migrants in an irregular 
situation. Furthermore, visa requirements have been reintroduced for a selected number 
                                                
38 See Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Movilidad Humana, Acuerdo Ministerial número 000031, April 2, 
2014.  
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of nationals. 
In sum, Ecuador’s populist liberal migration rhetoric is mirrored by the 2008 
Constitution, which stipulates the human right to migrate, and the 2008 policy of visa 
freedom. However, the lack of a comprehensive reform on the legislative level leads to 
incoherence with these discursive and constitutional ideals. The continued 
criminalisation of irregular migration through the secondary migration legislation in force 
since 1971, as well as the government’s unwillingness to implement regional agreements 
on mobility, further leave Ecuador in the place of publicly proposing and internationally 
demanding progressive immigration policies based on universal citizenship and migrants’ 
humans rights, without passing and implementing such policies at home.  
 
POLITICAL REACTIONS TO RECENT IRREGULAR IMMIGRATION  
 
It could be argued that changes in discourses always precede changes in policy, and that 
discursive gaps in Brazil’s and Ecuador’s immigration policies are thus just an issue of 
timing. Indeed, with regards to agenda setting and consensus building, South American 
states have taken decisive steps into the direction of immigration policy liberalisation - at 
both the domestic and the regional level. The actual translation of this new policy 
consensus into legislation and policies might simply take longer (Ramírez Gallegos, 2013). 
It is, of course, possible that the adoption of new legislations, following the Argentinean 
model, will narrow the gap between discourse and law in Brazil and Ecuador. As discussed 
previously, in both countries, comprehensive legislative immigration reforms are currently 
subject to debate. However, discursive gaps have persisted for about 15 years in the case of 
Brazil, and 10 years in the case of Ecuador, and can thus not simply be ascribed to the time 
needed for policy adoption. Furthermore, a full translation of governmental rhetoric, that 
is, granting a “universal right to migrate” through the de facto opening of borders coupled 
with regularisation mechanisms is unlikely in all three countries.  
To further test for discursive gaps in policies targeting irregular immigration, this 
section analyses governments’ reactions to recent irregular south–south migration from 
extra-continental origins. Governmental discourses in Argentina, Brazil, and Ecuador 
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proclaim the universality of migrants’ rights, irrespective of legal status and national origin. 
Asian and African immigrants and immigrants of colour have historically been most 
discriminated against in South America (FitzGerald and Cook-Martín, 2014). Governments’ 
approaches to recent increases in south–south inflows from Africa, Asia, and the 
Caribbean thus offer a “least-likely” case to assess in how far the universal liberal 
discourses translate into policy measures in practice.  
We have argued that Argentina is the case country which has undergone the most 
coherent development between discourse and practice, and that its right to migrate may 
be understood in two possible ways: as an obligation of the state to provide regularisation 
avenues; and as an individual right to have a time period in which to attempt to regularise. 
However, migrants having entered the country clandestinely do not have the right to stay 
(Article 29 Immigration Law). Given that citizens of neighbouring countries and most 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries can enter 
Argentina without visas, this mostly affects south–south migrants from Africa, Asia, and 
the Caribbean who increasingly arrived in Argentina over the past decade, mostly via 
Brazil and as irregular migrants (Freier, 2013a). The government’s response to these new 
inflows will be illustrated by the case of Senegalese and Dominican immigrants.  
The Senegalese population in Argentina is estimated at 3,000–5,000 
(Kleidermacher, 2012 p. 113). Senegalese nationals encounter two main problems to 
regularisation. First, most entered Argentina clandestinely. Second, due to their precarious 
job situation – many work in the informal sector – they cannot fulfil the legal requisite to 
be formally employed to regularise their status (Nejamkis and Nievas). Faced with this 
situation, the Argentinean government decided to launch a new regularisation program, 
specifically for Senegalese nationals, on January 4, 2013,39 for a six-month duration. 
According to the regularisation’s legislative disposition, there were a number of reasons 
that led to its adoption: the willingness of Senegalese nationals to settle; the impossibility 
to regularise their status under the permanent mechanism due to Article 29; the negative 
effects their irregular situation had not only on their insertion into the labour market, but 
more importantly on exercising their rights, which could lead to situations of abuse; and 
                                                
39 Disposición 002 Direcci_on Nacional de Migraciones, January 04, 2013.  
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finally, the obligation of the state to take measures in accordance with Article 17. On the 
same day, another regularisation program was adopted specifically for Dominican 
immigrants.40 
Based on these cases, it might be argued that Argentina’s approach to irregular 
immigration shows a considerable level of coherence with its liberalised discourse. 
However, all Senegalese and Dominican nationals who entered the country after January 4, 
2013 continue to face problems to regularise. The same applies to all other nationals from 
Africa, Asia, or the Caribbean who entered Argentina without a valid visa. Hence, despite 
the adoption of regularisation programs for Senegalese and Dominicans, a discursive gap 
exists in the field of irregular immigration because these offer temporary regularisation for 
immigrants of selected nationalities only.  
Brazil’s official reaction to the increase in extra-continental south–south 
migration has been more cautious. The most significant group of recent south–south 
immigrants are Haitians, who in their majority reach South America via Ecuador, given 
the possibility of visa-free entry, and then travel by land via Peru or Bolivia to Brazil 
(Freier, 2013c). Faced with the arrival of around 15,000 thousand Haitian nationals since 
2010, the National Committee on Refugees (CONARE) did not grant Haitians refugee 
status because their arrival was driven by environmental issues, notably the aftermath of 
the January 2010 earthquake (Fernandes et al., 2013). However, in cases involving 
humanitarian circumstances, the CNIg has the final word on the possibility of granting 
residence permits.41  
This allowed the CNIg to grant residence permits for humanitarian reasons to the 
approximately 4,000 Haitians who reached Brazil before January 2012. From January 12 
onwards, the CNIg adopted Ministerial Order 97/12, valid for two years, by which Haitians 
could obtain a visa and residence permit because of humanitarian reasons in the Brazilian 
Embassy in Port au Prince. This mechanism was then extended until January 2015 by 
Ministerial Order 106/13 of October 24, 2013. The permit is valid for five years and may be 
renewed and transformed into a permanent permit, provided the person is regularly 
                                                
40 Disposici_on 001 Direcci_on Nacional de Migraciones, January 04, 2013.  
41 According to Ministerial Order 27/1998, the CNIg has the competence to solve cases not regulated in the 
law, such as granting residence permits in special situations.  
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employed in Brazil.  
The number of residence permits was originally capped at 100 per month. This 
number was adopted to avoid the establishment of a Haitian diaspora in Brazil, taking into 
account the alleged limited capacity of Brazil’s labour market. It was also adopted 
considering that, in the government’s view, not many Haitians would have the economic 
means to migrate to Brazil. It was further argued that providing these permits would put 
an end to the irregular flows in which smugglers were involved.42 However, the visa cap 
was lifted by Ministerial Order 102/ 2013 of April 26, 2013, as Haitians kept arriving 
irregularly in Brazil since they could not obtain a visa once the 100 visas had been issued 
(Fernandes et al., 2013 P. 66-67). Faced with the continuous arrival of irregular Haitian 
immigrants, the Brazilian government decided not to deport them but to continue 
granting them a residence permit based on humanitarian grounds. However, irregular 
immigration flows to Brazil recently also include increasing numbers of nationals from 
Nigeria, Senegal and Bangladesh, who cannot regularise their status.  
Thus, in the Brazilian case, there also is a gap between the government’s rhetoric 
and policy reactions to irregular extra-continental immigrants. Similar to the case of 
Senegalese and Dominicans in Argentina, the Brazilian government found a special 
solution for Haitians displaced in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake. Nevertheless, the 
law does not provide any regularisation mechanism, and irregular extra-continental 
immigrants depend on the discretionary power of the CNIg to legalise their status.  
Ecuador, in turn, represents the country where the gap between liberal discourse 
and policy reactions to extra-continental immigrants is widest. Correa claimed he would 
“do away” with passports and visas and indeed opened the country’s borders in 2008. 
However, universal visa freedom to Ecuador was short-lived. Only six months after its 
introduction, visa requirements were reintroduced for Chinese citizens, and 18 months 
later for citizens of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nepal, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, and Somalia. State Secretary of Migration, Leonardo Carrion, linked the decision 
of the partial reintroduction of visas to emerging “unusual immigration flows” from the 
above countries. A majority of visitors from these countries, he explained, overstayed the 
                                                
42 Ata da Reunião extraordinária de 12 Janeiro de 2012 do Conselho Nacional de Imigração.  
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permitted visa-free period of 90 days.  
It must be pointed out that the immigration of the concerned nationalities 
increased only on an extremely small scale after the introduction of visa-free access. With 
the noteworthy exception of Chinese, Cubans and Haitians, the yearly immigration rates 
for other African and Asian nationals, for whom visas were reintroduced, averaged at just 
above 300 per year from 2008 to 2010 (Freier, 2013c). With the reintroduction of visas, 
Ecuadorian policy was responsive to its own unintended impact, namely the increase in 
immigration from Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean. Given that there are no regularisation 
measures, there are currently thousands of extra-continental immigrants, most 
prominently Cubans,43 in an irregular situation in Ecuador.  
The above analysis shows considerable variation in government reactions to 
irregular extra-continental immigration. Argentina and Brazil present similar cases. Both 
governments found solutions for the largest groups of irregular extra-continental 
immigrants in the countries, Senegalese, Dominicans and Haitians. In Argentina, the 
regularisation program could only be achieved after extensive lobbying of the 
Ombudsman and civil society organisations and does not extend to all other immigrants 
who entered without a visa. Brazil presents a similar situation, where initial government 
reactions to increasing inflows of Haitians were ambiguous at best, but the CNIg could 
push through regularisation procedures. Other migrants in an irregular situation do not 
have the possibility to regularise their status. In Ecuador, the gap between discourse and 
policy reactions to extra-continental immigration is widest. Extremely small inflows of 
extra-continental migrants led the government to abandon its policy of universal visa-free 
access, and there are almost no regularisation measures in place.  
Restrictive reactions to irregular immigration in themselves might not be 
surprising. In the South American context, however, they present a reverse immigration 
policy paradox of officially welcoming all immigrants regardless of legal status or national 
origin, but de facto excluding south-south immigrants from Africa, Asia, and the 
Caribbean. As a result, there persists a gap between what South American governments 
                                                
43 http://ecuadorinmediato.com/index.php?module=Noticias&func=news_user_view&id=139408&umt=cuba
nos_en_situacion_irregular_no_pue- den_ser_deportados_del_ecuador.  
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demand from Western migrant receiving states, that is, regularisation policies irrespective 
of the legal status and national origin of immigrants, and the policies they implement at 
home.  
There are at least two reasons, which may be advanced in an effort to try to 
explain this reverse paradox. First, immigration policy liberalisation, most notably 
regularisation procedures and the MERCOSUR residence agreement, primarily target 
regional migrants. Most migratory movements in South America are intra-regional and 
one main factor leading to policy liberalisation was the large percentage of regional 
migrants in an irregular situation (Mármora, 2010). Second, restrictive reactions to extra-
continental immigrants may also be intertwined with racial discrimination. It is well 
documented that racial and ethnic discrimination are contentious issues across Latin 
America (Wade, 1997, Beck et al., 2011). At least in the Ecuadorian case, alleged security 
concerns that officially determined the restrictive reaction to the increase in extra-
continental south–south migration are closely intertwined with ethnic considerations 
(Holloway, 2012, Freier, 2013c). Antiracism can thus be politically salient in populist 
systems and at the same time, as Cook-Martín and FitzGerald (2010) suggest, fragile.  
Politicians are likely to be caught in the dilemma of serving somewhat 
contradictory populist stances: the demand for migrants’ rights and regularisation 
programs for emigrants in Europe and the US and the concurrent acceptance of the 
liberalisation of immigration policies in light of political coherence; and protectionist and 
even racist public opinion. Indeed, Ecuador seems to be a paradigmatic case in this regard. 
In 2010, over 95 per cent of Ecuadorians thought that Ecuadorian emigrants should have 
access to health care and education and form organisations to defend their rights in their 
countries of residence. At the same time 63.5 per cent believed that there were too many 
immigrants living in Ecuador, 73.1 per cent thought that immigrants increased crime and 
67.3 per cent thought that immigrants took away jobs of Ecuadorians (Zepeda and 
Verdesoto, 2010). 
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THEORY-BUILDING AND FURTHER RESEARCH  
 
This study challenges what has been considered common wisdom in theories on 
immigration policy, that is, that, in line with public opinion, countries’ governmental 
immigration discourses are significantly more restrictive than their immigration policies 
in practice. The three South American case countries indeed present a reverse 
immigration paradox of populist liberalism, in which the immigration discourses of 
governments are considerably more liberal than their policies and laws. Existing 
theoretical approaches to explaining immigration policies are not readily applicable to the 
South American context because they are framed around the assumption that 
immigration discourses are inherently more restrictive than their corresponding policies. 
Rather than presuming such a fixed relationship, the development of migration policy 
theory should be based on an unbiased analysis of the dynamics and interaction of 
political discourses and corresponding policies and laws. In the following section, the 
applicability of existing political theories on migration to the empirical case studies 
presented here will be evaluated in more detail.  
The main theoretical approaches in political migration theory can be broadly 
categorised as political economy, neo-institutionalist and constructivist approaches 
(Boswell, 2007). Contradicting Hollifield’s “liberal paradox” (of international economic 
forces pushing states towards openness, while domestic political forces are pushing 
toward greater policy closure), another political economy approach argues that 
concentrated group interests outweigh diffuse collective interest in decision-making 
processes. More specifically, it posits that employers and immigrant groups will lobby 
more intensively to promote liberal immigration policies than those who perceive to be 
negatively affected by immigration will lobby against them (Freeman, 1995). Doubts have 
been raised regarding the empirical plausibility of Freeman’s theory. Most importantly, it 
overlooks the fact that the state is more than a mediator and in fact plays an active and 
discrete role in defining immigration policies (Boswell, 2007). In the South American 
context, the demands of interest groups as a driving force of immigration policies can be 
further discarded, at least for the case of MERCOSUR, due to the top-down structure of its 
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policy-making process (Margheritis, 2012). The relatively small levels of immigration in 
South America, which range between 0.8 and 4.5 per cent of the total population in our 
case countries, are another reason to question the applicability of political economy 
approaches.  
Neo-institutionalists deny the possibility of reducing an explanation of social 
phenomena to the agency of individuals or interest groups and instead stress the 
importance of institutions. Pointing out that the state is no monolithic entity, they 
distinguish between the system of party politics and the administration, and different, 
possibly competing, agencies within it. Neo-institutionalist approaches also stress that 
state interests may significantly diverge from societal interests (Boswell, 2007). These are 
important contributions, which are applicable to our cases, for example, in Ecuador. The 
contradictory ideological alignments of the constitution and the migration law, and the 
question of which one should prevail, have led to serious tensions between different 
ministries and departments dealing with immigration management, depending on their 
political alignment to the president (Freier, 2013c). However, existing neo-institutionalist 
theories do not readily apply to the South American context, because they also focus on 
constraints – whether the state’s own bureaucratic structure, the judiciary, or 
supranational actors (Cornelius et al., 1994, Joppke, 1998b) – to implementing restrictive 
policies, and assume the tension between protectionist immigration discourses and 
comparatively liberal policies as a given.  
As well, neo-institutionalist approaches underestimate governments’ own 
interests. Boswell (2007) focuses on explanations of why and under which conditions 
administrations are constrained by institutions. We find her approach of conceptualising 
immigration policy-making in the context of governments’ functional imperatives useful 
to account for the state’s dilemma of wanting to meet competing requirements and 
expectations and thus, possibly intentionally choosing incoherence in the field of 
immigration policies. However, scholars need to interrogate which interests and norms 
the state feels compelled to take into account, and to which degree to avoid the pitfall of 
presuming a fixed relationship of immigration discourses being more restrictive than their 
corresponding policies. Importantly, none of Boswell’s five types of policy responses (2007, 
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94) are applicable to our case countries. Most importantly, Boswell categorises a “populist” 
policy response towards immigration as a high degree of restriction, whereas this study 
has shown that in South America, populist immigration policies have led to discursive 
policy liberalisation.  
Regarding constructivist approaches to explaining immigration policies, our cases 
confirm what Bonjour demonstrates, using a “typical Western liberal democratic case” – 
the Netherlands (Bonjour, 2011). Here, he argues that ideas, ideology and moral 
considerations of politicians and bureaucrats play a substantial role in the immigration 
policy-making process. Our cases suggest combining constructivist and rationalist 
approaches in the analysis of immigration discourses, policy and law making. This 
provides alternative evidence to the usefulness of limiting constructivist approaches to 
law making as suggested by Guiraudon and Lahav (2000), who argue that “[a] 
constructivist approach to norms . . . may work in the domain of law, whereas a rationalist 
one seems more appropriate to understand executive agencies’ resistance to these legal 
norms” (Guiraudon and Lavah, 2000 p. 189). Rights-based liberalism (Cornelius et al., 1994 
pp. 9-11), often described as lying outside the state and limiting it to implement restrictive 
policies, is propelled from within the state in our case countries. New liberal norms on 
immigration policies have clearly emerged and reinforced each other in South America on 
both the domestic and regional level. At the same time, policy makers have both been 
actively involved in propelling these norms and drawing on them, at the very least 
discursively, based on domestic political interest.  
This study also engages with the literature on immigration policies and race. A 
dominant strand of the literature describes a general development away from ethnic 
selectivity, that is, immigration policies that treat immigrants according to categories of 
race, ethnicity, nationality or country of birth (Brubaker, 1994, Freeman, 1995, Joppke, 2005, 
FitzGerald and Cook-Martín, 2014). Contrary to the prognosis of the demise of ethnically 
selective immigration policies in Latin America (FitzGerald, 2013), our study suggests that 
ethnic selectivity needs to be acknowledged as a persistent determinant of immigration 
policies in Latin America. At the same time, our cases confirm a central argument of Cook-
Martín and FitzGerald’s work (2014), which questions the antithesis between democracy 
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and racism and shows that undemocratic states were the first in the Americas to outlaw 
racial discrimination in immigrant selection. Indeed, Ecuador’s shift toward “competitive 
authoritarianism” (Levitsky and Way, 2010) under Correa increased his discretion to 
implement visa freedom, despite security concerns and racist prejudice among 
representatives of the institutions responsible for immigration (Freier, 2013c).  
Based on the case studies, we suggest three theoretical avenues for future research. 
First, scholars should further explore South American populist liberalism in the area of 
migration policies and in this context analyse the relationship between the region’s 
political turn to the left and its (discursive) liberal turn in migration policies. We have 
shown that this liberal shift in governmental immigration discourses and policies is based 
on the rejection of previous restrictive approaches to immigration of former authoritarian 
regimes, and, more importantly, the rejection of US-American and European immigration 
policies. The political salience of emigration and restrictive policies of Western migrant 
receiving states thus suggests focusing not only on domestic disputes but on how populist 
liberal immigration policies are shaped by international relations and other countries’ 
policies in the area of migration (FitzGerald and Cook-Martín, 2014).  
Second, the tensions that we have traced between populist liberal immigration 
discourses and policies and public opinion offer a promising avenue of future research 
regarding immigration policies and race. Populist support for liberal reforms, which is 
based on the rejection of US-American and European immigration policies, and the 
detection of elite racism (Van Dijk, 1993, Valluy) in the paradigmatic case of Ecuador, 
challenge established ideas of elite consensus equalling liberal tendencies and populism 
equalling protectionism (Cornelius et al., 1994, Freeman, 1995, Joppke, 1998b, Freeman et 
al., 2013). Restrictive responses to recent extra-continental south–south immigration can 
be partly explained by incompatible public opinion, which welcomes immigration policy 
liberalisation in theory but rejects poor and ethnically “unwelcome” immigrants. The case 
of Ecuador invites us to further test for elite racism in this and other cases.  
Third, regarding policy gaps and paradoxes, an important question worth 
exploring is in how far populist liberal immigration discourses leave less room for 
maneuver for actual policy adoption than restrictive discourses. This might be because 
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they do not oppose international human and migrants’ rights norms, but on the contrary, 
propel them. Domestic and international activist groups in such cases do not have to fight 
restrictive policies, but can rather press for coherence of liberal policies, simply by taking 
politicians at their word.  
Empirically, further research on Latin American immigration policies should be 
both narrowed down and broadened in scope. On the one hand, the dynamics of domestic 
policy-making, that could only be superficially traced in this comparative study, should be 
further untangled through in-depth case studies. At the same time, large N studies should 
test whether similar developments are taking place in other South and Central American, 
and Caribbean countries. Although the latter two sub regions have experienced similar or 
even higher emigration rates, it is likely that closer political affiliation to the Unites States 
weakens their liberal immigration discourses. Comparative studies should eventually 
include other predominantly migrant sending regions to test whether the tensions and 
dynamics between emigration concerns and immigration discourses and policies play out 
in a similar fashion.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In contrast to the much discussed puzzle of “why liberal states accept unwanted 
migration,” which rests on the definition of the immigration policy paradox as the gap 
between restrictive immigration policy discourses and comparatively liberal immigration 
policies, it is the exceptionally liberal immigration rhetoric of South American 
governments that is most surprising. The development of populist liberalism in the sphere 
of immigration has been driven by concerns regarding emigration and diaspora policies, 
and took place in counter-position to the immigration rhetoric of Western immigrant 
receiving states that rejects and criminalises irregular immigration. Our study suggests 
substantial variation in the degree to which legislative and policy change have followed 
discursive immigration policy liberalisation. While Argentina’s immigration policies and 
the 2004 Immigration Law present a significant liberal turn, larger discursive gaps persist 
in Brazil and Ecuador, which thus far have not embarked on comprehensive immigration 
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reforms. Regarding policy reactions to irregular extra-continental south–south migration, 
all three countries present the reverse policy paradox of publically welcoming all 
immigrants regardless of legal status or national origin, but de facto excluding immigrants 
from Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean, albeit to varying degrees.  
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THE IMPORTANCE OF ACCESS POLICIES IN SOUTH-SOUTH MIGRATION: 
ECUADOR'S POLICY OF OPEN DOORS AS A QUASI-EXPERIMENT 
 
 
Two research areas in migration studies remain understudied: the impact of tourist visas 
on global migration patterns and south-south migration. This paper argues that the 
interplay of short-stay visas of northern and southern countries is a key determinant of 
intercontinental south-south migration. Taking advantage of the quasi-experiment of 
Ecuador’s policy of universal visa freedom of 2008 to test the impact of the opening of 
borders of a Latin American country on previously restricted countries in Asia, Africa and 
the Caribbean, we show that on average, visa freedom duplicated immigration from these 
regions. Descriptive statistics and qualitative findings confirm the migratory motivation of 
extra-continental south-south entrants in the context of the perception of increasingly 
restricted access to their preferred northern destinations. They also highlight great 
variance in the magnitude and characteristics of these immigration flows. 
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“The necessary conditions for migration to occur may be social and economic,                                                                   
but the sufficient conditions are political and legal”                                                                                                                                                                 
(Hollifield, 2012 p. 281) 
“[W[hy did I come to Ecuador? It's not that I like Ecuador. I came because it's visa-free for Nigerians.”                                                
Nigerian asylum seeker  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A fundamental paradox characterises the post-World War II nation state-system: most 
people have the right to leave their home countries, but very few enjoy the right to freely 
choose where they want to move and settle. Article 13 of the non-binding Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 grants everyone the right to leave their home 
country, to emigrate. This right is respected by most governments44 and in theory implies 
the freedom to escape state repression, prosecution and economic hardship, or more 
generally, to seek better opportunities abroad. However, nowhere in international law is 
there a provision for the reciprocal right to immigrate, or even just travel to preferred 
international destinations (Sassen, 1996). Travel visas are important first access barriers 
for potential migrants and thus a significant immigration management tool. 
The degree of travel freedom of citizens is distributed asymmetrically across the 
world, with relatively free and wealthy countries concentrated in the northern 
hemisphere, whose citizens face few tourist visa restrictions, and citizens of relatively 
repressive and poor countries concentrated in the southern hemisphere, who face many 
(Neumayer, 2006, Whyte, 2008). Although, on average, visa-free mobility has increased 
over the past decades, the “global mobility divide” has also solidified (Mau et al., 2015). In 
the area of tourist visas, the principle of reciprocity is seldom applied, and OECD citizens 
enjoy expansive travel freedoms while their countries impose many restrictions on 
passport holders from southern countries.45 Countries with a history of violent political 
                                                
44 Historically, important exceptions have been Soviet Socialist Republics and other communist states. An 
example of a country that continues to have strict emigration policies, including a shoot-to-kill border 
policy, in place is Eritrea.  
45 Whyte (2008) analyses the Henley & Partners Visa Restriction Index 2006, and shows that citizens of the 
United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden had visa-free access to more than 160 countries. At the same time, 
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conflict and/or strictly autocratic regimes and very poor countries make up the group with 
the least travel freedom worldwide (Whyte, 2008).  
The majority of migrants who are able to leave poor, repressive or conflict-ridden 
states thus cannot legally enter free and safe northern countries of destination. For 
receiving countries, tourist visas are an important policy tool of immigration control, and 
compliance with visa requirements is not only enforced at national borders but forms part 
of the externalisation of northern immigration policies through foreign policy and carrier 
sanctions at airports in countries of origin (Geddes, 2005, Scholten, 2015). For both 
economic migrants and refugees, who most often can only claim asylum once they 
reached a safe country of destination, tourist visas thus represent an important “cliff at the 
border” (Pritchett, 2009). Northern governments make increasing efforts to keep 
“undesirable immigrants” from poor and repressive states and areas of conflict, especially 
from Africa and Asia, out of their territory (Finotelli and Sciortino, 2013, Czaika and de 
Haas, 2016). Many are deflected to undocumented and often perilous routes (Czaika and 
Hobolth, 2016), such as reaching Europe across the Mediterranean or crossing half of the 
Americas to enter the US and Canada. Others move to southern destinations instead 
(Hujo and Piper, 2010). 
Against this background it is important to explore what happens when relatively 
safe or economically attractive southern countries, or countries in geographically strategic 
locations for transit migration towards northern countries, lift visa restrictions for citizens 
from other countries in the south. In the context of increasing policy restrictiveness in the 
north, it is likely that tourist visa policies of southern countries significantly impact where 
south to north migration and refugee flows are diverted, and thus which new south-south 
flows emerge. In this paper we take advantage of the quasi-experiment of Ecuador’s policy 
of universal visa freedom of 2008 to test the impact of the opening of borders of a Latin 
American country on intercontinental immigration from previously restricted countries in 
Africa, Asia and the Caribbean. Complementary qualitative findings and descriptive 
                                                                                                                                      
the EU only granted visa-free access to citizens of 42 states. On the lower end of this hierarchy, Afghanistan, 
Iraq and Somalia had visa-free access to 26, 27 and 31 countries, see WHYTE, B. 2008. Visa-free Travel 
Privileges: An Exploratory Geographical Analysis. Tourism Geographies: An International Journal of Tourism 
Space, Place and Environment, 10 (2), 127-149. 
 80 
statistics on migrants’ motivations and characteristics fulfil three additional purposes. 
First, they confirm the migratory motivation of south-south entrants. Second, they probe 
the impact of the perception of increasingly restricted access to economically more 
attractive northern countries on the decision to move to Ecuador. Third, they more 
broadly help us understand not only how many migrants but who was attracted by 
Ecuador’s visa freedom.  
We understand south-south migration as broadly encompassing the international 
movement of economic migrants and refugees between and among developing nations 
and transitional economies in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and parts of Eastern Europe. 
The term “south” refers to comparatively less developed regions and countries, whereas 
the term ‘north’ refers to more developed regions or countries, including Europe and 
Northern America, Australia, New Zealand and Japan (UNDESA, 2012). It is important to 
point out that although this conceptual differentiation is heuristically useful and thus 
applied in this paper, the south-north terminology is misleading in that is not 
conceptually unambiguous (Bakewell, 2009, Campillo-Carrete, 2013), does not fully 
correspond to historic and geographic realities, and bears the risk of the normative 
naturalisation of a developmental divide between the two hemispheres.  
We find that Ecuador’s opening of borders increased the average monthly entries 
to Ecuador from previously restricted countries by 109 per cent. In the case of Chinese 
citizens, for which the policy was reversed in December 2008, the policy led to an increase 
of 642,7 per cent. For nine African and Asian countries, for which the policy was reversed 
in September of 2010, the monthly increase amounted to 590,1 per cent and for the 
previously restricted countries for which visas were not reintroduced, to 28,4 per cent. The 
reversal of the policy (reintroducing visa restrictions) led to a 70,9 per cent reduction in 
entry of Chinese citizens and a 90,7 per cent reduction in entry of citizens from the nine 
African and Asian countries. Qualitative findings confirm the migratory nature of these 
inflows and reveal three main motivations to migrate to Ecuador in the context of the 
perception of increasing closure of preferred northern destinations: 1. pressure to leave 
one’s country of origin; 2. onward migration, primarily to North America; and 3. settlement 
in Ecuador based on relatively better opportunities.  
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The paper proceeds as follows. The first section discusses the relevant literature on 
migration determinants and south-south migration. The second section presents the case 
study of Ecuador’s policy of open borders as a natural experiment to test the impact of visa 
policies on intercontinental south-south migration. The third section discusses the 
empirical model and quantitative results. Section four analyses south-south migrants’ 
characteristics and motivations. We then conclude. 
 
MIGRATION DETERMINANTS: A STRUCTURAL DISREGARD FOR TOURIST VISAS 
 
Scholars have identified diverse mechanisms that lead individuals to migrate. A broad 
consensus in the literature on both economic migration and refugee flows agrees that 
economic variables, such as wage differentials and differences in employment rates; 
political variables, such as the social and political context in both the country of origin and 
destination; spatial variables, such as distance and transportation costs; and affinity 
variables, such as religion, culture, language and kinship networks; are more important 
than access variables, or the rules of exit and entry into a country (for literature 
discussions see Cornelius and Rosenblum, 2005, Czaika and de Haas, 2013). 
The scholarly work that sees the determinants of international migration as 
overwhelmingly structural and well-established migration systems as resistant to policy 
regulation is largely based on qualitative studies. Quantitative evidence suggests that 
immigration and refugee policies significantly shape international migration patterns 
(Thielemann, 2006, Ortega and Peri, 2009, Mayda, 2010). Czaika and de Haas (2013) point 
out that the controversy about the impact of migration policies goes back to the lack of 
conceptual differentiation between policy effectiveness and policy effects. Although 
discursive and implementation gaps compromise the effectiveness of immigration 
policies, they have significant and often unintended effects on migratory patterns. 
Until recently, short-term visas have been surprisingly absent from the debate on 
political determinants of international migration (O'Byrne, 2001, Salter, 2003, Neumayer, 
2006). Only a few scholars have included tourist visas when looking at the impact of 
immigration policies on migration flows on an aggregated level (Hatton, 2004, Bertoli et 
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al., 2011). Conceptually, FitzGerald and Cook-Martín argue that short-stay visas, such as 
tourist visas, lie “at the margins of immigration policy” (FitzGerald and Cook-Martín, 2014 
p. 338), because they only manage the temporary visits of foreigners. Empirically, 
Bhagwati holds that visa policies do not matter because states are incapable of effectively 
controlling their borders (Bhagwati, 2003).  
It is true that national borders – even the high-tech securitised borders of 
developed countries – are never hermetically sealed. Nevertheless, past research on 
Europe indicates that the majority of irregular migrants enter their destination countries 
legally (Bigo and Guild, 2005, Collyer and de Haas, 2010, Düvell, 2011a) and then overstay 
their temporary visas. Legal entry significantly impacts the extent to which potential 
migrants perceive the movement to a specific country as a feasible option. As Brubaker 
puts it “[S]een from the outside – from the perspective of those turned down for tourist 
visas … – immigration control appears all too effective” (Brubaker, 1994 pp. 230-231).  
Another reason for the lack of studies of tourist visas has been the unattainability 
of reliable data. Both the lists of countries exempt of visas, and visa requirements 
themselves, change frequently and historic data is often difficult to obtain (Whyte, 2008). 
More recently, scholars have started to explore the impact of tourist visas as an 
immigration control policy. Neumayer (2011) and Bertoli and Fernández-Huertas (2012) 
coincide that tourist visa restrictions reduce bilateral flows of immigrants by around 40 
per cent, while increasing flows towards other destinations up to 17 per cent (Neumayer, 
2011, Bertoli and Fernández-Huertas, 2013). In the case of asylum applications in the EU, 
Czaika and Hobolth (2016) similarly find that bilateral asylum flows are more than 50 per 
cent lower for corridors with tourist visa restrictions.  
Most recently, the Determinants of International Migration (DEMIG) project used 
International Air Transport Association data to code tourist visa policy changes for 38 
issuing countries from 1973-2011. 46  Czaika and de Haas (2016) find that tourist visa 
restrictions significantly decrease immigration and emigration rates, thus decreasing 
circularity, encouraging long-term settlement and undermining migrants’ responsiveness 
to economic cycles. The advantage of analysing longitudinal bilateral data is that it allows 
                                                
46 The DEMIG VISA data will become publically available at some point in 2016. 
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for comprehensive results of overall policy effects. However, they do not reveal anything 
about the underlying causal processes and factors leading to the decision to migrate. 
 
GLOBAL MIGRATION PATTERNS: IGNORING SOUTH-SOUTH MIGRATION 
 
Both the UN Population Division and the World Bank estimate that south-south migration 
accounts for about a third of all international migration and for about half of all migration 
from developing countries (Ratha and Shaw, 2007, UNDESA, 2012, IDM, 2014) 
International migration shows the highest growth rates in the global south (Abel and 
Sander, 2014). If it were possible to properly account for irregular migration, this estimate 
would further increase; the UNHCR estimates that developing countries host 86 per cent 
of the world’s refugees. Nevertheless, international migration theory has focused on 
explaining south-north migration and has left the dynamics and characteristics of south-
south flows largely unexplored. Likewise, studies on the effects and effectiveness of 
immigration and refugee policies focus on the ability of North American and European 
governments to control south-north migration (Cornelius et al., 1994, Freeman, 1994, 
Guiraudon and Joppke, 2001, Durand and Massey, 2004, Messina and Lahav, 2006, Portes 
and DeWind, 2008).  
Thus, an extensive literature exists on migration and refugee flows to receiving 
countries in the global north, and the determinants and effects of northern immigration 
policies (Cornelius et al., 1994, Freeman, 1994, Gibney and Hansen, 2006, Thielemann, 
2012). By contrast, south-south migration and related trends in migration and asylum laws 
and policy in the global south are only beginning to be appreciated (De Lombaerde et al., 
2014). This bias reinforces the misconception that international migration occurs mainly 
from poor developing countries in the south to rich countries in the north. But south-
north migration is “just one piece of the complex web of migration” (Phelps, p. 2014) and 
migration scholars should pay more attention to the trajectories, actors and policies 
involved in south-south migration in order to understand the characteristics, 
determinants and interconnectivity of international migration systems. 
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While the majority of migratory movements in the south take place between 
neighbouring countries and within regions (Dumont et al., 2010, UNDESA, 2012), south-
south movements are extremely dynamic (Campillo-Carrete, 2013, De Lombaerde et al., 
2014). The distances in intraregional migration tend to become longer (Adepoju, 2004) and 
new interregional and even intercontinental routes are emerging (Souchaud, 2009, ACP, 
2012, Freier, 2013a). In Latin America, intercontinental south-south migration from Africa, 
Asia and the Caribbean, termed ‘extra-continental immigration’ by receiving 
governments, significantly increased in the past decade (OAS, 2010, Freier, 2013a). The 
intensification of inflows from Africa and Asia to Latin America, a region that offers 
smaller income increases, no cultural ties and is more expensive to reach than 
destinations in Europe, North America and Australia poses an intriguing research puzzle.  
Departing from the mainstream literature, a few econometric studies have used 
bilateral migration data to test how economic performance in sending and receiving 
countries determines south-south migration, however with conflicting results 
(Andreopoulos et al., 2005, Cummins et al., 2009, Dumont et al., 2010)47. It seems that 
“except for an initial relevance of country economic development differentials to initiate 
migration from relatively less to relatively more developed countries, there is nothing 
certain” (Campillo-Carrete, 2013). In essence, we know little about the characteristics, 
motivations and modes of migration of south-south migrants – who moves, why and 
under what conditions.  
Most generally, south-south flows have been identified as made up of mixed 
migration – economic migrants and refugees who make use of the same routes, means of 
transportation and smuggling networks (Bakewell, 2009, De Lombaerde et al., 2014). It has 
also been observed that south–south migrants differ from their south-north peers in that 
they are younger, possess relatively lower skills, less education and lower socio-economic 
                                                
47 Dumont et al. (2010) conclude that south-south migration increases steadily as the sender country income 
decreases, whereas Cummins et. al. (2009) affirm a non-linear negative relation between origin and 
destination country development, with the proposed implication that as the economic differentials of the 
two countries decrease, migration from the less to the more developed country would decrease as well, 
DUMONT, J.-C., SPIELVOGEL, G. & WIDMAIER, S. 2010. International Migrants in Developed, Emerging and 
Developing Countries: An Extended Profile. In: OECD (ed.) Employment and Migration Working Papers 
OECD Social. 
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levels (Campillo-Carrete, 2013, De Lombaerde et al., 2014). These findings are likely linked 
to the correlation between positive educational selectivity and distance travelled 
(Feliciano, 2005). It must be pointed out that most studies on south-south migration 
analyse intraregional flows, often between neighbouring countries. The finding of negative 
educational selectivity may thus not hold true for south-south migration between 
continents.  
In sum, in this study we seek to understand what impact the opening of borders of 
Ecuador, a relatively unattractive country in economic terms, had on south-south 
immigration from previously restricted countries. We also want to understand who the 
migrants attracted by visa freedom were. We thus combine the quantitative analysis of the 
impact of Ecuador’s visa policy on south-south migration with descriptive statistics and 
qualitative findings to uncover the underlying causal processes of the visa policy impact, 
and the characteristics and agency of new south-south migrants. Combining mixed 
methods into a single study (Lieberman, 2005) allows us to capitalise on the 
complementarity of both methods – large-sample quantitative data to establish the policy 
effect of visa freedom, and in-depth qualitative data to reveal the mechanisms underlying 
those effects.  
 
ECUADOR’S VISA POLICY AS A QUASI-EXPERIMENT   
 
In the past decade, when most countries in Europe and North America moved towards 
more restrictive immigration and refugee policies in the light of national security and the 
global economic and European refugee crisis, a substantial number of Latin American 
countries reformed their immigration and refugee policies in the context of what Acosta 
and Freier (2015) term “populist liberalism”. As these authors explain, the demand of the 
recognition of migrants’ rights by Latin American governments in the context of mass 
emigration fed back into countries’ immigration policies based on the logic of political 
reciprocity. The Argentine, Uruguayan and Bolivian immigration laws and Ecuador’s 2008 
Constitution led this legislative liberalisation process with the postulation of the “right to 
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migrate”, and in the case of Ecuador, “universal citizenship” (Acosta Arcarazo and Freier, 
2015). 
The specific case of policy liberalisation in Ecuador offers a unique natural 
experiment to test the impact of access policies on south-south migration. Although the 
country has thus far not reformed its restrictive 1971 immigration law, on June 20th 2008, 
President Rafael Correa effectively removed all visa requirements for individuals entering 
the country by presidential decree. The new policy allowed citizens of any nationality to 
enter Ecuador without a visa and stay for a period of ninety days. Under the new policy, 
entry was granted regardless of nationality, proof of funds, or a booked return trip, 
arguably making Ecuador the most accessible destination in the world.  
 
Figure 2: Map showing countries affected by the immigration policy 
 
 
The rational of quasi-experimental designs is to assess the causal effect of a variable that is 
changed through an exogenous shock or intervention on an outcome of interest (Cook 
and Campbell, 1979, Meyers, 1995). Ideally, this change occurs in a treatment group – as if 
randomly assigned with respect to other potential causes of different outcomes (Dunning, 
2008) – while the same variable is held constant in one or more comparable control 
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groups (Meyers, 1995). The reversal of the initial treatment strengthens evidence of a 
causal relationship between the treatment and the dependent variable, if the effect on the 
latter is thereby also reversed.  
Ecuador’s extreme policy of universal travel freedom makes for a quasi-
experiment to assess the impact of short-stay visa policies of a developing country on 
intercontinental south-south migration for a number of reasons. First, the policy change 
only affected citizens from 136 previously ‘restricted’ countries (PRCs) located primarily in 
Central America, Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and the Caribbean. Passport holders from 
57 previously ‘open’ countries (POCs) located primarily in North and South America, and 
Europe already enjoyed travel freedom to Ecuador. A map showing the countries affected 
by the immigration policy can be seen in Figure 2. The initial treatment of visa freedom 
was reversed for Chinese citizens on 1 December 2008, and for citizens of Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan and Somalia nationals 
another eighteen months later, on 3 September 2010.  
Second, the opening of borders was an external shock to Ecuadorian politics and 
exogenous to changing immigration flows. The treatment of policy change did not occur 
in response to within-state changes in either the outcome variable (south-south 
migration) itself, or in response to an unobserved factor that independently influences the 
outcome variable (Besley and Case, 2000). According to the official press release of the 
Ecuadorian Foreign Ministry, visa-free travel to Ecuador was implemented to apply the 
universal principle of free movement, which was shortly after enshrined in the 2008 
Constitution, and to further tourism to Ecuador.48 The fact that visa exemptions were 
already in place for all OECD countries except Mexico, most European countries, and all 
South American countries except Guyana and Suriname, makes the political motivation of 
promoting tourism questionable. It is unlikely that the government expected tourism from 
Asia, Africa, Central America and the Caribbean to increase.  
The true political rational behind the policy change was Correa’s strategy of 
positioning himself in a morally superior position vis-à-vis the US and Europe in the 
context of his diaspora politics (Margheritis, 2011, Acosta Arcarazo and Freier, 2015). It is 
                                                
48 http://www.mmrree.gob.ec/mre/documentos/novedades/pol_exterior/junio/bol398.htm. 
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no coincidence that Correa declared that he would “do away with the invention of the 
20th century of passports and visas”49 days before the European Parliament approved the 
Return Directive,50 which he polemically baptised the “Directive of Shame”, on 17th June 
2008. Importantly, for the quasi-experimental design of this paper, the implementation of 
visa-free travel to Ecuador was an external shock to Ecuadorian politics because it was a 
single-handed spontaneous decision by Correa that was not based on any domestic 
political debate.  
The policy change was not motivated by prior increases in immigration flows nor 
enacted as a response to an economical up-turn that could have also caused south-south 
immigration through increased labour demand. Migration to Ecuador decreased in the 
years before the policy change (Herrera Mosquera et al., 2012). Economic growth had 
recovered from the 1999 crisis but with a GDP growth rate of 4.4 per cent in 2006 but only 
2.2 per cent in 2007, the economy made a negative development prior to the annulment of 
all visa requirements. The official unemployment rate decreased from 7.2 per cent in 2000 
to 5 per cent in 2007 but still remained too high as to suggest an acute labour shortage that 
could have led to short-stay visa policy liberalisation for the sake of attracting economic 
immigration.51 
It the following section, the paper will test the effect of Ecuador’s open access 
policy on south-south migration. The quasi-experimental study design follows a 
difference-in-difference (DD) where the trend of monthly entries by citizens of 
nationalities not affected by the policy change provides a counterfactual for estimating 
the impact of the open access policy on south-south migration. We also use this method to 
estimate the impact of the partial reversal of the initial policy change.  
 
 
 
                                                
49  Agencia EFE, June 12, 2008, http://www.hoy.com.ec/noticias-ecuador/correa-elimina-el-visado-a-los-
extranjeros-297707-297707.html. 
50 DIRECTIVE 2008/115/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 16 December 2008. 
The Directive governs a broad range of issues, in particular an obligation to return irregular migrants, their 
treatment during expulsion proceedings, entry bans, procedural rights and the grounds and conditions for 
detention. 
51 http://data.worldbank.org/country. 
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Lechner explains the empirical strategy of the DD approach as follows: 
 
The idea of this empirical strategy is that if the two treated and the two nontreated groups [pre-
treatment treated, post-treatment treated, pre-treatment nontreated and post-treatment 
nontreated] are subject to the same time trends, and if the treatment has had no effect in the pre-
treatment period, then an estimate of the “effect” of the treatment in a period in which it is known 
to have none, can be used to remove the effect of confounding factors to which a comparison of 
post-treatment outcomes of treated and non- treated may be subject to. This is to say that we use 
the mean changes of the outcome variables for the nontreated over time and add them to the 
mean level of the outcome variable for the treated prior to treatment to obtain the mean outcome 
the treated would have experienced if they had not been subjected to the treatment (Lechner, 2010 
p. 168). 
 
The initial treatment of the quasi-experiment is the implementation of visa 
freedom, whereas the reintroduction of tourist visas for China in December of 2008 and 
nine other African and Asian countries in September of 2010 constitutes a partial reversal 
of the treatment. The treatment group are all previously restricted countries (PRCs), 
which is further divided in three sub-groups: Always Treated (AT), China, and Reversed 
(R). The comparison group are all previously open countries (POCs). As a robustness 
check, we also compare immigration from previously restricted countries to Ecuador and 
neighbouring Peru, a country that did not experience the same policy intervention, but is 
comparable across other migration determinants. 
 
EMPIRICAL MODEL AND RESULTS 
 
Since Ecuador does not gather official data on immigration and emigration stocks, we use 
entry data. Ecuador's National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INEC) made data 
publically available detailing all entries into and exits out of the country between 1999 and 
2014. For each entry and exit observation, the database contains information on the 
nationality of the individual, mode of transport, immigration office location, year, month, 
sex, age, occupation, visa status, motivation for travel and origin/destination. 
Unfortunately, no identification information is provided to allow the matching of an entry 
with a corresponding exit, and it is thus not possible to determine the length of stay for 
each entrant.  
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We argue that any increase in entries from PRCs captures immigration rather than 
increased tourist flows. Given the estimated average yearly income from 1999-2008 of 
individuals from PRCs ($8765.43) it is unlikely that visa freedom would have had a great 
impact on tourism. Travel to Ecuador from all PRCs requires an original trip by air or 
water, even if they enter from neighbouring countries, which carries a high minimum 
fixed cost making touristic intentions unlikely for the majority of PRC citizens. The 
minority of individuals from PRCs with the resources to travel as tourists to Ecuador 
would likely have been able to bear the costs of obtaining a prearranged tourist visa before 
the requirement to do so was removed and thus would have been largely unaffected by 
the 2008 policy change. 
For the purpose of this study, an immigrant is defined as any individual of foreign 
nationality entering Ecuador whose real motivation is not tourism. Given that we depart 
from the assumption that travellers from PRCs, in their majority, were not tourists even 
though they entered on tourist visas, only the observations of travellers from POCs 
entering Ecuador with tourist visas were removed from the sample. Data were then 
aggregated to a count of entrants by country of nationality (c) and month (m) to facilitate 
regression analysis.  In total, entry count data were recorded for 193 countries over 180 
months.   
 
Figure 3: Semi-annual Entrant Flow 1999-20 
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In December 2008, only six months after opening its doors, Ecuador reversed the policy for 
Chinese citizens. Another 18 months later, in September 2010, Ecuador reversed the policy 
for entrants carrying passports of nine additional countries.52 These reversals create four 
distinct treatment groups across four distinct time periods. Table 10 (see Appendix) shows 
each of these groups and their state of entry access across time. Figure 3 shows the flow of 
immigrants into Ecuador from each of these groups across the time periods of interest. 
We use a difference-in-difference (DD) approach to formalise the analysis of the 
impact of the open door policy and its subsequent reversal on each of the PRC sub-groups. 
For an entry into Ecuador to have been affected by the policy change, two conditions must 
be satisfied: first, the entry must have taken place while the open door policy was in effect; 
and second, Ecuador must have previously required a pre-arranged visa for visitors with 
the entrant’s nationality. This suggests a DD strategy for estimating policy effects that 
relies on a comparison of entry flows of immigrants from previously restricted and open 
countries, both before and after policy implementation.  The basic DD regression model is 
then: 
 𝑀  !" = 𝛾𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑎! + 𝜇𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦! + 𝛽 𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑎! ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦! + 𝛼! + 𝜀!"     (1) 
 
where 𝑀  !"  is the number of entrants into Ecuador from nationality c in month m and 𝛼!  
is a country of origin fixed effect.  𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑎!  is a dummy for the visa requirement (based on 
nationality of the entrant) and 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦!  is a time dummy that switches on once the policy 
change is in effect. Country of origin fixed effects control for the average differences across 
nationalities in any observable or unobservable predictors, such as differences in 
language, distance, wealth. For countries where the policy was later reversed, two time 
dummies can be included, one for the removal of the visa restriction, and one for the 
reintroduction of the restriction.  
 
 
                                                
52 For a discussion of the reasons for the reintroduction of visas see Paper Three. 
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Equation (1) above can then be modified to include the three treatment groups and three 
treatment periods (AT, China, Rev): 
 𝑀  !" = 𝛾!"𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑎!"! + 𝛾!!!"#𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑎!!!"#! +   𝛾!"#𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑎!"#!  +𝜇𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦! + 𝜑!!!"#𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙!!!"#! + 𝜑!"#𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙!"#!  +𝛽!" 𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑎!"! ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦!+ 𝛽!!!"# 𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑎!!!"#  ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦!   +   𝛽!"# 𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑎!"#! ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦!  +𝜃!!!"# 𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑎!!!"#! ∙ 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙!!!"#! + 𝜃!"# 𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑎!"#! ∙ 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙!"#!  +𝛼! + 𝜀!"    (2) 
 
 In accordance with the literature on running regression analysis with count data, a 
generalised linear model was used to estimate equation (2) (Cameron and Trivedi, 2013). 
Due to the over-dispersion of the entry count variable, a negative binomial probability 
distribution family was chosen over a Poisson distribution. The estimation results of 
equation (2) provided in the first column of Table 3 (as Incident Rate Ratios) show that 
removing visa restrictions led to a 28.4 per cent increase in the monthly immigration flow 
into Ecuador from PRCs for which the policy was never reversed (AT). It led to a 642.7 per 
cent increase for Chinese citizens and a 590.1 per cent for the other group of nine African 
and Asian countries for which the policy was later reversed.  Scaling these estimates by the 
number of recorded pre-policy entries from each group leads to a total average increase of 
109.1 per cent as a result of the ‘open door’ policy.  
The impact of the subsequent reversal of the open door policy for citizens from 
China and nine additional countries is also estimated in equation (2), and the results are 
shown in the first column of Table 3. The reinstatement of visa requirements for Chinese 
citizens six months later in December of 2008 led to a 70.9 per cent decrease in entry, 
while the reversal of the policy for the other group of nine African and Asian countries in 
September 2010 led to a 90.7 per cent decrease in entry. The results indicate that the policy 
change and subsequent reversal had a net positive effect on Chinese citizens (𝜃 > 1/𝛽), 
with Chinese migration to Ecuador after the policy reversal “overshooting” (Czaika and de 
Haas, 2016) pre-treatment levels.  
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Table 3: Policy effects on entry 
 
  Equation (2) Equation (3) Equation (2) 
VARIABLES 
Ecuador Entry  
1999-2014 
Ecuador Entry  
1999-2014 
Peru Entry  
1999-2014 
        
Policy x Always Treated Citizens 1.284*** 0.958 1.124 
  (0.116) (0.093) (0.120) 
Policy x Chinese Citizens 7.427*** 5.998*** 1.005 
  (0.421) (0.552) (0.085) 
Policy x Reversed Citizens 6.901*** 5.374** 1.422 
  (3.306) (3.602) (0.454) 
Policy Reversal x Chinese Citizens 0.291*** 0.276*** 1.106* 
  (0.015) (0.021) (0.064) 
Policy Reversal x Reversed Citizens  0.093*** 0.066*** 0.636* 
  (0.035) (0.031) (0.161) 
Policy 1.155** 1.430*** 1.593*** 
 
(0.065) (0.131) (0.134) 
Policy Reversal (China) 1.137*** 1.101 0.936 
 
(0.055) (0.085) (0.050) 
Policy Reversal (Rev) 1.199*** 1.354*** 1.503*** 
 
(0.052) (0.076) (0.076) 
Always Treated Citizens 0.000*** 0.870 0.001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.086) (0.000) 
Chinese Citizens 1.057*** 0.493*** 0.267*** 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.011) 
Reversed Citizens 0.004*** 1.184 0.000*** 
 
(0.001) (0.706) (0.000) 
Constant 237.150*** 304.114*** 1,868.120*** 
 
(2.893) (13.792) (73.951) 
    Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 34,560 48,600 41,856 
Robust standard errors, clustered by nationality, in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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As will be discussed in the section four, the net positive effect on Chinese citizens can be 
explained by increased legal migration in the context of the intensification of economic 
collaboration. The lifting of visa requirements and reversal however had a net negative 
effect on the other group of nine African and Asian countries (𝜃 < 1/𝛽). The net negative 
effect on the other group of nine African and Asian countries is linked to the main 
motivation of transmigrating to North America. With the reintroduction of visa 
requirements it is likely that they, or the people smugglers they contracted, now chose 
other, less costly routes. These findings suggest an asymmetrical effect of policy change: 
the impact of policy liberalisation does not mirror the effects of a policy change in an 
opposite, more restrictive direction (ibid.). 
Another way of testing the impact of Ecuador’s visa policy on south-south 
migration is comparing the migration from PRCs to a comparable destination. If the same 
migration flows increased to a comparable country that did not experience the policy 
treatment of open borders, this would undermine the robustness of our findings. Peru 
offers a suitable comparison, as it did not experience the same policy intervention, but is 
similar across other migration determinants. Pre-treatment differences arguably exist 
between Ecuador and Peru, and Peru can thus only offer an imperfect control case.  
Regarding economic pull-factors, or differential variables, migrant’s decisions are 
seen as essentially guided by processes of income maximisation and risk minimisation due 
to increased employment opportunities (Harris and Todaro, 1970, Borjas, 1989). Both 
Ecuador and Peru are lower-middle income countries. Ecuador’s GDP per capita stood at 
US$ 4,256 and Peru’s at US$ 4,247 in 200853. The unemployment rate was 6.0 per cent in 
Ecuador and 4.5 per cent in Peru. The economic pull-factors that might have enticed 
potential immigrants to move to Peru or Ecuador arguably are comparable between the 
two countries.  
As far as historic pull-factors or affinity variables are concerned, such as 
ideological or cultural links based on colonial legacies and social networks (Massey et al., 
1993), Peru and Ecuador are similarly “foreign” to African, Asian and Caribbean migrants. 
Spanish is the official language in both countries, which is an equal hindrance for African, 
                                                
53 http://data.worldbank.org/country. 
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Asian, and French- and English-speaking Caribbean migrants and an equal advantage for 
Spanish-speaking Caribbean migrants. In both countries small groups of African slaves 
arrived during the colonial era, followed by Chinese slave workers after the official end of 
slavery. Afro-Peruvian and Afro-Ecuadorian, as well as Chinese communities exist in both 
countries. However, in 2008 there were no significant communities of more recent extra-
continental immigrants in Peru and Ecuador that could have offered strong social 
networks.  
Regarding spatial variables, geographic proximity between countries of origin and 
countries of destination impacts international migration patterns because shorter 
distances mean easier access due to lower transportation costs. Ecuador and Peru are 
similarly difficult to reach for African, Asian and Caribbean migrants. There are no direct 
flights from Africa and Asia to Ecuador or Peru, and the most economic options via 
European countries are often barred because they require transit visas. Most Asian and 
African interviewees in Ecuador had paid various thousand US$ for their journey.  
Lastly, as concerns political pull factors, Thielemann points out that ‘political 
concerns about personal security and migrants’ acceptance into a new host society can be 
expected to be important considerations for potential migrants’ (Thielemann, 2006 p. 88). 
Ecuador and Peru can both be considered relatively free and peaceful countries. In 2008, 
Freedom House rated Ecuador with 3 points as partly free and Peru as free with 2.5 points 
(Freedom House 2008). Regarding the expected acceptance into the new host society, it is 
worth pointing out that in the World Economic Forum (WEF)’s recent Travel & Tourism 
Competitiveness Reports, Ecuador scores significantly below Peru regarding attitudes 
towards foreigners.54 Regarding political pull factors, Peru can thus be considered more 
attractive to potential immigrants than Ecuador.  
 In equation (2) above, we used Ecuadorian entry data to estimate the impact of 
the open access policy on entry from previously restricted countries, where entries from 
previously open countries served as the counterfactual. Entry data for Peru are publically 
available, and thus, it is possible, as a robustness check, to estimate the same impact, this 
                                                
54  The WEF asks “How welcome are foreign visitors in your country?”. The data can be used as a proxy for 
xenophobic sentiment. In 2009, Ecuador ranked on place 107 and Peru on place 85 out of 140 countries.  
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time using entries from PRCs into Peru as the counterfactual. Modifying equation (2) from 
above, we have: 
 𝑀  !" =  !"𝐸𝑐𝑢𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑟!"! + 𝛾!!!"#𝐸𝑐𝑢𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑟!!!"#! +   𝛾!"#𝐸𝑐𝑢𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑟!"#!  +𝜇𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦! + 𝜑!!!"#𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙!!!"#! + 𝜑!"#𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙!"#!  +𝛽!" 𝐸𝑐𝑢𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑟!"! ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦!+ 𝛽!!!"# 𝐸𝑐𝑢𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑟!!!"#! ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦!   +   𝛽!"# 𝐸𝑐𝑢𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑟!"#! ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦!  +𝜃!!!"# 𝐸𝑐𝑢𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑟!!!"#! ∙ 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙!!!"#! + 𝜃!"# 𝐸𝑐𝑢𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑟!"#! ∙ 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙!"#!  +𝛼! + 𝜀!"  (3) 
 
where 𝐸𝑐𝑢𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑟!  is a dummy for the country of entry. 
 
The results, shown in the second column of Table 3, are consistent with our earlier results 
in both direction and magnitude. The result least robust to the alternative method is the 
effect of the policy on entrants for which it was never reversed (AT). This result is no 
longer significant, hinting at the less pronounced impact of the policy on this group.     
There are two reasons why we chose to use POC entry into Ecuador as the 
counterfactual in our primary specification and not PRC entry into Peru. The primary 
reason is the endogeneity that may arise when Ecuador’s open access policy affects an 
individual’s decision to enter Peru. While we feel comfortable arguing that the open access 
policy did not have a significant impact on the decision of individuals from POCs to enter 
Ecuador, we can imagine that it may have impacted the decisions of individuals from 
PRCs to enter Peru. Individuals from PRCs considering to enter Peru before Ecuador 
removed visa restrictions may be more likely to decide to enter Ecuador (and not Peru) 
once the open access policy was in effect. To test this theory, we estimated equation (2) 
using the Peruvian entry data.  
The results, shown in the third column of Table 3, show that there does not appear 
to be an effect of Ecuador’s visa policy on entry into Peru.  However, drilling down and 
running equation (2) for China only shows a relatively small, but statistically significant 
impact on Chinese entries to Peru as a result of Ecuador’s ‘open door’ policy (15 per cent 
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reduction) and subsequent reversal (35 per cent increase). This may indicate a 
geographical substitution effect (Czaika and Hobolth, 2016) whereby the removal of visa 
restrictions in Ecuador may be causing Chinese immigrants, who would have chosen Peru 
as a destination, to choose Ecuador instead.  
The second reason why we chose to use POC entry into Ecuador as the 
counterfactual in our primary specification and not PRC entry into Peru is because the 
Peruvian entry data available to us did not include data on entrant characteristics (age, 
gender, origin of travel, etc.).  Without these characteristics we would not be able to carry 
out the analysis provided in the following section on how the immigration policy 
impacted the type of entrant who decided to travel to Ecuador.  
 
MIGRANT CHARACTERISTICS, MOTIVATIONS AND AGENCY 
 
We have shown that Ecuador’s visa freedom had a significant impact on entries from PRCs 
in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean and theorised that most of these entrants were migrants 
rather than tourists. In the INEC data we also have basic information on the 
characteristics of each entrant such as age, sex, and origin of travel. Replacing the 
dependant variable, 𝑀  !" , in equation (2) above with 𝐴𝑔𝑒  !"# , 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟  !" , and 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒  !"# , respectively, allows us to examine how the policy change affected the 
composition of entrants from each group (AT, China, nine others) across those 
characteristics.55  Among the group that was always affected by the policy change (AT), the 
composition of entrants appears to be about 2 years younger after the policy treatment.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
55 𝐴𝑔𝑒  !"# is the age of the individual (i), with nationality (c), entering in month (m); 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟  !" is the 
proportion of males with nationality (c), entering in month (m); and 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒  !"# is the straight line 
distance travelled by individual (i), with nationality (c), entering in month (m). 
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Table 4: Policy Effects on Composition 
VARIABLES Age Distance Prop Male 
        
policy_visa_at -1.778* -39.510 0.021 
  (1.063) (100.690) (0.013) 
policy_visa_china -10.071*** 3,541.623*** -0.034*** 
  (0.350) (84.480) (0.011) 
policy_visa_rev -4.938*** 628.910 0.178*** 
  (1.080) (405.603) (0.020) 
reversal_china_visa_china 7.677*** -319.508*** 0.097*** 
  (0.346) (69.958) (0.010) 
reversal_rev_visa_rev 3.417*** 579.888 -0.158*** 
  (0.880) (417.026) (0.029) 
policy 1.560*** 117.819 -0.002 
 
(0.350) (84.480) (0.011) 
reversal_china -0.325 -100.673* 0.000 
 
(0.313) (55.911) (0.009) 
reversal_rev 1.064*** 257.234** -0.007 
 
(0.181) (114.875) (0.008) 
visa_at -1.805* 3,993.308*** -0.062*** 
 
(0.998) (86.138) (0.009) 
visa_china -5.412*** 3,761.056*** -0.016*** 
 
(0.172) (30.214) (0.004) 
visa_rev -9.298*** 3,189.550*** -0.123*** 
 
(0.990) (381.656) (0.016) 
Constant 42.105*** 3,038.050*** 0.716*** 
 
(0.172) (30.214) (0.004) 
    Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,652,900 1,652,168 15,682 
Robust standard errors, clustered by nationality, in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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For Chinese citizens, once the open door policy took effect, entrants were, on average, 10 
years younger, 3.4 per cent more female, and travelled 3,500km further. Entrants from the 
other 9 countries for which visas were reintroduced were, on average, 5 years younger and 
18 per cent more male after the introduction of visa freedom, and travelled 1100km further 
(see Table 4). This might be indication for family reunification in the case of Chinese 
versus pioneer migration (Lindstrom and Ramírez, 2010) in the case of other previously 
restricted countries. Visa freedom not only had an impact on the magnitude but also on 
the composition of extra-continental south-south flows. To understand these findings and 
the causal mechanisms of the visa policy impact on migrants’ decision-making process, it 
is necessary to zoom our analysis further in and examine the individual migrant groups 
affected by the policy change. 
The following section explores some complementary qualitative findings and 
descriptive statistics in order to confirm the migratory motivation and the perception of 
increasingly restricted access to economically more attractive northern countries. At the 
same time, the section seeks to improve our understanding of the magnitude and 
characteristics of recent extra-continental south-south immigration. The analysis includes 
immigrants from 12 PRCs: Chinese immigrants for whom visa-freedom only lasted four 
months; the nine nationals for whom visa requirements were reintroduced after two years; 
and Cuban and Haitian migrants as these are the nationalities with the highest increase of 
immigration from the group for whom visa freedom was not reversed in the period under 
analysis.  
The qualitative findings are based on field research that was conducted in Quito, 
Ecuador, between May and August 2011 and included interviews with 58 African, Asian 
and Caribbean immigrants. In total, information on approximately 80 immigrants was 
gathered in an accompanying survey (see Table 12). Interviews with immigrants were 
conducted at various sites to ensure a more representative sample of the different 
migratory situations and legal statuses: the Ministry of the Interior; waiting rooms of the 
provincial headquarters of the Immigration Police in Pichincha (Province of Quito); the 
Directorate of Refugees (Dirección General de Refugiados); the Nigerian congregation of La 
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Iglesia Remedia Cristiana de Dios in Quito; and the neighborhoods of La Florida, Santa 
Clara and La Mariscal.  
Although migrant populations were hard to reach, interviews and surveys with 
migrants avoided snowball sampling (Berg, 2004) and were conducted at various sites to 
ensure a more representative sample of the different migratory situations and legal 
statuses. Given the exploratory nature of the research on migrants’ motivations and 
characteristics, interviewees were selected only on grounds of nationality and also include 
migrants that reached Ecuador before universal visa freedom was implemented in 2008 
(see Appendix, Table 12). Only eleven of these interviews were recorded and transcribed, 
as the majority of immigrants felt uncomfortable with the idea of having their testimonials 
taped.  
 
“Tourist” Entries versus Structural Home Country Factors 
 
We have thus far assumed that most of entrants of PRCs were migrants rather than 
tourists, although they took advantage of the policy of visa free travel for the purpose of a 
90-day tourist stay and entered on tourist visas. After the policy change 12x tourist visas 
were indiscriminately extended to visitors at all ports of entry.  
Indeed, Table 5 shows that almost all citizens from the 12 countries under 
consideration entered Ecuador on 12X tourist visas via international airports and also 
officially declared tourism to be the motivation for the visit. The fact that almost all 
visitors from the PRCs under consideration entered on 12x tourist visas supports our 
findings that their choice of Ecuador as a destination was determined by the policy of 
open doors. Noteworthy exceptions are Bangladeshis migrants, 29 per cent of which 
entered by land and eleven per cent by sea. Also, only 44 per cent of Cubans entered on 
tourist visas with 42 per cent declaring tourism as their motivation.  
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Table 5: Modes of Entry and Structural Home Country Factors 
COUNTRY 
Percentage 
via Airport 
(Visa free)* 
 
Percentage 
Visa 12X 
(Visa free)* 
 
Percentage 
Tour. Motiv. 
(Visa free)* 
 
GDP  
Per capita 
(2008) 
 
Freedom 
House** 
(2008) 
Visa Free 
destinations 
(2008) 
 Travel 
Freedom 
(2008) 
Somalia 99 100 92 - 7 25 87/89 
Afghanistan 99 88 78 384.1 5 22 89/89 
Ethiopia 96 99 92 325.8 5  29 83/89 
Nepal 90 96 90 476.6 4.5 32 32/89 
Kenya 97 96 83 938.6 3.5 58 50/89 
Eritrea 97 98 90 306.7 6.5 29 83/89 
Bangladesh 60 97 85 618.1 4.5 39 73/89 
Nigeria 86 94 83 1,376.9 4 45 67/89 
Pakistan 90 84 74 1,042.8 5.5 25 87/89 
China 96 86 79 3,441.2 6.5 33 79/89 
Cuba 97 44 42 5,385.7 7 42 70/79 
Haiti 98 98 92 674.7 4.5 36 76/89 
Data Sources: INEC, World Bank, Freedom House; Henley & Partners Visa Restriction Index 
*Visa free periods: China (July 2008 – Nov. 2008), Cuba and Haiti (July 2008 – 2014), All others (July 
2008 – Aug. 2010); ** (1=most free; 7=least free) 
 
As argued before, the fact that extra-continental south-south migrants in their majority 
came from (very) poor and unfree countries, as measured by GDP per capita data and the 
Freedom House Index 2008, makes us doubt that the main motivation for travelling to 
Ecuador was tourism. The data from the Henley & Partner Visa Restriction Index 2008 
show that these 12 countries were not only characterised by being poor and repressive but 
also by ranking among the nations with the least travel freedom worldwide (as a means of 
comparison, Danish citizens ranked on place 1/89 and could travel to 157 visa free 
destinations in 2008). It is thus more likely that citizens from these PRCs saw visa free 
travel to Ecuador as an opportunity to leave their home countries and regions.  
Given the relatively low level of average income ($8,233) and high level of 
inequality (51.9) in Ecuador from 1999-2008, as compared to the PRCs ($9,979 and 39.5 
respectively) and the fact that Ecuador shares a porous border with Columbia and Peru, 
which facilitates irregular transmigration to other destinations in South or North America.  
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it seems more probable that immigrants would continue their journey than to choose 
Ecuador as a final destination. Qualitative research with Asian, African and Caribbean 
citizens and NGO workers confirmed that practically no citizens from PRCs entered 
Ecuador to explore the country as tourists. The most important motivation for both 
economic migrants and refugees was to use Ecuador as a gateway to the American 
continent, mostly with the intention to transmigrate to the US. However, in some cases, 
visa freedom implied an important exit option out of countries of origin. This was 
especially true in two cases: for refugees and for Cuban nationals.  
 
Seeking Asylum: Refugees or Regularisation Strategies 
 
We assume that the migrants from PRCs who chose Ecuador as a safe haven to escape 
persecution or generalised violence in their home countries would seek asylum at the 
airport or shortly after entering Ecuador. The only nationality with a significant number of 
entries on 12 IV refugee and asylum visas was Afghanistan with 8 per cent (for all other 
nationalities the share of entries on the 12 IV visas was below 1 per cent).  Comparing the 
number of entries in the visa free periods with the number of asylum claims for each 
nationality filed in the following year(s), gives us a rough idea of the percentage of 
migrants who applied for asylum.56  
Roughly 30 per cent, of Afghans, Pakistanis, Nigerians, Bangladeshis and Somalis, 
17 per cent of Eritreans and 10 per cent of Nepalese and 7 per cent of Ethiopians filed 
asylum claims after arriving in Ecuador. The low acceptance rates of refugees in many 
cases (Table 6, third column) do not necessarily imply that these were not genuine asylum 
claims. Rather they have to be read in combination with the rate of abandoned asylum 
applications. For example, only roughly 7 per cent of Eritrean asylum applicants were 
accepted as refugees from 2009-2013. However, considering that about 85 per cent of 
                                                
56 This is an imperfect approximation because data on asylum claims are only available per year, whereas 
entries for the visa free periods were calculated per month. We consider the available data on asylum claims 
for the year(s) 2009-2013 for Cuba and Haiti, 2009 for China, and 2009-2010 for all others. The data for Cuba 
and Haiti must be updated for 2014/15 as soon as it becomes available. 
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Eritreans abandoned their asylum applications, this amounts to a rejection rate of under 
10 per cent.  
 
Table 6: Asylum Applications 
Country 
 
Percentage 
Asylum 
Applications 
 
Percentage 
Abandoned 
mid 2011 
 
Percentage 
Excepted 
2009-13 
Cuba 4 13 0.4 
Haiti 3 37 3 
China 0.6 63 0 
Pakistan 32 29 32 
Nigeria 34 28 5 
Bangladesh 29 54 0.3 
Eritrea 17 85 6.8 
Kenya 0 0 0 
Nepal 10 40 1.7 
Ethiopia 7 42 7.1 
Afghanistan 33 13 59 
Somalia 33 44 4 
Data Sources: Dirección General de Refugiados and UNHCR 
 
The high rates of abandoned asylum applications suggests that many migrants, whether 
genuine refugees or economic migrants, filed asylum claims to legalize their stay in 
Ecuador before transmigrating to other destinations. Indeed, interviewed representatives 
of the UNHCR and NGO representatives voiced concern about both the misuse of the 
institution of asylum as a means of seeking legal status after the permitted 90-day period. 
The representative of the UNHCR in Quito explained that there were accounts of the same 
African and Asian individuals filing asylum claims in various countries along their journey 
from Africa to the US.  
At the same time these interviewees stressed that among the mixed migrant flows 
were genuine refugees. Indeed, the nationalities with the highest probability of being 
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refugees based on the number of overall refugees originating from these countries57, also 
showed the highest percentage of abandoned asylum applications: Eritrea (85 per cent), 
Somalia (44 per cent) and Ethiopia (42 per cent). There is ample journalistic evidence of 
West African and especially Eritrean refugees making their way through Ecuador and 
across the Americas to reach the US.58  
  
Estimating Magnitudes and Demographic Characteristics 
 
In order to reach an estimation of the size and characteristics of the migrant populations 
present in Ecuador, Table 7 compares the number of entries and net migration rates for 
each nationality during the respective visa free periods, the 2010 census data and the size 
of the respective migrant populations present in Ecuador in mid-2011, as estimated by 
leaders of the respective communities, NGO representatives and officials. The table 
further lists average ages and the percentage of men for the respective visa free periods. 
As pointed out above, it is impossible to link entry and exit data to individuals. 
However, comparing entry data with net migration rates (entries minus exists) provides a 
rough indication of how many individuals from PRCs stayed beyond the permitted 90-day 
tourist stay, or left without being captured by border officials. While in some cases the net 
migration comes very close to the number of entries, such as Eritrea and Somalia, in 
others, such as Cuba, there is a significant divergence, indicating that a majority of Cubans 
officially left Ecuador again, or even travelled back and forth between the two countries.  
At the same time, the mid 2011 estimations of the Cuban population, as in the 
cases of China and Haiti, lie considerably above the 2010 census data, which points to 
immigrant communities with irregular status. For the other nine nationalities, the mid-
2011 estimates tend to be lower than census data and net migration rates, which suggests 
irregular transmigration to other destinations.  Indeed, immigrants from Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Somalia, Kenya and Nepal seemed untraceable in the qualitative research process. 
Interviews with NGO representatives and the UNHCR suggested that these groups, upon 
their arrival in Ecuador, almost immediately continued their journey northwards towards 
                                                
57 http://data.worldbank.org/country. 
58 E.g. http://www.merip.org/mer/mer275/eritrean-refugees-trek-through-americas. 
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the US and Canada. For Bangladeshis, Nigerians, Pakistanis, Chinese, Cubans and 
Haitians, interviews revealed migrant communities present in Ecuador, predominantly in 
Quito.  
Table 7: Magnitude and demographic characteristics 
COUNTRY 
Entries 
(Visa free)*  
Net Mig. 
(Visa free)* 
Census  
2010 
Estimated Pop. 
Mid 2011  
  
Average Age 
(Visa free)* 
Percent. Male 
(Visa free)* 
Afghanistan 145 60 73 100 30 82 
Ethiopia 391 298 10 > 50 30 75 
Nepal 451 311 23 > 50 32 91 
Kenya 454 277 12 > 50 29 75 
Eritrea 662 628 - > 50 29 76 
Bangladesh 743 516 46 100 31 96 
Nigeria 935 435 197 250 34 90 
Pakistan 1,083 466 271 100 32 95 
China 10,746 6672 3,016 20,000 28 66 
Cuba 130,571 14,443 7004 10,000 38 65 
Haiti 22,805 16,480 528 1,000 31 79 
*Visa free periods: China (July 2008 – Nov. 2008), Cuba and Haiti (July 2008 – 2014), All others (July 
2008 – Aug. 2010) 
 
Regarding the demographic characteristics of these inflows, they were predominantly 
young men in their late twenties and early thirties. This is an interesting finding as the 
literature points out the feminisation of international migration in recent decades 
(Morrison et al., 2008, Donato and Gabaccia, 2015), with almost half of all international 
migrants being women (Taylor, 2006). However, women tend to claim a larger share in 
migration to developed countries, i.e. in south-north migration flows (ibid.).  
The overwhelmingly large share of men in inflows from Nepal, Bangladesh, 
Nigeria, and Pakistan suggests that these are pioneer migrants (Lindstrom and Ramírez, 
2010), who are either single or move alone to explore new migratory routes to Ecuador and 
beyond, before their wives and children follow. In these cases, predominantly male 
migration might also be related to cultural factors of patriarchic societies. The larger share 
of women from the Horn of Africa might be an indication of these flows being connected 
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to the refugee crisis, which equally affects men and women.59 The relatively large share of 
women in the cases of China, Cuba and Haiti in the context of migrant communities 
present in Ecuador suggests family and network migration. In the cases of Cuba and Haiti, 
it might also be the case that geographic and cultural proximity make Ecuador a less 
“risky” destination, which increases the share of female migrants. 
 
Building (on) Networks and a Future in Ecuador  
 
The qualitative research identified three groups with relatively strong aspirations to 
remain and work in Ecuador: Chinese, Cubans and Nigerians. In all three cases, ethnic 
communities were already present in Ecuador before the policy change. In the ten years 
before visa freedom, 28,700 Chinese and 27,500 Cubans but only 465 Nigerians had made 
their way to Ecuador. From 1998-2008, 9 per cent of Nigerians, 15 per cent of Chinese, 24 
per cent of Cubans citizens had entered on family visas. On the one hand side, family 
migration can be rated as an indication of growing ethnic communities. However, 
qualitative research also revealed the common occurrence of fraudulent marriages, 
especially in the case of Cuban migrants. Based on Art. 8.4 of the 2008 Constitution, 
citizenship could be acquired very easily through marriage with an Ecuadorian citizen, 
and there were various accounts of criminal networks facilitating fraudulent marriages 
and false documentation. It is also noteworthy that before the policy change, 9 per cent of 
Nigerians and 19 per cent of Chinese citizens entered on investor visas. In the case of 
China this reflects the growing economic collaboration between the two countries since 
2008 (see Paper Three). As pointed out above, the percentage of Cubans entering on 12x 
tourist visas since 2008 is comparatively low (44 per cent). From 2008 to 2014, 10 per cent 
of Cubans entered with work contracts, 5 per cent as professionals and 15 per cent on a 12 
IX tourist visa extending 91 days. 
Given their dominant numeric presence, it was surprising that it was almost 
impossible to conduct interviews with Chinese immigrants. According to Alejandro Díaz 
Chong, an Ecuadorian businessman of Chinese descent and Secretary of the 
                                                
59 http://data.unhcr.org/horn-of-africa/regional.php. 
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Confederation and Association of the Chinese Colony in Ecuador (Confederación y 
Associación de la Colonia China en Ecuador), Chinese immigrants reject being interviewed 
due to time constraints and language barriers. In the case of Chinese, interviews with 
Leonardo Carrión, State Secretary for Migration, Gu Jiafeng, political advisor of the 
Embassy of the People’s Republic of China, and Alejandro Díaz Chong, suggested that 
most of the recent Chinese immigrants were young adults with medium to low 
educational levels who came to Ecuador to work in Chinese restaurants and businesses. 
The research process entailed seventeen in-depth interviews with Cuban 
immigrants, who saw Ecuador’s visa freedom and the friendly relationship between the 
two countries, which made obtaining a passport and the required official travel 
permission more likely, as their chance to leave Cuba60. Most interviewees came to 
Ecuador with entrepreneurial aspirations or wished to work in their professions as 
doctors, nurses and teachers. However, this was seldom possible due to the lack of regular 
immigration status. A Cuban university teacher expressed her consternation over the fact 
that most Cubans were attracted by what she called the “Ecuadorian dream” of saving 
money in US Dollars but ended up barely covering their living expenses. According to 
these records, those Cubans who could regularise their migratory status found a lucrative 
business opportunity in the semi-official export of articles of daily use, e.g. cloths and 
soap, to Cuba. This business strategy might explain the high number of Cuban entries 
compared to the Cuban net migration rate. Cubans also expressed aspirations of 
eventually reaching the US and Canada.  
Transmigration to the US and Canada was an initial motivation that came up in 
most of the interviews with nineteen Nigerian immigrants. However, Ecuador also 
presented the opportunity of settlement. Three interviewees explained that the US and 
Canada had lost appeal to them as final destinations because of the ongoing economic 
crisis. Others were stranded because they lacked the financial means to continue their 
onward journey. They then found life partners and/or business opportunities and decided 
to stay. While newly arrived Nigerian immigrants tend to work as English teachers, others 
                                                
60 As of January 13, 2013, all Cuban government-imposed travel restrictions and controls have been abolished 
based on Decree 302 of 11 October 2012. 
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who have stayed in Ecuador for longer own their own businesses, such as automobile 
garages.  
In the case of Bangladeshi immigrants, qualitative research confirmed a point 
made by (Bakewell et al., 2012), that migration flows from the same country of origin at 
different points in time does not necessarily imply network migration. Patricio Izurieta 
Mora Bowen, Honorary Consul of Bangladesh since 1984, recalled a first group of rather 
affluent Bangladeshi businessmen entering Ecuador after the country’s dollarisation in 
2000. According to him, the majority of these early Bangladeshi immigrants in Ecuador 
had medium educational levels with many working in the textile industry. With visa-free 
access in 2008, poorer and less educated Bangladeshi started arriving in Ecuador, without 
the doing – or approval – of the former group.  
 
Transmigration: A Gateway to the Region and Beyond 
 
As pointed out above, qualitative research confirmed the motivation to transmigrate to 
the US and Canada across immigrant groups. Two noteworthy cases with different aspired 
final destinations were Haitian and Chinese citizens. Díaz Chong, secretary of the Chinese 
Confederation saw Ecuador as increasingly less attractive for Chinese investment and 
immigration because of increasing labour costs and tax controls. He explained that 
Chinese citizens were increasing migration to Argentina, Colombia and Peru in search of 
better business opportunities. Gu Jiafeng, political advisor of the Embassy of the People’s 
Republic of China, further explained that Chinese migrants used Ecuador as a platform 
not only to reach North American, but also European countries – mainly Germany, 
France, England and Italy – with counterfeit passports. Both explicitly named the 
combination of visa freedom to Ecuador and restrictive European access policies as the 
determinant for Chinese migration to Ecuador.  
In the case of Haiti, interviews suggested onwards migration to Brazil, often with 
the motivation of reaching French Guyana, and eventually France. Previous research has 
pointed out the sharp increase of Haitian migration to Brazil after the 2010 earthquake. 
Since then, Brazil has become the third most important country of destination for 
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Haitians, preceded only by the Dominican Republic and the US of America (IOM, 2014, 
Pacheco Pacifico et al., 2015).  
 
Diverging Levels of Agency 
 
Qualitative research found significant variation in the vulnerability and agency of intra-
continental south-south migrants in Ecuador. In the case of Chinese citizens visa freedom 
led to a surge of young migrants with relatively low socio-economic backgrounds who 
were dependent on ethnic networks or people smugglers. Carrión and Chong reported 
that whole families pooled their resources to send migrants to Ecuador, and that some 
Chinese migrants had to work to pay for their journey after their arrival in Ecuador – 
suggesting that they possibly were victims of exploitive people smugglers or even human 
traffickers.61 
There were various accounts of exploitive human smugglers deceiving migrants. 
In an interview with three Bangladeshi men who sold homemade pastries in the historic 
centre of Quito, they explained how people smugglers had deceived them.  They had been 
made to believe that due to the dollarisation Ecuador was part of the US and that they 
would earn a minimum wage of $1,500 monthly. One of the interviewees explained that 
his family sold their land and paid $15,000 for him to reach Ecuador in 2009. In the context 
of human smuggling, the Honorary Consul described high levels of vulnerability among 
the Bangladeshi migrant population, with some arriving without the financial means to 
secure food and housing. Some Bangladeshi citizens are trapped in Ecuador and cannot 
return home because they lack money and travel documents, or fear facing the authorities 
at the border because of their irregular migratory status.  
Similar accounts were given by a group of nine Pakistani men living together in 
very a humble three-bedroom-apartment. According to their accounts, they were 
economic migrants, working as street vendors of silver jewellery or as restaurant workers, 
making about $250 monthly, and being able to send about $100 home to their families. 
                                                
61 Human trafficking is the illegal trade of human beings for the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation 
or forced labour, whereas people smuggling is the procurement of the irregular entry of a person into a state, 
generally to obtain a financial or other material benefit. 
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Two of them explained they had fallen victim to people smugglers, who had promised 
them that the flight to Ecuador would enable them to reach the US. Both paid around 
$10,000 for their journey to Ecuador, after selling all their belongings and borrowing 
money from family and friends.  
Another especially vulnerable group in Ecuador were Haitians. There were various 
accounts of people smugglers that lured Haitians to Ecuador on false promises of being 
able to study, work, or to travel to the US and French Guiana and France. We interviewed 
a teenage girl who had been part of a group of eight who were "accompanied" to Ecuador 
by human smugglers after paying approximately $4,000 each in the belief that this would 
secure them bursaries for a university education in Ecuador. The anecdotes of an 
interviewed Haitian community leader further exemplified the high levels of 
misinformation and vulnerability, and the lack of education of many recently arrived 
Haitians, who asked where to “find the bridge” or “take the bus” to France. 
Cuban and Nigerian interviewees, on the other hand, stood out because of their 
high degree of agency and elevated socio-economic backgrounds. Twelve of the nineteen 
Nigerians interviewees, and fifteen of the eighteen Cuban interviewees had a university 
degree and all others had finished high school. Cuban interviewees were doctors, nurses, 
or technicians and Nigerian immigrants had given up respectable jobs, e.g. as accountants 
or bankers back home. At the same time both Cuban and Nigerian interviewees described 
the limited opportunities for economic and personal growth back home, in many cases 
despite their tertiary degrees, as the main motivation to leave in search for better 
opportunities abroad.  
In both cases, interviewees described the financial support of family members and 
friends in third countries, Cubans had to pay between $200 and $5000 for the necessary 
legal and illegal paperwork such as a fraud Ecuadorian invitation letter. With the average 
Cuban wage ranging at about $18 in 2008, Cuban interviewees explained that it would 
have been impossible to gather such amounts without the financial assistance of family 
members and friends in third countries. Nigerian migrants explained that they had found 
out about visa-free travel to Ecuador on the Internet and by word of mouth and organised 
their journey online, very often with the financial help of friends and family members in 
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third countries. Some had travelled and worked in other countries such as South Africa, 
Libya, Oman and Spain, before making their way to Ecuador. I also interviewed two 
Nigerian refugees and two asylum seekers who had fled religious violence in their home 
regions, and four Cuban asylum seekers who explained that they had filed claims to 
regularize their migratory status. 
 In sum, the characteristics and agency of recent extra-continental immigrants in 
Ecuador vary between and within national origins. The fact that immigrants who arrived 
after the implementation of travel freedom tend to be younger, more male and from more 
remote areas in their home countries points to them being pioneer migrants. Our findings 
confirm the assumption made in both the literatures on south–south and pioneer 
migration, that these migrant groups tend to be relatively young. However, we find varying 
evidence regarding skills, education and socio-economic levels. The agency of migrants 
varies significantly from highly educated individuals who take self-determined migration 
decisions to exploited victims of people smuggling. An interesting finding is that in the 
cases of high levels of agency global migrant networks rather than ties to ethnic 
communities in Ecuador, facilitated the journey to, and transmigration from Ecuador.   
 For migrants from PRCs travel freedom to Ecuador presented an attractive 
opportunity in the light of the perception of increasingly restrictive immigration policies 
in Europe and North America. In fact, many of the interviewees did not know much about 
Ecuador – except for the fact that they could enter without a visa. Visa freedom 
determined the choice of destination both for economic migrants and asylum seekers, and 
also, albeit more indirectly, for smuggling victims. We identify the following three migrant 
motivations: 1. pressure to leave one’s country of origin, 2. onward migration, primarily to 
North America and 3. settlement in Ecuador based on relative improved opportunities.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This paper addresses two major gaps in the migration literature: the dominant south-
north bias and the neglect of the tourist visas as migration determinants. Migration theory 
has largely developed based on studies of south-north migration to the US and the EU, 
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although these flows only make up roughly a third of all international migration. The 
existing literature thus fosters the inaccurate image of international migration as 
consisting of constant global flows of people from less developed countries in the global 
south to developed nations in the north.  
Against the background of the global mobility divide between citizens from poor 
and repressive countries in the global south and citizens from rich countries in the global 
north, an important question worth asking is what happens when relatively safe but 
economically unattractive southern countries in geographically strategic locations for 
transmigration towards northern destinations relax their visa restrictions. The paper 
shows that Ecuador’s policy of universal visa freedom of 2008 increased immigration from 
previously restricted countries in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean by an average of 109 per 
cent.  
The paper also highlights the importance of unpacking aggregated results of the 
impact of visa policies to uncover significant quantitative differences between different 
immigrant groups. For Chinese citizens, Ecuador's open doors policy led to an increase in 
entries of 643 per cent and for nine African and Asian countries, for which the policy was 
reversed in September of 2010, the monthly increase amounted to 590 per cent. It is crucial 
to consider not only the relative increases but also the magnitude of these flows. More 
than 10,000 Chinese citizens entered in only four months of visa freedom. In the case of 
the other nine nationalities for which visas were reintroduced, however, entries ranged 
from only 71 in the case of Somalia to 1,083 in the case of Pakistan over the course of two 
years. These small numbers pose the question why visa requirements were introduced for 
these nationalities, which should be explored in further research. 
Mixed methods, including qualitative in-depth interviews, are necessary to throw light on 
the interaction between structural parameters and the agency and decision-making of 
migrants on the micro-level.       
Our findings contribute to the emerging empirical literature on south-south 
migration by addressing a number of distinct and largely unexplored features of such 
migrations, including new immigration patterns (intercontinental south-south routes), 
the composition of migration flows and migrant motivations. Intra-continental south-
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south migrants to Ecuador are heterogeneous; not only are they diverse in terms of 
national origin and sex, but also with respect to their socioeconomic backgrounds and 
levels of education. Although many interviewees expressed explicit motivations of 
transmigrating to North America and Europe, others primarily perceived Ecuador’s visa 
freedom as an exit option out of their country of origin. Ecuador was not their preferred 
destination, but an accessible place of safety and relatively improved opportunities.  
The main theoretical implication of the paper is that we need to break up 
conceptions of static migration systems and conceptualise international migration as 
driven by essentially economic motivations but as embedded in global opportunity 
structures, which are significantly shaped by access policies, including tourist visas. 
Increasingly restrictive northern visa policies, in the context of ongoing economic 
problems and rising xenophobia in the migrant and refugee crisis, will likely deter growing 
numbers of immigrants to relatively attractive, accessible destinations in the global south. 
The visa policies of southern countries will significantly impact where these flows are 
diverted, and thus which new south-south flows emerge. 
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3 
 
OPEN DOORS (FOR ALMOST ALL):                                                             
ECUADOR’S TOURIST VISA POLICY BETWEEN POPULIST SOCIAL 
LIBERALISM AND RACIALISED SECURITY CONCERNS 
 
 
This paper addresses the question in how far racism and perceived security threats of 
domestic and international political actors constrain immigration policy liberalisation 
outside Western liberal democracies. The paper analyses the partial reversal of Ecuador’s 
extreme policy of open doors, the annulment of all tourist visa requirements in 2008 for 
ten African and Asian countries by 2010. The government justified this partial policy 
reversal as security policy in reaction to an increase in south-south flows from new extra-
continental origins. Qualitative research reveals that alleged security concerns were 
closely intertwined with ethnic prejudice of domestic and international political actors, 
not least in the context of the Global War on Terror. Contrasting a broad consensus that 
immigration policies have moved from prevalent negative ethnic selectivity62 towards 
widespread ethnic neutrality, the paper suggests tourist visas as a central immigration 
management tool, in which overt selection by national origin persists.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
62 As will be discussed below, “ethnic selectivity” in this context is an umbrella term for policies and laws that 
select potential immigrants according to categories of race and ethnicity, but more broadly nationality or 
country of birth, see FITZGERALD, D. 2013. Ethnic Selection in Immigration to Latin America. In: NESS, I. 
(ed.) The Encyclopedia of Global Human Migration. Wiley-Blackwell. 
 115 
“The future drama of South America will be African and Asian migration across the Atlantic.” 
(Ecuador State Secretary for Migration, Leonardo Carrión, June 2011) 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the context of the Syrian refugee crisis and terrorists attacks targeting global capitals 
carried out by the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) and its sympathisers, the triangular 
relationship between immigration, security and racism anew is the subject of public 
debates across North America and Europe (Berman, 2015, Gibson, 2015, Talaga, 2015). 
Although the objectivity of the securitisation of migration or its discursive representation 
as an existential security threat, has been widely contested, it has led to a tangible shift 
towards restrictive immigration and asylum policies (Huysmans, 2000, Ibrahim, 2005, de 
Haas et al., 2015). A growing body of literature has analysed the contemporary 
securitisation of immigration discourses and policies since the end of the Cold War, and 
especially since the 9/11 attacks (Bourbeau, 2011, Douglas and Sáenz, 2013). Scholars have 
further explored how racism and security concerns interrelate in these processes (Tumlin, 
2004, Hammerstad, 2014).  
Existing studies focus on immigration policies in North America and Europe. We 
know virtually nothing about how alleged racism and security concerns influence 
migration management outside of Western liberal democracies. It is likely that both 
securitisation and racialisation of immigration also occurs in predominantly migrant 
sending countries, but that political actors face different opportunities and constraints in 
translating these into policy. Latin America is a region especially worth studying in this 
context. In the past decade, administrations in South America have become outspoken in 
their rejection of the securitisation paradigm of the Global War on Terror (Livingstone, 
2009, Emerson, 2010) and the related criminalisation of migrants, especially their emigrant 
citizens in the United States (US) and Europe (Acosta Arcarazo and Freier, 2015).  
In an effort to show political coherence, various Latin American administrations 
have recently rewritten their immigration legislation in the spirit of non-discrimination, 
migrants’ human rights and (increasing) free human mobility (Ceriani Cernadas and 
Freier, 2015, Freier and Acosta Arcarazo, 2015). They further actively promote the 
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conceptual detachment of migration from international organised crime such as drug and 
human trafficking, and international terrorism (Magliano and Clavijo, 2011). At the same 
time, racial and ethnic discrimination continue to be contentious socio-political issues 
across Latin America (Wade, 1997, Beck et al., 2011, Johnson, 2013). It is also well known 
that the US, which since 9/11 has realigned its foreign policies in Latin America through 
the prism of the Global War on Terror (Felbab-Brown, 2008), continues to exert 
substantial influence on the security policies of various countries in the region through 
soft and hard power (Livingstone, 2009). Immigration control is a key element of US 
security policy, and security actors not only have a heightened interest in keeping their 
“backdoor” (southern border) shut, but also want to control who enters their “backyard” 
(the Latin American region). 
Are Latin American administrations, which in their discourses vehemently 
criticise the restrictive immigration policies of the US and Europe and actively endorse 
non-discrimination in immigration policies, less likely to racially securitise migration? 
How does external pressure, first and foremost from the US, interrelate with domestic 
securitisation and racialisation processes? And what strategies do politicians and officials 
pursue to bridge possible gaps between their liberal discourses and discriminating 
policies? In order to find answers to the above questions, this paper analyses the reversal 
of Ecuador’s open doors policy, the annulment of all tourist visa requirements in 2008, for 
ten African and Asian countries by 2010. Given the difficulty to detect overall trends in 
immigration policies, such as racialised securitisation, it is more promising to identify 
such developments in specific policy areas (Czaika and de Haas, 2013). 
The paper shows that despite populist immigration policy liberalisation, ethnic 
selectivity persists in Ecuador’s tourist visa policy. With the reintroduction of visa 
requirements the Ecuadorian administration was responsive to the unintended impact of 
its open doors policy, namely the increase of irregular immigration from Africa, Asia and 
the Caribbean. The racist stigmatisation of new south-south flows as made up by illegal 
aliens, delinquents and terrorists exerted domestic and international pressure on Correa’s 
administration to impede them. Domestically, political opponents and the media, but also 
members of his administration, voiced racialised security concerns about new south-south 
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immigration. Internationally, China and countries across the Americas, first and foremost 
the US, exerted pressure on Ecuador to reinstate visas to prevent the transmigration of 
south-south immigrants. However, it took an external event, or “exogenous shock”, the 
migrant massacre of San Fernando of 2010, as a catalyst for the policy reversal to take 
place.  
This paper’s second section reviews the relevant literatures on the securitisation 
and racialisation of migration policies and the importance of tourist visas as migration 
management tools. It also discusses the qualitative approach and methodology of the 
paper. The third section provides the empirical analysis and the final fourth section 
summarises the findings and discusses their theoretical implications.  
 
THE (RACIALISED) SECURITISATION OF MIGRATION AND TOURIST VISAS 
 
The central importance of controlling borders in the security concerns of ruling elites goes 
a long way back in human history (Wang, 1995, Chaichian, 2014). In the modern era, 
security has been a decisive factor in immigrant selection in colonial periods, the early 
years of state formation, and during the World Wars (FitzGerald and Cook-Martín, 2014). 
After fears of communist infiltration that dominated the Cold War era subsided, more 
diffuse perceptions of international migration being related to organised crime, drug 
trafficking, and international terrorism took over the political discourses in Western 
liberal democracies (Faist, 2006). This latest wave of the securitisation of migration is 
characterised by the conception of immigrant groups collectively posing a threat to 
international security, state stability and societal cohesion (Bourbeau, 2011), and the 
inclusion of refugees and asylum seekers as part of this perceived threat (Betts, 2009, 
Hammerstad, 2014).  
Scholarship on the nexus of security and migration can be broadly divided into 
realist and neoliberal scholars in international relations (IR), critical security studies, and 
constructivist approaches, including securitisation theory (ST) (Bourbeau, 2011). IR 
scholars argue that Western states rightly fear the economic, political and military security 
threats associated with mass migration (Weiner, 1993, Miller, 1998, Rudolph, 2003, 
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Huntington, 2004, Rudolph, 2006). Based on the observation that security threats are not 
objectively given realities but constituted through social processes, there has been a broad 
constructivist turn in security studies (Hammerstad, 2011). 63 Contradicting migration 
scholars who focus on the state as an autonomous agent (Zolberg, 1999, Hollifield, 2000, 
Rudolph, 2003), constructivists argue that one cannot understand the securitisation 
process without acknowledging the agents of securitising (Bourbeau, 2011). ST, of the 
Copenhagen School, focuses on how securitisation happens through labelling something 
as a security issue through a “speech act”, which creates a sense of crisis and urgency and 
allows for exceptional and emergency measures (Buzan et al., 1998, Hough, 2004, Bain, 
2006, Buzan, 2007). Discourse is thus understood as a decisive form of political action (Van 
Dijk, 1997). 
Although the objectivity of the securitisation of migration has been widely 
contested, it has led to a tangible shift towards restrictive immigration policies, especially 
in access policies, which include tourist visas, low-skilled migration and asylum (de Haas 
et al., 2015). Scholars have underscored the negative consequences of this securitisation for 
migrants, especially considering their human rights (Faist, 2006, Freeman, 2004). The 
securitisation of migration is closely intertwined with the criminalisation of immigrants 
and immigration law and policy in Western liberal democracies, which includes 
partnerships between law enforcement and immigration officials for immigration status 
determination, workplace raids, mass arrests, criminal charges for undocumented 
immigrants and mass deportations (Sáenz and Douglas, 2015).  
The collective securitisation of immigrant groups (Bourbeau, 2011) suggests ethnic 
discrimination in contemporary securitisation processes, and indeed some scholars argue 
that securitisation is closely intertwined with the racialization of migration and 
immigration policies – the processes and actions through which the supposed inferiority 
or undesirability of certain groups  (such as blacks, non-whites, non-Westerners) is 
constructed (Garner, Lentin, 2011). It is important to point out that racialisation does not 
                                                
63 Directly opposing realist accounts, critical security scholars argue that the securitization of migration is 
not about objective security threats at all, but rather part of the neoliberal “governmentality of unease” 
which exerts social control through the creation of the sense of insecurity, fear, danger, and unease by 
bureaucrats, see BIGO, D. 2002. Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of 
Unease. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 27, 63-92.  
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only refer to putative phenotypical or biological difference, but can also instrumentalise or 
construct ethnic and cultural traits as the basis of differentiation. Lentin points out that 
notions of biological race weigh heavily, but defines racism and racist arguments as more 
generally “endowing the characteristics, appearances, traditions, and lifestyles attributed 
to groups of different ‘others’ with negative signifiers that are deemed to be natural and 
insurmountable” (2011 p. 12).  
In the context of the Global War on Terror in the US and Europe counter-
terrorism, criminal and immigration policies merged (Tumlin, 2004) and discrimination 
expanded to immigrants of Arab and South Asian descent. Religion, especially Islam, has 
become a pivotal ethnic marker, and Western immigration policies especially victimise 
Arabs and Muslims (Sivanandan, 2007, Lentin, 2011, Hammerstad, 2014). Some 
securitisation scholars claim that politicians in the US and Europe use securitisation 
discourses as a disguise for racist immigration policies and as national identity 
construction based on fears of foreign others (Huysmans, 2000, Bigo and Guild, 2005, 
Givens, 2013). Ibrahim (2005) goes as far as to call the securitisation of migration “racism’s 
most modern form” because it specifically targets culturally distinct migrants.   
It is important to point out that racist criteria in immigration policies often 
correlate with other migrants’ characteristics, such as income and skills. Gilbert (2007) and 
Johnson (2009) argue that class, alongside race, continues to define US and European 
immigration policies. Johnson finds that in “operation, and to a certain extent in design, 
US immigration laws aim to keep poor and working people of color out of the United 
States” (Johnson 2009: 34). Similarly, Garner (2007) analyses the construction of EU 
immigration policy with regard to racialisation and shows that conditions of entry and 
settlement have become more difficult for low-skilled non-EU nationals typically not 
categorised as “white”. Hobolth finds that especially travellers from poor, Muslim and 
asylum producing countries are refused tourist visas to European territory (Hobolth, 2012). 
The point then is not to claim that racism is the sole motivation for implementing 
restrictive policies but to ask how other determinants of immigration policy, such as 
alleged security concerns are intertwined with racism.  
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It is worth pointing out that studies on the racialised securitisation of migration 
stand in somewhat stark contrast to a broad consensus in the political immigration 
literature that describes a sustainable shift from prevalent negative ethnic selectivity 
towards widespread ethnic and racial neutrality since 1945, at the very least in de jure 
immigration policies (Freeman, 1994, Hansen, 2002, Joppke, 1998a, Cook-Martín and 
FitzGerald, 2010, FitzGerald and Cook-Martín, 2014). Ethnic selectivity, in this context, is 
an umbrella term for policies and laws that select potential immigrants – based on racist 
prejudice – according to categories of race, ethnicity, nationality or country of birth 
(FitzGerald, 2013).64 According to this view, the ethnic blocking of immigrants based on 
eugenics that was explicit in emerging immigration law at the beginning of the 19th 
century became illegitimate after the Holocaust, the anticolonial movement and the 1960s 
US civil rights movement. When ethnic selectivity in migration policies persists today, it is 
seen as confined to positive discrimination, or the formally non-ethnic filtering of 
immigrants based on skills or family ties (even if these are correlated to ethnicity).  
The tension between these two closely related bodies of literature can be partly 
explained by the latter’s neglect of tourist visas. Although they can be considered one of 
the simplest, most straightforward ethnically selective immigration policy tools, there has 
been a peculiar tendency among prominent scholars to neglect them as lying “at the 
margins of immigration policy” (FitzGerald and Cook-Martín, 2014 p. 338). Based on 
national origin, tourist visas determine access rights, i.e. the initial entry of potential 
immigrants into a country. In many countries, especially in destination countries that are 
not easily accessible via terrestrial borders, a majority of irregular migrants enter legally 
and then overstay their temporary visas (Bigo and Guild, 2005, Collyer and de Haas, 2010, 
Düvell, 2011b). Furthermore, compliance with tourist visa requirements is not only 
enforced at national borders but forms part of the externalisation of immigration policies 
of major Western immigrant receiving countries (Scholten, 2015).   
                                                
64 Historically, immigration policies have been seldom explicitly linked to immigrants’ ethnic or racial 
background, with the noteworthy exception of Africans, or blacks, and Chinese. Rather, nationality or 
country of birth have been as proxies for ethnicity and race, see FITZGERALD, D. & COOK-MARTÍN, D. 2014. 
Culling the Masses: The Democratic Origins of Racist Immigration Policy in the Americas, Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press.  
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Tourist visas are especially prone to both securitisation and ethnic selectivity 
because the lists of countries with visa requirements are not usually inscribed into 
immigration law, but handled by special committees, often within foreign ministries. 
Policy makers can change visa requirements without public legal processes. With a view to 
the securitisation of tourist visas as immigration management tools, Neumayer finds that 
instead of voicing concerns that the nationals of certain countries might be especially 
prone to overstaying their temporary visas to seek asylum or irregular employment, 
politicians often justify restrictive visa policies by claiming that visa freedom accelerates 
criminal activities such as drug and people trafficking, or terrorism (Neumayer, 2010). 
While FitzGerald and Cook-Martín (2014) acknowledge that immigration policies in the 
Americas are still ethnicised in practice, it is important to study tourist visas as a policy 
area in which explicit ethnic selectivity persists.65 
In sum, we know that immigration discourses in the US and Europe remain 
ethnicised, especially in the context of the post 9/11 securitisation paradigm, and that this 
racialised securitisation has led to restrictive legal and policy responses. We do not know 
how these processes play out outside Western liberal democracies, such as in the context 
of left-wing populist administrations in Latin America that condemn the security 
paradigm of the Global War on Terror but likely face US pressure to adhere to it 
nevertheless. We also know little about how political actors not only shape but make sense 
of these securitisation processes and how these understandings influence both the 
opportunity structures for policy formulation and strategies of bridging discursive policy 
gaps. 66  
 
 
                                                
65 As regards policy implementation, visas are issued at the discretion of consular and immigration control 
officers, and foreigners usually have no legal recourse if they are unfairly denied a visa. In the visa granting 
process, officials often apply racialised profiles, sorting out applicants based on their ethnic backgrounds, or 
by the way they look or talk, see SHENON, P. 1998. Judge Denounces U.S. Visa Policies Based on Race or 
Looks. NY Times, 23 January 1998.1998).  
66 Czaika and de Haas’ differentiate between ‘discursive gaps’ (the discrepancy between the objectives stated 
in official discourses and concrete policies and legislations, i.e. policy outputs), ‘implementation gaps’ (the 
disparity between official laws, measures and regulations, and their actual implementation), and ‘efficacy 
gaps’ (the extent to which policies actually determine migratory movements, i.e. policy outcomes), see 
CZAIKA, M. & DE HAAS, H. 2013. The effectiveness of immigration policies: A concenptual review of 
empirical evidence. Population and Development Review, 39. 
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METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH  
 
In this paper, I analyse the discourses of domestic political actors, how they make sense of 
racialised securitisation and which strategies they employ to bridge discursive policy gaps. 
I also discuss how the interplay of domestic and international racialised securitisation and 
the exogenous shock of the San Fernando migrant massacre in Mexico determined the 
partial reintroduction of visa requirements. Building an in-depth case study based on thick 
description (Geertz, 1973) allows for such causal inference (Gerring, 2004). The levels of 
analysis regarding domestic securitisation processes include the micro-level of discourses 
and reasoning of individual political actors and the meso-level comparison between 
different institutions. I then zoom out to show international securitisation pressure on the 
state level, including the discourses of some political actors. 
The empirical analysis rests on process tracing and the analysis of 35 in-depth 
interviews with politicians, government officials and representatives of international 
organisations and NGOs, conducted in Quito, Ecuador, in July and August of 2011 (see 
Appendix, Table 13). It also includes descriptive statistics and the analysis of relevant 
media coverage. The literature that shows the (racialised) securitisation of migration 
focuses on discourse analysis of newspapers, laws, policy documents and official 
statements by politicians and officials (Ibrahim, 2005, Johnson, 2009, Bourbeau, 2011, 
Hammerstad, 2014). Qualitative interviews have the distinct advantage of revealing not 
only how political agents talk about the relationship between immigration policies, 
(alleged) security concerns and racist prejudice, but how they make sense of these 
discourses and how these understandings shape strategies of reconciling discursive policy 
gaps. Furthermore, interviews were especially important to detect covert racist 
motivations in Ecuador’s tourist visa policy, as these constitute “norms and cognitive 
schemas in policy-making that are not often formally articulated” (Cook-Martín and 
FitzGerald, 2010), but were revealed in informal interviews.  
This empirical research included 35 elite interviews conducted with 21 Ecuadorian 
politicians and government officials and 14 representatives of international organisations 
and NGOs. These open-ended, semi-structured in-depth interviews lasted between 30 
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minutes and two hours. Officials representing the different ministries and government 
departments involved in immigration policy-making and management included: the 
Ministry of the Exterior (Cancillería)67; the Ministry of Interior (Ministerio del Interior); the 
Ministry of Justice, Human Rights and Culture (Ministerio de Justicia, Derechos Humanos y 
Cultos); the National Police (Policía Nacional) and its National Migration Directorate 
(Dirección Nacional de Migración, DNM); and the National Secretary of Migrants 
(Secretaría Nacional del Migrante, SENAMI) 68 . Representatives of international 
organisations and NGOs included the UNHCR, IOM, Asylum Access and Jesuit Refugee 
Service  (see Appendix for list of all interviews). All of these interviews were recorded and 
transcribed, and in this paper I provide my own translation of relevant citations from 
Spanish to English. 
 
ECUADOR’S POLICY OF OPEN DOORS 
 
Ecuador, under the presidency of Rafael Correa, is a paradigmatic case of Latin American 
populist immigration policy liberalisation, and Correa an especially outspoken critic of the 
criminalising character of US and European immigration policies (Acosta Arcarazo and 
Freier, 2015). In the context of Ecuadorian mass emigration after the 1999 economic 
collapse, and the introduction of tourist visa requirements for Ecuadorians by Spain in 
200369, Correa used emigration and migrants’ rights as a key theme in his 2006 presidential 
campaign and an identification platform of his movement Alianza PAIS (Patria Altiva y 
Soberana - Proud and Sovereign Fatherland) (Margheritis, 2011). Since then migration has 
been central to his “anti-imperial” foreign policy discourses. Correa domestically 
instrumentalises the fact that “immigration policy … is a signal to government and people 
of country of emigration about their basic moral worth and international standing” 
(FitzGerald and Cook-Martín, 2014 p. 31). Restrictive immigration policies, including 
                                                
67 In 2014 the Ministry was renamed Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility (Ministerio de 
Relaciones Exteriores y Movilidad Humana). 
68 SENAMI was integrated into the Foreign Ministry in 2013. 
69 In the so-called ‘emigration stampede’ (estampida migratoria) that followed the economic crisis of 1999, 
close to 140,000 Ecuadorians had emigrated to the United States and some 320,000 to Spain by 2005. The EU 
included Ecuador on its list of countries with tourist visa requirements in 2003. 
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tourist visa requirements, affect both the conditions of Ecuadorians’ emigration and their 
collective feeling of self-worth, which makes Correa’s condemnation of the West in this 
policy area emotionally effective. 
Based on the notion of political coherence, Correa’s rejection of restrictive 
immigration policies in the context of Ecuadorian emigration fed back into the 
formulation of populist liberal immigration policies (Acosta Arcarazo and Freier, 2015, 
Margheritis, 2011). On 12 June 2008, Correa declared that he was “in the middle of a 
campaign to dismantle the invention of the 20th century of passports and tourist visas”70 and 
unilaterally lifted all visa requirements to enter Ecuador for a 90-day stay by presidential 
decree a week later. In September, the country passed a new constitution, which 
enshrines the state’s commitment to define and implement migration policies that will 
support migrants’ universal rights, combat discrimination and the concept of “illegal 
immigration”, and promote the ideal of universal citizenship. The 2008 visa policy of open 
doors reflected the president’s liberal discourse and anticipated these constitutional 
ideals.  
However, rather than realpolitik, the introduction of visa freedom was a symbolic 
act in line with Correa’s populist moral discourse and did not last long. After only six 
months, tourist visas were reintroduced for Chinese citizens. Two years after their initial 
annulment, the government reinstated tourist visa requirements for citizens of 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan and Somalia. 
The country’s partial reinstatement of tourist visas stands in sharp contrast to its 
constitutional ideals. A representative of an Ecuadorean NGO found:  
 
I think that at the moment, we are going through schizophrenia in the area of migration [policy], 
schizophrenia in the sense that we have a constitution that recognizes rights that are much more 
progressive than international conventions. Things like the right to migrate, human mobility, the 
protection of Ecuadorians abroad, universal citizenship… We have these very elevated 
constitutional parameters but they were never processed at the government level.  
 
Indeed, the Correa administration to date has not bridged significant discursive and 
implementation gaps (Czaika and de Haas, 2013) between president’s discourse and the 
2008 Constitution, on the one hand, and its migration law on the other. The 1971 migration 
                                                
70 hoy.com.ec: Correa elimina el tourist visado a los extranjeros, 12/06/2008 http://www.hoy.com.ec/noticias-
ecuador/correa-elimina-el-tourist visado-a-los-extranjeros-297707-297707.html. 
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law has a strict securitized outlook and criminalises migrants in an irregular situation 
(Arcentales Illescas and Garbay Mancheno, 2012, Acosta Arcarazo and Freier, 2015). 
Interviewees within different ministries and departments dealing with migration 
management expressed confusion as to whether they ought to adhere to the 
constitutional specifications or the 1971 law.  
There is academic consensus that the two groups especially affected by racist 
immigration policies in the Americas and Europe, whether overtly or through 
administrative practices, have historically been African (or black) and Asian (Geddes, 
1995, Schoenwaelder, 2004, Gilbert, 2007, Johnson, 2009, FitzGerald and Cook-Martín, 
2014). Reservations against immigrants of colour from Africa and Asia are still reflected in 
the visa policies of EU members and countries across the Americas today.71 With very few 
exceptions, Latin American countries mirror these restrictions. Thus, the fact that the 
reintroduction of visa requirements targeted ten African and Asian nationalities suggests 
probing for the link between alleged security concerns and racial prejudice. The tension 
between Correa’s astonishingly liberal discourse and the constitutional provisions on 
migration on one hand, but the reintroduction of selective visa policies on the other, 
further lends itself to exploring the strategies of securitisation agents to discursively bridge 
this gap.  
With the selective reintroduction of tourist visas, the Ecuadorian government was 
responsive to its own unintended impact. It had not anticipated any increase in new south-
south flows and tourist visas were reintroduced as an immigration control policy. In his 
first public statement on 7 September 2010, State Secretary for Migration and Consular 
Affairs, Leonardo Carrión, linked the decision of selectively reintroducing tourist visas to 
emerging “unusual immigration flows”, i.e. the increase of immigration from the above 
countries.72 In an interview with the author, he explained that “people started arriving 
from the most foreign and distant places”.  
                                                
71 All African, Central and South Asian and Middle Eastern, and about half of the countries of East and 
Southeast Asia, Australia and Oceania, Central America and South America are listed on the EU’s black list 
of countries with tourist visa requirements. Australia, Brunei, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore and the 
Republic of Korea are the only non-European countries whose citizens may travel under the US Visa Waiver 
Program. 
72 http://www.bbc.co.uk/mundo/america_latina/2010/09/100907_ecuador_inmigrantes_africa_asia_tourist 
 126 
 
Similarly, the special advisor on human trafficking in the Department of Justice explained:  
 
The official argument was that tourist visas were reintroduced because these are new nationalities, 
nationalities that have never come to these latitudes. 
 
 
The “problem” with these new nationalities was not that they came to visit Ecuador, but 
that they overstayed their tourist visas. The justification of reintroducing tourist visas to 
stem irregular immigration constitutes a discursive gap in relation to free human mobility, 
as well as in implementation gap with a view to Art. 11 (non-discrimination) and Art. 416 
(universal citizenship, freedom of movement, and the progressive extinction of the status 
of alien or foreigner) of the 2008 Constitution. Interviewed government officials were 
painfully aware of and at unease with these contradictions. A special advisor on human 
trafficking in the Department of Justice struggled to justify the need for the partial 
reintroduction of tourist visas:  
 
So the whole world could come without a tourist visa. Now, lately, some [nationalities] got 
restricted… It’s not that they are restricted. It’s that the necessity became apparent to re-impose 
some kind of document, or in this case, tourist visas, for some nationalities. Nevertheless, the free 
mobility that the Constitution talks about is still implied. 
 
Since Ecuador does not gather official data on immigration and emigration stocks, entry 
and exit data must be used to reach an estimate of the immigration flows that followed 
the open door policy. Although estimates of net migration (entries minus exists) are 
imperfect proxies for migratory movements because they include short-term visits, they 
have the distinct advantage of also capturing irregular immigration by visa over stayers. In 
combination with entry data, net migration can give us a good idea of how many people 
entered a country without officially leaving (see Table 8). 
 The net migration of Chinese for the visa free period from July to November 2008 
was 6,672, and that of all other African and Asian nationals for whom visas were 
reintroduced amounts to 3,060 in the visa free period from July 2008 to August 2010. The 
reversal of visa freedom thus was a reaction to the immigration of around 10,000 Asian and 
African nationals who either stayed in Ecuador or transmigrated irregularly without their 
                                                                                                                                      
visa_rg.shtml 
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exit being captured by migration statistics. Cubans and Haitians also constituted 
significant new immigration flows but, as will be discussed below, visa requirements were 
not reintroduced until 2015. It thus needs to be pointed out that although entries of the 
nationalities for which visas were reintroduced significantly increased with visa freedom 
(see Paper Two), they did so on a very small scale compared to the entry of Caribbean 
immigrants such as Cubans. The reversal of visa freedom thus cannot be persuasively 
explained by recourse to the economic or social impact of these new immigrants in 
Ecuador. 
 
Table 8: Entries and Net Migration July 2008 – August 2010 
Country Entries Net Migration 
China* 10,746 6,672 
Eritrea  662 628 
Bangladesh 743 516 
Pakistan 1,083 466 
Nigeria 935 435 
Nepal 451 311 
Ethiopia 391 298 
Kenya 454 277 
Somalia 71 69 
Afghanistan 145 60 
Cuba  51,441 6,554 
Haiti 2,244 1,065 
Data Source: INIEC Ecuador 
* Visa free period July to November 2008 
 
 
DOMESTIC SECURITISING AGENTS 
 
Correa’s visa policy faced criticism both from the political opposition, the media and from 
within his administration. All actors justified their reservations against the policy of open 
borders and so-called “new extra-continental immigration” from Africa, Asia and the 
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Caribbean with security concerns linked to the alleged increase in both domestic and 
international crime. At the same time, most interviewees, with the noteworthy exception 
of members of the intelligence agencies, mentioned xenophobia and discrimination, 
especially against black Cubans, Haitians and Africans, either explicitly as a reason for the 
securitisation of new extra-continental immigration and the reintroduction of tourist 
visas, or at least in the general context of the reception of immigrants of colour in Ecuador.  
According to some studies, delinquency in Ecuador – especially violent crime 
connected to international criminal networks – increased from the 1990s (Carrión Mena, 
2003, Ojeda Segovia, 2010). However, the available quantitative data is inconclusive. 
Holloway (2012) looks at crime data for the two largest Ecuador cities, Quito and 
Guayaquil, from 2007-2010 and shows that reported property crimes, including theft and 
robbery, actually decreased in both cities for most of the visa free period. Reported violent 
crimes, including homicide, rape and aggravated robbery, decreased in Quito, where most 
new migrants reside, but significantly increased in Guayaquil, Ecuador’s largest city. No 
official data is available on the link between immigration and crime rates. An interviewed 
representative of the Public Protector claimed that an internal report had shown that 
foreigners were not more prone to commit crimes than nationals, as their incarceration 
rates did not exceed their percentage in the population. This paper does not aim to assess 
the objectivity of this assertion but to show that the reversal of visa freedom was based on 
its racialised securitisation. 
 
Oppositional Politicians and Media  
 
Oppositional politicians and media severely criticized Correa’s policy of open doors, 
directly blaming increasing crime rates on immigration without agreeing on the 
nationalities of the culprits. The securitisation of migration and criminalisation of 
immigrants served their interest of discrediting Correa’s government. In the aftermath of 
the partial reintroduction of tourist visas, the oppositional mayor of Guayaquil of the 
centre-right Social Christian Party (Partido Social Cristiano, PSC) Jaime Nebot, demanded 
the reintroduction of tourist visas for “the countries which we know import crime to 
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Ecuador: Colombia, Peru, some countries in Central America, Europe and Asia”73. However 
former Foreign Minister Antonio Parra Gil demanded the government should stop all 
“illegal immigration”, declaring that the “real delinquents don’t come from Asia, China and 
Pakistan” but from Colombia and Cuba.74 
Already before the Correa presidency, mass media played an important role in 
placing violence and crime in the centre of everyday life and in promoting restrictive 
immigration policies (Carrión Mena, 2008). The relationship between Correa, who 
controls a large part of the Ecuadorian media and progressively cut down on press 
freedom, and the oppositional media has been uneasy from the beginning of his 
presidency. This escalated in a polemic law suit in 2011, in which Correa successfully sued 
El Universo, the country’s leading opposition newspaper for calling him a “dictator”, 
demonising them as part of “a media dictatorship”. Confirming Carrión’s judgment that 
the media has played a crucial role in various interviews with NGO representatives and 
the Consul of Cuba in Ecuador, the media was raised as over-representing the criminal 
activities of foreign nationals in Ecuador. Josep Herreros, Head of the UNHCR in Ecuador 
found: 
 
What happened is that the opposition and the media created a connection between migration and 
an increase in crime that doesn’t exist to weaken the government … [T]here has not been a 
significant increase in crime and there is no reason to blame crime on immigrants, but the media 
have done so to weaken the government.  
 
In her media analysis of El Universo, Wagner (2010) finds that in the years following the 
implementation of visa freedom, the newspaper frequently reported on irregular migrants 
detected along the route from Ecuador to the US (i.e. in Colombia, Costa Rica and 
Mexico), generally framing these in the context of the transnational crimes of people 
smuggling, drug trafficking and terrorism. A noteworthy example of this sensationalist 
securitising media coverage is reports about the detention of the Eritrean people smuggler 
Dawit Tadese, alias Jack Flora in 2011, who was falsely described as a cousin of Osama bin 
                                                
73  http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/articulo-237316-guayaquil-quieren-exigirle-tourist visa-
colombianos-y-peruanos. 
74  http://www.eluniverso.com/2010/09/06/1/1355/regimen-quiere-pedir-tourist visa-paises-africa-asia.html. 
 130 
Laden.75 El Universo criminalises two particular groups of migrants in Ecuador: Chinese 
and Africans (Wagner, 2010).  
 
The Administration  
 
Racialised security concerns about increasing extra-continental south-south immigration 
were also evident among representatives of all ministries and departments in which the 
author conducted interviews. Depending on political association to Correa, these 
sentiments translated into different types of security concerns and different strategies of 
reconciling the gaps between racially securitising migration and the liberal ideals of 
Correa’s migration discourse and the 2008 Constitution.  
Interviewees that were politically aligned with Correa more often stigmatised 
extra-continental immigrants as helpless victims of international human smuggling rings. 
Officials critical of the president tended to exaggerate the impact of visa freedom on new 
south-south flows and directly criminalised African and Asian immigrants. In interviews, 
high-ranking officials of all ministries and SENAMI were supportive or at least 
sympathetic to Correa’s human rights based approach to migration management. 
Members of intelligence agencies, subsidiary to the Ministry of the Interior, rejected and 
racially securitised visa freedom. As will be discussed below, at the time of the policy 
reversal, rivalry and in some cases outright animosity existed between and across the main 
ministries involved in Ecuadorian immigration policy-making, especially between the 
Foreign Ministry and intelligence agencies under the Ministry of the Interior.  
 
Intelligence Agencies  
 
Within the administration, representatives of the police and the DNM were the most 
severe critics of visa freedom and the most outspoken agents of racialised securitisation. 
In a joint interview, a high-ranking major and the legal advisor of the DNM blamed the 
“weak” immigration policy of the executive for Ecuador’s current “migration problem” of 
                                                
75  http://www.eluniverso.com/2011/05/04/1/1361/policia-desconoce-detencion-supuesto-primo-bin-
laden.html 
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increased African, Asian and Caribbean inflows. Members of DNM tended to inflate new 
extra-continental inflows in a pejorative way. For example, the major spoke of “massive 
inflows” of Africans, who entered Ecuador in “exaggerated numbers”. He voiced concerns 
that “the decision of the President to open Ecuador’s doors” had led to the “loss of control” 
over immigration, which bore unforeseeable security risks for society at large. He also 
implied resignation about not being able to influence the executive’s policies: 
 
It’s as if I let everyone enter my house, and let them do whatever they want. I’ll lose my house. But 
if I put controls, I automatically know what they are doing and they will behave in a normal way – 
but well, basically, that is state policy. 
 
Interviews with members of the different intelligence agencies revealed a heightened 
awareness for political correctness and at the same time clear prejudice against certain 
nationalities. The legal advisor of the DNM declared that he couldn’t voice security 
concerns about certain nationalities because he would thereby discriminate against 
certain nationalities, whereas the major openly admitted having to revert to 
discrimination against specific nationalities due to security concerns: 
 
We believe that the world is so globalised that universal citizenship, or free human mobility is 
desirable. But all mobility needs to be controlled. And although it is true that Ecuador has a 
constitution that guarantees many rights, we always have to see the security angle as well – even if 
that means that one is acting based on xenophobia and discrimination against the one or other 
nationality. 
 
He further directly criminalised extra-continental immigrants by linking them to allegedly 
growing crime rates in Ecuador: 
 
We’re not saying that the immigrants [from Africa, Asia and the Caribbean] are the criminals. It 
just so happens that crime increased [since extra-continental immigration increased].  
 
In the same interview the mayor justified ethnic profiling of Muslim immigrants: 
 
It’s not that we make any difference by continent … We treat every case totally independently and 
we never compare one case to the next because we know that the motivations to travel are 
different and that the smugglers act differently, that we are dealing with countries with totally 
different customs. If we have a Muslim country, we won’t compare it with a Christian country … we 
try to treat each case according to its importance. 
 
An especially clear example of ethnic profiling in Ecuador’s immigration policy beyond 
the 2010 policy reversal is the rounding up of the Muslim immigrant population in Quito 
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on 10 March 2011. According to various interviews and the official report of the Public 
Protector, the Ecuadorian police arrested 67 South-Asian and Arab immigrants at 
gunpoint in “Operation Twilight” (crespúsculo). The migrants were brought to a special 
prison in a private house in Quito. Transgression judges ordered the de facto mass 
deportation of the entire group. The group was illegally detained for three months and 
many of their rights were violated. Six men were extradited to the United States and 17 
were deported. The Public Protector found that the detentions had been made on ethnic 
grounds.  
In an interview, a first lieutenant and captain of the National Intelligence 
Secretary (Secretaría Nacional de Inteligencia, Senaín) explained that tourist visas had to 
be reintroduced for the ten African and Asian countries because of the security threat 
posed by the ‘high risk profiles’ of these nationals, who had “problems with the judiciary in 
very sensitive areas for the Ecuadorian state and on a global level.” Field observations with 
members of the Senaín revealed clear racial profiling. Middle and high-ranking officials 
generally accused new arrivals of Arab and South-Asian descent of being linked to people 
smuggling and Islamist terrorism. They further linked black immigrants “from Africa and 
Haiti” to increased domestic crime, drug trafficking and child pornography. Juan 
Villalobos, Officer for Political Affairs of the Jesuit Refugee Service described the racial 
profiling in immigration controls as follows: 
 
It really depends on the nationality … If you’re Colombian, Cuban, or even from the Middle East it’s 
more likely that they will deport you because there is a stigma surrounding these populations. They 
[the migration police] go out to search for nationalities like Colombians, or they search for Cubans, 
or populations of the Middle East. You ask a European or US-American in an irregular situation, 
who probably exist, I mean, maybe they don’t come constantly because there are fewer vulnerable 
situations, but there should be cases. They are not asked for their papers because it is assumed that 
they are tourists, that they have money. 
 
Racial profiling was also evident in the border control management of the police. 
Interviewed officials spoke of the discretion they enjoyed in confirming the “tourist 
profile” of foreigners and explained that since the partial reintroduction of tourist visas, 
the airport police pays special attention to African entries. A police officer working in 
 133 
immigration at the airport Mariscal Sucre in Quito expressed her prejudice and 
resentment against Africans denouncing discrimination as follows: 
 
From Africa, they come with a somewhat worrying profile for us. And then they come with this 
attitude of “Why are you controlling me, why? Because I am black? Discrimination! Discrimination!”  
 
Interestingly, within the intelligence agencies, security concerns about new extra-
continental south-south immigrants seemed to take precedence over more ‘traditional’ 
concerns about Colombians importing drug traffic and crime to Ecuador:  
 
We don’t pay a lot of attention to the numbers and we obviously know that they enter in their 
thousands across the northern border, Colombian citizens who come to seek refugee status, 
hundreds of Colombians enter, who see Ecuador as miniature US, yes, but it’s more about the 
sensitive type of person that enters. 
 
Political actors in the Foreign Ministry severely criticized the securitisation of new extra-
continental immigration. A former State Secretary for migration explained that in the 
context of Operation Twilight the police spun a narrative of international terrorism linked 
to extra-continental migrants to boost their own prestige, exaggerating and 
misinterpreting facts, i.e. depicting Tamil rebels (a Sri Lankan armed group that fought 
against its government until 2009) as international terrorists and claiming that they had 
established themselves in Ecuador. According to the former State Secretary: 
 
The Security Cabinet wanted to give the issue [of the reversal of visa freedom] great publicity, not 
as migration policy, but as a successful police investigation uncovering cells of international 
terrorism. But that agenda collapsed with the questions we from the Foreign Ministry posed… [It] 
was a serious conflict between the Foreign Ministry and the police [and] cost the Minister of the 
Interior his post because he supported us and lost control over the police. The Chief commander of 
the Police, against whom we voiced many objections, received the support of the president. They 
sacrificed the minister and buried the issue.  
 
In sum, political actors representing the Ecuadorian intelligence agencies racially 
securitized South-Asian and Arab Muslims, who they collectively saw as terrorists, and 
blacks – including African and Caribbean immigrants – whom they linked to increased 
domestic crime, drug trafficking and child pornography.  
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Political Allies 
 
Officials aligned with Correa also approved of the decision to partial reintroduce visa 
requirements. However, they clearly felt this ethnically selective policy reversal targeting 
ten African and Asian nationalities to be inconsistent with their values of democratic 
humanitarianism. Their outspoken rejection of racism seemed crucial for their self-image 
of being tolerant, progressive leaders (see Van Dijk, 1993), and they thus used disclaimers, 
euphemisms and open contradictions to deny the racist elements in the securitisation of 
the visa policy.  
The Director of Human Rights of the Ministry of the Interior praised Ecuador as a 
pioneer in progressive immigration policies towards the implementation of universal 
citizenship. At the same time, she explained that as every new policy the implementation 
of visa freedom had its flaws, which needed to be “corrected along the way”. She also 
rejected the notion of widespread xenophobia in Ecuador, while at the same time 
admitting that new extra-continental immigrants faced especially difficult conditions 
regarding their reception in Ecuador: 
 
I don’t think that my country is still xenophobic, really, I don’t think so, because we opened our 
doors to all nationalities… I won’t deny that there are pockets of xenophobia and violence, but 
really very disperse. But for those [Caribbean, African and Asian] nationalities it is very difficult. 
 
The former State Secretary for Migration was even more critical and called visa freedom a 
failed policy experiment: 
 
The policy is a kind of interesting, but failed, absolutely failed experiment. It was utopian. We are 
talking about how beautiful it would be – about the way the world should be, a world in which 
people move where they want and not where they are forced to go … [T]here will always be a 
nomadic sector of humanity. “I was born here and I want to leave, why? Because my spirit moves 
me.” That always existed. Perfect. That man can go where he wishes. But right now he is here 
because of what is happening in Africa and in Asia – because he is dying of hunger there.   
Intriguingly, he interpreted the constitutional right to migrate as only extending to soul-
searching migrants and conceptually denied it to poor migrants who are forced to leave 
their home countries as a matter of survival. Reconciling the selective reintroduction of 
tourist visas with the ideals of Correa’s immigration rhetoric through the victimisation of 
recent south-south migrants instead of their direct criminalisation was a recurrent 
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strategy for various interviewed officials close to Correa. Images of poor, desperate 
immigrants, fleeing warfare and hunger in Africa and Asia were also mirrored in the 
discourses of some NGOs. However, this image is not consistent with the results of 
qualitative interviews the author conducted with recent African and Asian immigrants. 
Paper Two discusses the mixed but in many cases surprisingly high socio-economic 
backgrounds of extra-continental immigrants. 
Another strategy of Correa’s allies to explain the partial re-introduction of tourist 
visas was to ambiguously link African and Asian immigration to both human trafficking 
and people smuggling. In his first statement, Minister of the Interior Gustavo Jalkh 
described the policy as a preventive measure to avoid the abuse of Ecuador as a bridge for 
committing the crime of human trafficking (trata de personas).76 Three days later Deputy 
Foreign Minister, Kintto Lucas explained: “Somehow it was detected that people from 
those countries were being smuggled through Ecuador. People smuggling (tráfico de 
personas) is one of the things that we are not going to allow, beyond the fact that we allow 
human mobility”.77  
The distinction between the two concepts is crucial regarding the government’s 
motivation to impede new south-south migration, and its adherence to the constitutional 
ideal of free human mobility. Human trafficking is the illegal trade of human beings for 
the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation or forced labour, whereas people 
smuggling is the procurement of the irregular entry of a person into a state, generally to 
obtain a financial or other material benefit. Smuggled migrants voluntarily pay people 
smugglers, whereas victims of trafficking are forced into sexual or labour exploitation by 
traffickers’ use of coercion and/or deception. Human smuggling is an administrative 
offence against a country’s borders and should not be considered a criminal offence if the 
constitutional right to migrate was applied. Human trafficking is a crime against a person, 
involving severe human rights violations but not necessarily international border 
crossings.78 
                                                
76 http://www.eluniverso.com/2010/09/07/1/1355/ecuador-pedira-tourist visado-9-paises-africa-asia.html. 
77 http://www.eluniverso.com/2010/09/10/1/1355/vicecanciller-ecuador-utilizado-trafico-personas.html. 
78 The majority of trafficking victims in Ecuador are women and children trafficked domestically from border 
and central highland areas to urban centers for commercial sexual exploitation, as well as for involuntary 
domestic servitude, forced begging, and forced labor in mines and other hazardous work 
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Although it is possible that Jalkh simply misspoke, blurring the conceptual 
difference between people smuggling and human trafficking enabled the government to 
criminalise irregular migrants’ means of transportation, while portraying the migrants 
themselves as victims in need of state protection. Building on both sides of the dichotomy 
of “iconic trafficking victim versus illegal alien” (Srikantiah, 2007), the Ecuadorian 
government simultaneously framed the selective reintroduction of tourist visas as driven 
by security concerns and human rights considerations. 79  Indeed, in his first public 
statement, State Secretary for Migration Carrión described the reintroduction of tourist 
visa requirements as a “humanitarian act to impede that Ecuador would be used as a 
bridge (to third countries) by the gangs of human smuggling.”80  
In some instances, the differentiation between the victimization and 
criminalisation of immigrants became blurred. Some officials close to Correa engaged in 
direct criminalisation of immigrants themselves. Others did so indirectly, by criminalising 
their alleged means of entry – often in an emotional, resentful tone. Leonardo Carrión 
explained that Ecuador would not permit that the opening of its doors, which the 
government had granted the world “with great generosity”, would be misused for 
“delinquent activities”. The fact that new extra-continental immigrants had entered 
Ecuador for “illicit reasons”, he explained, gave the government the right to take adequate 
measures. Similarly, the Foreign Minister, Eduardo Barrera, lamented that the 
“revolutionary principle” of opening its doors to the world had been exploited by the 
coyote networks. 81  If the right to migrate and universal citizenship were applied, 
facilitating migration to or from Ecuador should not be considered a crime.  
                                                                                                                                      
(http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2010/142759.htm). In some cases, human trafficking and human 
smuggling can become intertwined because undocumented migrants can be more vulnerable to 
exploitation. In one recent case, authorities discovered an international trafficking network that exploited 
female Cuban migrants by forcing them into prostitution to pay off their debts 
(http://www.elnuevoherald.com/ultimas-noticias/article2034653.html). 
79 In the U.S. context, the undocumented migrant is seen as a “dangerous, manipulative criminal who drains 
social services”, whereas “the iconic victim is innocent, helpless, and complies with law enforcement”, see 
SRIKANTIAH, J. 2007. Perfect Victims and Real Survivors: The Iconic Victim in Domestic Human Trafficking 
Law. Boston University Law Review 87. 
80 http://www.bbc.co.uk/mundo/america_latina/2010/09/100907_ecuador_inmigrantes_africa_asia_tourist 
visa_rg.shtml 
81 http://www.bbc.co.uk/mundo/america_latina/2010/09/100907_ecuador_inmigrantes_africa_asia_tourist 
visa_rg.shtml 
 137 
These findings are in line with Magliano and Clavijo (2011) who argue that many 
South American governments reject the securitisation of migration that has led to 
“building walls” in Western liberal democracies. They promote the conceptual 
detachment of international migration from international organised crime, including drug 
and human trafficking and terrorism, but at the same time perpetuate the securitisation of 
irregular and undesired migration by reframing it under the paradigms of human rights 
and the protection of human trafficking victims.   
Qualitative research found low levels of people smuggling among interviewed 
extra-continental immigrants – only 12 per cent of interviewees described having reached 
Ecuador with the help of smugglers. The most notorious cases of deception in people 
smuggling were those of Haitians, and no tourist visas were reintroduced for Haitian 
citizens. It is further questionable whether Correa’s government really sees the protection 
of victims of people smuggling and human trafficking as a priority. Despite the victimising 
discourse, no assistance is offered to trafficking victims. Furthermore, government officials 
echoed the view of NGO representatives and the UNHCR that restrictions, including the 
reintroduction of tourist visa requirements, only further increased the costs and risks of 
people smuggling. The advisor for human trafficking at the Ministry of Justice explained: 
 
Well, sure, I definitely think that migration in the world is unstoppable. The only thing restrictions 
do is that they help those committing these crimes. Because [then] entering a country requires 
false documentation … That increases the profit of the people committing these crimes. One 
doesn’t stop migration by being more restrictive. So, we can’t get to letting no one in either.  
 
From the above we can conclude that Correa faced internal political pressure from the 
political opposition and the media, and from within his administration to revoke universal 
visa freedom. The domestic agents that called for the reversal of visa freedom engaged in 
the racialised securitisation of extra-continental immigration, and the criminalisation or 
victimisation of migrants, depending on their ideological alignment with Correa. 
However, given Correa’s track record of dealing with “unruly” media and his drift towards 
competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way, 2010), domestic securitisation agents on 
their own would unlikely have been successful in achieving a reversal of his populist open 
door policy. 
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INTERNATIONAL SECURITISATION AGENTS 
 
The Correa administration also faced international pressure to reverse universal travel 
freedom. Due to its porous borders and geographical proximity to Central America, 
Ecuador has long been a transit country for Latin American migrants who, just as many 
Ecuadorians, emigrate to the US and Europe with the help of people smugglers (Kyle and 
Ling, 2001, Zepeda). Recent extra-continental immigration has been a phenomenon 
discussed in migration management circles all over the Americas, and in past years 
governments and regional organisations such as the Organization of American States 
(OAS) have shown increasing concerns regarding these flows, convening special 
governmental meeting and commissioning reports on the subject. As the State Secretary 
Carrión explained: 
 
There was regional preoccupation. It was complicated. They [African, Asian and Caribbean 
immigrants] came to Ecuador and from Ecuador they moved on to other countries with the help of 
the mafia. They didn’t come to stay in Ecuador … Everyone started to complain because they 
started to arrive irregularly in Chile, Argentina, Peru, Bolivia, and obviously they started arriving in 
the US, in Canada … 
 
Interestingly, in his discourse, what he described as human smuggling “gangs” in the 
domestic context turned into the “mafia” when speaking about regional security 
preoccupation. The transmigration of new immigrants was facilitated by another liberal 
aspect of the 2008 Constitution, which originally automatically gave nationality to spouses 
of Ecuadorian, without any additional requirements (Art. 8.4.): 
 
This [immigration] continued without any control, in accordance with the new constitution and 
the policy of universal citizenship, and gave room to the establishment of mafias who organised 
the arrival, marriage, nationalization and divorce [of foreigners with Ecuadorian nationals]… The 
foreigner would arrive in Ecuador as a tourist in the morning, a contact person would receive him, 
they went to the Civil Registry with the person who would become the Ecuadorian spouse – 
obviously in exchange of being paid – in the afternoon he would receive his ID and present his 
application for citizenship … This led to thousands of Cubans, Pakistanis and other nationals 
adopting Ecuadorian citizenship and many of them used their Ecuadorian passport to travel 
onwards to the US, and other countries in the region such as Argentina and Brazil.82 
                                                
82 According to the State Secretary, the “mafia” even reached the office of the Foreign Ministry in Guayaquil, 
which led to the (unconstitutional) policy correction of the requirement of having been married for three 
years before extending citizenship, as well as the prohibition of marriage between Ecuadorians and 
foreigners on tourist visas violating national and international laws, falling back in line with the Latin 
American tendency of excessive prosecution of false marriages in law and in practice.  
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Conservative media in the US echoed such concerns. InSight Crime (2011) spoke of an 
“explosion of African and Asian nationals moving through the country (with 156 reported 
arrivals from South Africa during the first quarter of 2011)”83 and Reich and Vásquez (2012) 
stated on the Foreign Policy website: 
The government of Ecuador has once again crossed the line between irresponsible policies and 
ideologically driven actions that have created a serious security problem not only for its citizens 
but also for the entire Western Hemisphere. The disarray created in Ecuador’s immigration policy 
has permitted transnational criminal organisations and terrorist groups — possibly including al 
Qaeda — to potentially use the country as a base of operations with the ultimate objective of 
harming the United States. In June of 2008, the Ecuadorian government opened its borders to 
foreigners and ended visa requirements to enter its territory. This opened the floodgates to 
nationals from Africa, the Middle East, and Asia (Reich and Vásquez). 
As pointed out above, the numbers of new extra-continental migrants entering Ecuador in 
most cases were extremely small. While speaking of “floodgates”, Foreign Policy indicated 
an increase of Pakistani citizens from 92 entries in 2006 to 518 in 2010. In the same 
interview, the State Secretary in the Foreign Ministry linked regional security concerns 
regarding the arrival of new south-south migrants directly to racism, for example in the 
case of Haitians arriving in Brazil via Ecuador after the 2010 earthquake: 
 
Why is the topic of Haitians so important in Brazil? Because of the Governor of Acre, which is the 
Amazonia region of Brazil, where they enter ... The Haitians that come to Ecuador and Peru are 
black, and the Governor of Acre doesn’t want blacks in his region. And because the Governor of 
Acre has a high-ranking position in the Worker’s Party and is close friends with the President, he 
asked his friend to prohibit the entry of blacks to his territory. 
He further ridiculed Brazil’s racially motivated “security concerns” and their 
preoccupation with Haitian immigrants:  
The numbers are not very large. When a Brazilian delegation came to discuss the issue here in 
Ecuador, 480 Haitians had entered Brazil… “Oh my god, we have to do something, 480 entered, 
that’s an unsustainable risk for Brazilian security. And one of them had AIDS, oh my God!” 
 
When asked about similarly small numbers in case of African and Asian immigrants to 
Ecuador for whom tourist visas were reinstated, the interviewee clearly felt uncomfortable 
and swiftly changed the topic.  
The available data on abandoned asylum applications until mid-2011 strongly 
suggests that a large proportion of the migrants who officially entered Ecuador without 
                                                
83 http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/bin-ladens-cousin-arrested-in-ecuador 
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officially leaving, most probably did not remain in the country. It is unlikely that up to 85 
per cent of asylum seekers in the cases of some nationalities would have abandoned their 
application process if they had indeed remained in the country. Interviews with extra-
continental immigrants confirmed that many saw Ecuador as a gateway to onward 
migration to other countries in the region, and predominantly to the US (see Paper Two). 
 
Diplomatic Pressure from China 
 
The first country that was successful in exerting diplomatic pressure on the Correa 
administration to reinstate tourist visas for its nationals was China. The former State 
Secretary recalled: 
They sent a high-ranking Chinese official to ask Correa to reinstate tourist visas. They explained 
that Ecuador doesn’t know, has no idea, how the Chinese mafias work … that China, as Ecuador’s 
friend wanted to prevent the country from becoming a platform of the Chinese mafia, which would 
have been a risk for the entire region. 
 
Tourist visa requirements for Chinese citizens were reinstated in December 2008, 
with the exception of official travel parties. InSight Crime (2011) claimed that visa freedom 
led to the increase of Colombian, Russian and Chinese organised crime in Ecuador, 
including human smuggling networks. Tourist visa freedom did not affect Colombian 
citizens. And when speaking about concerns regarding Russian mafias in the same 
interview, the interviewee laughed and argued that visa policies had no impact on 
international mafias because they had the means to obtain any kind of tourist visa 
requirements they wanted. It thus seems that reflecting the domestic context the 
discursive categorisation of people smugglers as “international mafias” also led to the 
securitisation of irregular extra-continental immigration on the international level.   
The Chinese ambassador to Ecuador, Cai Runguo, openly admitted that tourist 
visas were reintroduced to stem irregular migration. Rather than speaking of organised 
transnational crime, he declared that while his government understood that Ecuador 
wanted to stimulate tourism, trade and investment, many “ordinary migrants” with the 
motivation of reaching the United States were among the Chinese entering Ecuador. Their 
movement needed to be controlled (Universo, 2008). For a long time China tried to stem 
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emigration as a form of domestic political control and to protect its international 
reputation. However, by the early 2000s, this policy had shifted to promoting emigration, 
especially to “new markets” in Africa and Latin America (Biao, 2003).84 It is more likely that 
US concerns and US-China relations explain China’s intervention in Ecuador’s visa policy. 
China has been collaborating with the US, Canada and Australia in combating irregular 
migration and returning apprehended migrants since the late 1990s (ibid).   
China’s political leverage in Ecuadorian domestic affairs of immigration policy is 
explained by their unequal economic relationship. Since Correa announced Ecuador was 
defaulting on his foreign debt in 2008, China has become the country’s main foreign 
creditor and bought around 60 per cent of its foreign debt (Polga-Hecimovich, 2013). 
Intriguingly, visa freedom for Chinese citizens again took effect in Ecuador on 1 March 
2016, officially once more to “promote Chinese tourism”85. The new unilateral lifting of 
tourist visa requirements should be understood as a symbolic act in the context of 
Ecuador’s inferior position in the increased political and economic rapprochement 
between the two countries.86 The volatility of tourist visa policy towards China and the 
related (de)securitisation of Chinese immigration might also reflect decreasing influence 
of the US on China in the area of migration management. 
 
Continued US Influence  
 
Indeed, the international securitisation agents with the most political leverage were US 
officials. According to the former Ecuadorian State Secretary for Migration, until the late 
                                                
84 Although China has relaxed is formerly strictly controlled emigration policy in the last decade, the 
government mainly encourages skilled migration and return and has paid little attention to the emigration 
of low-skilled workers, which remains largely illegal. The Chinese government holds that the fundamental 
reason for illegal migration, in China rests on the unfair and unjust international political and economic 
order, the deceptive practices by human smugglers and “unreasonably” immigration policy of receiving 
countries, see BIAO, X. 2003. Emigration from China: A Sending Country Perspective. International 
Migration, 41, 21-48. 
85 Acuerdo Ministerial Nº 000027. 
86 In early 2015, both countries’ signed a bilateral agreement, which included bilateral visa freedom, which 
has not yet been implemented by either party. The agreement had been signed between Xi Jinpin and Rafael 
in January 2015, during Correa’s state visit, the first by an Ecuadorian president, to China. During the same 
visit other expansive cooperation was agreed upon, including Chinese investments of $5.296 million, long 
term loans, a Chinese scholarship program for Ecuadorian children and technological exchange were agreed 
on, see http://www.elcomercio.com/actualidad/china-ecuador-acuerdan-supresion-visa.html. 
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1990s, Ecuador’s visa policy had been an extension of the policies of the US, with 
governments placing tourist visa restrictions on countries that the Department of Home 
Security considered as “dangerous”. These were first and foremost communist regimes, but 
visa policies also aimed to impede flows from poor countries and included negative ethnic 
selectivity.87 After 1989, Ecuador signed bilateral agreements to remove visa requirements 
with many Eastern European countries and in the 1990s started signing such agreements 
in the region, which the US adamantly opposed. According to the former State Secretary, 
by the late 1990s “the United States had managed to extent its border to Panama, with all 
Central American countries imposing tourist visa requirements on the Andean countries 
to impede migration flows to the United States … In Central American countries, some of 
the migration officials were gringo policemen.”  
In the post-Cold War era, the US security focus in Latin America shifted to drugs, 
illegal immigrants and refugees, and since 9/11, to terrorists. According to John Craddock, 
Commander of Southern Command, responsible for all US military activities in South and 
Central America in 2006: 
The transnational terrorist, the narco terrorist, the Islamic radical fundraiser and recruiter, the 
illicit trafficker, the money launderer, the kidnapper and the gang member all have access to and 
leverage an unprecedented freedom of movement [in Latin America] (cited after Livingstone 2009: 
122). 
Thus, at the time that Ecuador implemented visa freedom, US security concerns about 
Latin America focused on immigration control. The securitisation of migration based in 
these concerns targeted Arab, South Asians and Muslims as potential terrorists and South 
and Central Americans as potential human traffickers and people smugglers and criminals 
(Lentin 2007; Livingstone 2009). The second Bush administration politicised the potential 
of anti-American jihadi groups to find safe havens in Latin America to carry out 
fundraising activities, or to reach the US in irregular immigration flows from the south to 
carry out attacks as a critical threat (Felbab-Brown 2008). But although Hezbollah activity 
is documented at the border between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay (Goldberg, 2002, 
                                                
87 According to the former State Secretary, Cubans required a tourist visa because they lived under a 
communist regime, whereas visa requirements for Haitians were based on the country’s poverty as a push 
factor for emigration to “wherever they could”. 
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Felbab-Brown, 2008), there otherwise have been no reported cases of groups like al-Qaida 
successfully using Latin America as an entry point into the United States.   
It has been shown that US interests continue to strongly influence the 
development of Central American immigration policies since 9/11, which since shifted 
from a focus on the protection of migrants’ human rights and the relationship between 
migration and development, towards security concern in line with US policy (Alba et al., 
2010). Indeed Central American security and migration discourses and concerns often 
mirror US concerns. Diplomatic cables published by Wikileaks reveal the overlap of 
concerns regarding Ecuador’s policy of open doors. Immediately after the introduction of 
tourist visa freedom, in July 2008, US ambassador to Ecuador, Lind Jewell, expressed 
concerns that Ecuador would be used as a “trampoline for those intending to immigrate to 
the United States”.88 Referring to illegal transmigration through their territories, Costa 
Rican Director for Migration Mario Zamora declared that Ecuador was “causing instability 
for all America”, and the former security advisor to the Panamanian President Marcel 
Salamin polemically called Correa a “consumptive patient, whose cough is infecting 
everyone else.”89 
A 2009 report by the International Assessment and Strategy Center quotes an 
unnamed US official who claimed that “in every major case of non-Mexican and non-
Central American illegal immigrants entering the US in the past year the migrants have 
transited Ecuador” (quoted after InSight Crime 2011). Concerns persisted after the selective 
reintroduction of tourist visas. In November 2010, Zamora told US Ambassador Peter M. 
Brennan that flights from Ecuador via Costa Rica to Guatemala or Belize had become “very 
cosmopolitan,” and that he feared an influx of irregular migration of Eastern Europeans, 
Arabs, South Americans and Africans. Zamora was especially concerned about Chinese 
immigrants (as victims of trafficking and smuggling), Iraqis, Afghans and Iranians (as 
potential terrorists), and the African immigrant influx (no reasons given).90  
Four Pakistani immigrants who had been detained in the operation Twilight, the 
rounding up of the Muslim immigrant population in Quito on 10 March 2011, reported that 
                                                
88 http://files.vpro.nl/wikileaks/cable/2008/07/08QUITO672.html. 
89 http://files.vpro.nl/wikileaks/cable/2008/07/08QUITO672.html. 
90 http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08SANJOSE882.html. 
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FBI officials had interviewed them.91 Among the men were a few individuals who were 
allegedly listed on “certain red lists” of the US and Interpol. While intelligence officials 
suggested links to international Islamist terrorist networks, representatives of the Foreign 
Ministry claimed that accusations were based on money laundering. According to the 
Public Protector, six men were extradited to the US without any due legal process. All 
others were released. This case shows that despite the populist liberal condemnation of 
US immigration policy, Ecuador in fact continued to collaborate in US directed migration 
control. The ethnic profiling of Muslims as terrorists mirrors the “hijacking” of the 
immigration policy discourse by racialised discussions on combating terrorism in the US 
(Johnson, 2010). The political pressure of the US on Correa’s visa policy worked both 
directly and also indirectly through US influence on Central American and Chinese 
immigration management.  
 
CONTEXTUAL FACTORS 
 
Both domestic and international pressure arose immediately after the introduction of visa 
freedom but, with the exception of Chinese citizens, the Correa administration only 
reversed visa freedom two years later in September 2010. As Bourbeau (2011) points out, 
the capacity of securitisation agents is bound by contextual factors such as geographic and 
historic context, judicial frameworks, domestic audiences and exogenous shocks. 
Exogenous shocks are events that induce points of departure from established 
sociological, cultural, and political patterns and offer “windows of opportunity” for agents 
of transformation. After the analysis of the securitisation process by domestic and 
international agents, the following section will discuss three contextual factors:  1. 
                                                
91 Foreign Policy confirms U.S. involvement operation twilight. It states that in 2011 an investigation was 
conducted by the U.S. Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) attaché in Quito, Ecuador, the HIS office in 
Atlanta, the Miami division of the FBI and the Ecuadorian National Police. The operation led to the arrest of 
Irfan Ul Haq, a Pakistani citizen who according to the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency 
(ICE) was conducting a human smuggling operation in Quito that attempted to smuggle an individual they 
believed to be a member of the TTP from Pakistan (Tehrik-e Taliban), which was designated as a foreign 
terrorist organization by the State Department in 2010, into the United States”, see REICH, O. & VÁSQUEZ, E. 
2012. How Ecuador’s immigration policy helps al Qaeda. Foreign Policy, 2 Arpil 2012. 
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domestic public opinion on security and immigration; 2. regional integration; and 3. the 
exogenous shock and trigger of the policy reversal of the San Fernando migrant massacre. 
 
Public Opinion 
 
Although there is no clear evidence for the overall increase of crime in Ecuador, public 
opinion on crime sees Ecuador has having moved from being a self-perceived isle of peace 
(between its violent neighbours Peru and Colombia) to a new platform of international 
crime (Carrión Mena, 2011). There is a close relationship between racism and perceptions 
of crime in Ecuador. Racial and ethnic discrimination, first and foremost against 
indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorians, is ubiquitous in public life and the media, and 
enshrined in Ecuadorian social psychology (de la Torre, 1996, Cervone, 1999, Rahier, 1999, 
Beck et al., 2011). 92  Depreciate representations of Afro-Ecuadorians as “dangerous 
criminals” date back decades (Rahier, 1999, Beck et al., 2011) and have been accompanied 
by the criminalisation of the indigenous population. As “institutionalized anti-racist 
movement[s], and the political, economic, and cultural influence of formerly excluded 
ethnics” (FitzGerald, 2013) in Ecuador grew, crime has been increasingly linked to 
foreigners. As an official of the Public Protector put it: 
 
In the 60s and 70s everything bad that happened in the country was blamed on the indigenous 
people. After that the guilt was passed on to the afro-descendants, which had to stop because of 
the vindication of ethnic rights. So now, after the nationals, the foreigners became the protagonists. 
This topic is managed politically by the state and it is managed very inadequately by the media.  
 
With the increase of Colombian immigrants and refugees the perception spread that their 
presence increased crime rates, thefts and kidnappings (Martínez, 2005). With the arrival 
of new extra-continental immigrants security concerns shifted to these new immigrant 
groups.  
Public opinion on immigration, crime and migrants’ rights in Ecuador is complex 
and rather contradictory. In 2010, over 70 per cent of Ecuadorians believed that 
                                                
92 A recent study published by the World Economic Forum, indeed finds very high levels of xenophobia in 
Ecuadorian society. According to the World Economic Forum, Ecuador ranked 118 out of 140 countries 
regarding it’s friendliness towards foreigners in 2011. 
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immigrants in Ecuador generated insecurity and crime (Zepeda and Verdesoto, 2010 p. 95). 
At the same time, over 95 per cent thought that migrants should have access to health care 
and education and form organisations to defend their rights in their countries of residence 
(ibid.). Correa was thus confronted with somewhat opposing public opinion: the demand 
for migrants’ rights and regularisation programs (in the context of emigration to the US 
and Europe) on the one hand, and the protectionist, and even racist, public opinion, on 
the other. The contextual factor or public opinion on immigration and crime facilitated 
the partial reintroduction of tourist visa requirements. 
 
Regional Integration 
 
Another important contextual factor that further explains the selection of countries for 
which visa freedom was reversed is regional integration and related diplomatic 
considerations that constrained the securitisation of immigration from “befriended” 
nations. The 2008 Constitution emphasizes the importance of Latin American integration 
process and the implementation of compensation policies for equal regional development 
(Art. 243, 1). Correa stressed that the reintroduction of tourist visa requirements would not 
affect the bilateral relations with any of the sending states.93 He severely rejected the 
demand by some opposition members for the reintroduction of tourist visas for Peruvians 
and Colombians as completely absurd in the context of regional integration. It is for 
similar reasons that no tourist visas were reintroduced for Cubans and Haitians until 2013 
and 2015, despite much higher rates of irregular migration, similar stark prejudice against 
Cubans and Haitians of colour, the well documented exploitation of Haitians by people 
smugglers, and the transmigration of both groups towards the US and Brazil.  
In the case of Haiti, State Secretary of Migration Carrión stressed that they had 
responded to Brazilian pressure to reintroduce visas by saying that there was nothing they 
could do since Ecuador supported Haiti and publically advocated for the assumption of 
regional responsibility and the large scale issuance of humanitarian and student tourist 
visas. Nevertheless, in 2013, an invitation letter by a wealthy sponsor, and in 2015, online 
                                                
93 http://www.bbc.co.uk/mundo/america_latina/2010/09/100907_ecuador_inmigrantes_africa_asia_tourist 
visa_rg.shtml. 
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registration, became mandatory for Haitian nationals travelling to Ecuador. Cuba and 
Ecuador are partners in the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America and their 
bilateral relations under Correa are characterised by reciprocal solidarity. It is likely that 
this alliance was the main reason for Ecuador originally not to reintroduce tourist visas for 
Cubans, although soon after the introduction of visa freedom they entered (and stayed or 
transmigrated) in their thousands. In 2013, an invitation letter by a wealthy sponsor, and in 
December 2015, tourist visas, were reintroduced for Cuban nationals, officially due to the 
“humanitarian crisis” of thousands of Cubans transmigrating through Central America 
with the goal of reaching the US.94  
 
The San Fernando Migrant Massacre 
 
From the above analysis, we have learned that there was substantial domestic and 
international pressure on Correa to reverse universal visa freedom. Visa requirements for 
Chinese citizens were introduced swiftly following petition by the Chinese government. 
The contextual factors of public opinion and regional integration favoured the racial 
securitisation of migration, and the alleged link between increasing crime and new extra-
continental immigrants had become a publically debated issue by mid-2010. However, it 
was not clear that any other measures would be introduced. Correa discussed the issue in 
his State of the Nation Address (informe a la nación) on 10 August 2010. He declared that a 
study was underway to assess the relationship between the entry of certain nationalities 
and the increase in crime.95 He promised to introduce all necessary measures should such 
a link be confirmed, however he considered this an “absurd” assumption.96 
The trigger for the policy reversal for nine other African and Asian nationalities 
was the exogenous shock of the San Fernando migrant massacre. On 22 August 2010, the 
Los Zetas drug cartel murdered 72 undocumented migrants, mainly from Central and 
South America, in the municipality of San Fernando, Tamaulipas, Mexico. The migrants 
were abducted from a bus and brought to a ranch, and when they refused to join the 
                                                
94 http://www.cancilleria.gob.ec/ecuador-solicita-visa-de-turista-a-los-cubanos-desde-el-1-de-diciembre/ 
95 It is likely that he referred to the study conducted by the Public Protector cited earlier in this article. 
96 http://lahora.com.ec/index.php/noticias/show/1101001401/-1/home/goRegional/Manabi. 
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cartel, they were blindfolded and shot in the back one by one. The Fernando massacre 
caused international outcry from human rights groups and political condemnation from 
governments across the Americas. The mass shooting brought in the political spotlight the 
issue of human rights abuses against migrants in Mexico, and migrants’ rights more 
generally, in various countries in the region. Six of the victims were Ecuadorian, including 
one of only three survivors and the only one to share the horrific details of the crime.  
The haunting personal account of the victim – he had survived a shot to the neck 
and face, faked his death, and then escaped and walked for miles until he reached a 
military checkout and found help – was widely reproduced in Ecuadorian media, and 
intensified the pressure on Correa to act. According to the former State Secretary for 
Migration, Correa used San Fernando in his propaganda machine to reaffirm his 
commitment to the migrant cause. Not only did he demand a rigorous investigation from 
Mexico but promised to provide maximum protection to migrants and castigate the 
criminal groups who abused and controlled human smuggling rings97. In the context of 
increased pressure from the police after the dismantling of a human smuggling ring weeks 
earlier98, the San Fernando massacre tilted the playing field in favour of the Security 
Cabinet and their demands to reverse visa freedom. On 6 September 2010 State Secretary 
Carrión announced the reintroduction of visa requirements for Afghanistan, Bangladesh, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan and Somalia with immediate effect.99  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Populist leftist governments in Latin American vehemently criticise the restrictive 
immigration policies of the US and Europe and actively endorse non-discrimination and 
colour blind immigration policies. To cohere with these discourses, various 
administrations have passed surprisingly liberal immigration laws that make the region an 
outlier by international comparison. Perhaps not surprisingly, this does not mean that 
                                                
97 http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/elmundo/ecuador-impone-visa-nueve-paises-de-asia-y-africa-trata-
articulo-222917. 
98http://www.eluniverso.com/2010/09/10/1/1355/vicecanciller-ecuador-utilizado-trafico-personas.html. 
99 http://www.eluniverso.com/2010/09/06/1/1355/ecuador-establece-visa-ciudadanos-nueve-paises.html 
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Latin American immigration policies are free from racialised securitisation and ethnic 
selectivity. This paper has explored how the pressure of external political actors 
interrelates with domestic securitisation and racialisation processes in the case of 
Ecuador, and what strategies politicians and officials pursue to bridge the gap between the 
populist liberal discourse on immigration and discriminating visa policies. 
Empirically, this paper demonstrates that Ecuador’s 2008 policy of open doors 
faced domestic and international opposition based on the racialised securitisation of new 
extra-continental immigrants of colour and Muslim belief as delinquents and terrorists. 
Domestically, securitisation agents included Correa’s political opponents and the media, 
but also political allies within the administration. Internationally, China and countries 
across the Americas, first and foremost the US, were decisive in pressuring Correa to 
reinstate visas in order to prevent transmigration. With the exception of Chinese citizens, 
Correa’s administration did not reverse visa freedom until the exogenous shock of the San 
Fernando migrant massacre. The contextual factors of public opinion and regional 
integration favoured the racial securitisation of immigrants from countries with which 
Ecuador had no, or only loose, ties. With a view to the external validity of the case study, it 
is worth pointing out that these contextual factors are similar in other Latin American 
countries. Processes of racialised securitisation of migration might thus play out similarly. 
The racialised securitisation of visa policies contradicts the liberalisation of Latin 
American immigration policies. Politicians and immigration officials thus needed to 
develop strategies to bridge the resulting discursive gaps. The research shows that the 
victimisation of irregular migrants and the criminalisation of their means of 
transportation was a common strategy of Ecuadorian officials to soften the contradiction 
between the political ideology of free human mobility and universal citizenship, and the 
ethnically selective reintroduction of tourist visas. These findings are in line with 
Magliano and Cavijo (2011) who argue that the rejection of the securitisation of migration 
by South American administrations goes hand in hand with reframing the securitisation of 
irregular migrants under the paradigms of human rights and the protection of human 
trafficking victims. The findings thus suggest not only considering how racialised 
securitisation of migration and immigration policies occurs through “speech acts”, but 
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how political actors in turn make sense of these discourses and how such understandings 
shape the process of policy formulation. Scholars should further link the literatures on the 
racialised securitisation of migration and ethnic immigration policies by acknowledging 
the persistence of (securitized) ethnic selectivity in tourist visas, and tourist visas as a 
central immigration policy tool. The paper further shows the key roles of tourist visas of 
relatively remote but strategic transit countries for the security interests of geographically 
connected destination countries.  
By disaggregated the various agents of racialised securitisation and the 
contradictory preferences of mass audiences, the findings challenge established ideas of 
elite consensus equalling liberal tendencies and populism equalling protectionism 
(Joppke, 1998; Freeman et al. 2012) as oversimplified. Future studies should test whether 
the discrimination against black, Arab and South-Asian Muslim immigrants is a more 
general phenomenon in the context of the Global War on Terror, both inside and outside 
Western liberal democracies, and whether historic discrimination against Asian and 
Chinese immigrants subsides in the context of the economic and political rise of China.     
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“A golden thread that connects many of the legal and policy instruments [on migration management in Latin 
America] is their avowedly progressive character.”                                                                                                            
(Cantor et al., 2015 p. 3) 
“The position of Brazil and Argentina was: ‘I think we were wrong. We made a law thinking in the MERCOSUR, 
in Latin America, and suddenly we are flooded by half of the Congo.’” 
(Ecuador State Secretary for Migration, Leonardo Carrión, June 2011) 
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The motivation of this thesis was twofold. First, it sought to explore the scope and 
underlying contradictions of immigration policy liberalisation in Latin America. The first 
paper broadly addresses this question for the cases of Argentina, Brazil and Ecuador. It 
investigates the “reverse paradox” of extremely progressive and inclusive immigration 
policy discourses and their partial translation into laws and policies on the one hand, and 
the de facto rejection of immigration from Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean on the other. 
The third paper picks up this last issue and provides an in-depth analysis of the reasons 
that led to the partial reversal of Ecuador’s policy of universal visa freedom for ten African 
and Asian nationalities.  
Second, the study sought to understand the reciprocal causal relationship between 
policy liberalisation and newly emerging extra-continental south-south migration. In 
other words, it explored in how far policy liberalisation had an impact on extra-
continental immigration, and whether the emergence of these new inflows in turn 
affected migration policies. The conceptual basis for this research has thus been the 
duality of migration flows and immigration policies as both dependent and independent 
variables.  The second and third papers address this reciprocal causal relationship 
between immigration policies and flows in the case of Ecuador’s policy of universal visa 
freedom, increasing extra-continental south-south migration and the reversal of visa 
freedom for ten African and Asian nationals. This concluding chapter summarises the key 
findings and empirical contributions of the thesis, as well as the theoretical and normative 
implications of the study’s results. Reflecting on these, the chapter concludes with ideas 
for future research.  
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
In his keynote address at the 10th anniversary conference of the International Migration 
Institute at the University of Oxford on 13 January 2016, Hein de Haas pointed out various 
areas in migration studies in need of further research. His main criticism included the 
static approach that focuses on outcomes without addressing the processes that precede 
them, and the dominant south-north bias of the literature. This PhD helps address these 
weak spots in migration studies by analysing the processes leading to immigration policy 
liberalisation and the increase in south-south immigration in Latin America. In the 
following, I will first review the empirical contributions of policy as the dependent 
variable, and then of policy as independent variable. 
 
A Reverse Immigration Policy Paradox 
 
The first paper applies a mixed methodological approach of legal analysis and process 
tracing to explore in how far recent immigration policies in Argentina, Ecuador and Brazil 
constitute a liberal turn, or rather a reverse immigration policy paradox of officially 
welcoming but covertly rejecting irregular migrants. It thus treats policy as the dependent 
variable. In contrast to the much discussed puzzle of “why liberal states accept unwanted 
migration” (Joppke, 1998b), which rests on the definition of the immigration policy 
paradox as the gap between restrictive immigration policy discourses and comparatively 
permissive immigration policies, the paper identifies a reverse gap between exceptionally 
liberal political discourses and comparatively restrictive immigration policies.  
Immigration discourses in the three case countries shifted from closure and 
securitisation to emphasizing migrants’ human rights, non-racism, and non-
criminalisation. These discourses developed in the context of emigration and diaspora 
polices and in strong counter position to the restrictive immigration rhetoric in the US 
and Europe, from which South American governments demanded the “humane” 
treatment and regularisation of their nationals. Although the specific political context of 
liberalised immigration discourses has been South American emigration to Europe and 
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North America, proclaimed values of the universality of migrants’ rights and the necessity 
for regularisation measures fed back into the country’s immigration discourses based on 
the logic of coherence and political reciprocity.   
The legal analysis suggests substantial variation in the degree to which legislative 
and policy change have followed discursive immigration policy liberalisation. Argentina’s 
2004 Immigration Law presents a significant liberal turn, both in its domestic context and 
in international comparison. Larger discursive gaps persist in Brazil and Ecuador, which 
thus far have not embarked on comprehensive immigration reforms. Regarding policy 
reactions to irregular extra-continental south–south migration, all three countries present 
the reverse policy paradox of publically welcoming all immigrants regardless of legal 
status or national origin, but de facto excluding immigrants from Africa, Asia, and the 
Caribbean, albeit to varying degrees.  
 
The Racialised Securitisation of Extra-Continental Immigrants 
 
The third paper also treats policy as the dependent variable. It picks up the rejection of 
recent extra-continental immigrants as it analyses the partial reversal of Ecuador’s 
universal visa freedom for ten nationalities. It also treats policy as the dependent variable. 
The paper addresses the question in how far racism and perceived security threats of 
domestic and international political actors constrain immigration policy liberalisation in 
Ecuador. The paper shows that Ecuador’s 2008 policy of open doors faced domestic and 
international opposition based on the racialised securitisation of new extra-continental 
immigrants of colour and Muslim belief as delinquents and terrorists.  
Domestically, securitisation agents included Correa’s political opponents and the 
media, but also political allies within the administration. Internationally, China and 
countries across the Americas, first and foremost the US, were decisive in pressuring 
Correa to reinstate visas in order to prevent transmigration towards or through their 
territories. The contextual factors of public opinion and regional integration favoured the 
racial securitisation of immigrants from countries with which Ecuador had no or only 
loose diplomatic ties. Chinese diplomatic pressure determined the reintroduction of visas 
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for their citizens after only six months of visa freedom. In the case of the other nine 
nationalities, the exogenous shock of the San Fernando migrant massacre determined the 
timing of the policy reversal.  
The racialised securitisation of visa policies stood in stark contrast to President 
Correa’s populist liberal discourse on immigration. Politicians and migration officials thus 
needed to develop strategies to bridge the resulting discursive policy gaps (Czaika and de 
Haas, 2013). The paper shows that the victimisation of irregular migrants and the 
concurrent criminalisation of their means of transportation was a common strategy of 
Ecuadorian officials to soften the contradiction between the political ideology of free 
human mobility and universal citizenship and the ethnically selective reintroduction of 
tourist visas.  
 
The Impact of Tourist Visas on South-South Migration 
 
The second paper addresses the impact of policy liberalisation on south-south 
immigration from outside the region in the case of Ecuador’s policy of open borders. It 
thus treats policy as independent variable, and seeks to understand both the effect of 
policy liberalisation on the numerical increase in immigration flows, as well as the 
characteristics of new extra-continental immigrants. The paper thus not only asks how 
many new immigrants came to Ecuador once visa freedom was implemented, but also 
who they were. The paper takes advantage of the quasi-experiment of Ecuador’s policy of 
universal visa freedom of 2008 to test the impact of the opening of borders of a Latin 
American country on previously restricted countries in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. It 
uses official entry data and a difference-in-difference approach to formalise the analysis of 
the impact of the open door policy and its subsequent reversal on south-south migration, 
and estimates the policy effect through a comparison of entry flows of immigrants from 
previously restricted and open countries, both before and after policy implementation.  
On average, immigration from previously restricted countries more than doubled. 
In the case of Chinese citizens, for which the policy was reversed in December 2008, the 
policy led to an increase of 642,7 per cent. For nine African and Asian countries, for which 
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the policy was reversed in September of 2010, the monthly increase amounted to 590,1 per 
cent and for the previously restricted countries for which visas were not reintroduced to 
28,4 per cent. The reversal of the policy (reintroducing visa restrictions) led to a 70,9 per 
cent reduction in entry of Chinese citizens and a 90,7 per cent reduction in entry of 
citizens from the nine African and Asian countries for which the policy was reversed. The 
results indicate that the policy change and subsequent reversal had a net positive effect on 
Chinese immigration but a net negative effect on the other group of nine African and 
Asian countries. It is important to relate these relative changes in inflows to absolute 
numbers. More than 10,000 Chinese citizens entered in only four months of visa freedom. 
In the case of the other nine nationalities for which visas were reintroduced, entries 
ranged from only 71 in the case of Somalia to 1,083 in the case of Pakistan over the course 
of two years.  
Complementary descriptive statistics and qualitative findings highlight great 
variance in the characteristics, agency and motivations of these recent immigrants. 
Interviews revealed that almost all took the decision to move to Ecuador in the context of 
their perception of increasing policy closure of their preferred destinations in Europe and 
North America. Apart from the decisive factor of Ecuador being an accessible destination, 
there were three main motivations: 1. pressure to leave one’s country of origin, 2. onward 
migration, primarily to North America and 3. settlement in Ecuador based on relative 
improved opportunities. The characteristics and agency of recent extra-continental 
immigrants in Ecuador vary from highly educated individuals with a high degree of agency 
to exploited victims of people smugglers. On average, immigrants from previously 
restricted countries in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean who arrived after the 
implementation of travel freedom tended to be significantly younger, more often male 
and from more remote areas in their home countries.  
 
In sum, the five most important empirical contributions of this PhD are: 
 
1. It offers a comparative overview of contemporary immigration frameworks in 
Argentina, Brazil and Ecuador.  
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2. It shows that, contrary to Europe and North America, governmental immigration 
discourses in Argentina, Brazil and Ecuador are significantly more liberal than 
their immigration policies in practice, i.e. there exists a “reverse” discursive gap 
between political discourse and policy formulation and implementation.  
3. It demonstrates that racial prejudice among domestic and international elite 
actors affects immigration policy-making in Ecuador. 
4. It shows Ecuador’s policy of universal visa freedom between 2008 and 2010 led to 
an increase of (irregular) south-south migration. 
5. It presents empirical evidence on the characteristics, motivations and agency of 
south-south migrants from Africa, Asia and the Caribbean to Ecuador. 
 
THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
Political migration scholars have repeatedly pointed towards the lack of theorisation of 
migration policies and their relationship to migratory movements (Massey et al., 1998, 
Massey, 2009, Hollifield and Wong, 2013b). When trying to explain the evolution of 
policies, there have been some attempts to synthesise the rather broad range of 
theoretical approaches to explaining immigration policy into one comprehensive 
framework by extracting and combining the most important independent variables of 
each (e.g. Meyers, 2004). Such approaches are valuable to test independent variables in 
large N studies, but are still far from the perhaps elusive goal of a coherent theory of 
migration policy-making. The South American cases discussed in this thesis do not fit in 
the existing theoretical assumptions and typologies and thus contribute to expanding our 
understanding of the motivations and nature of immigration policies. Regarding policy as 
independent variable and its impact on migratory movements, there is a tension between 
the qualitative findings that see well-established dynamics in migration flows as resistant 
to policy regulation, and quantitative evidence, which suggests that immigration and 
refugee policies significantly shape international migration patterns (see Paper Two). In 
the following, I will again first focus on the theoretical implications of my findings for 
debates on policy as the dependent variable, and then for policy as independent variable 
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Implications for Debates on Policy Gaps and Paradoxes 
 
What is the migration paradox, or, more precisely, what is the migration policy paradox?100 
As the first paper of this thesis points out, this question has been debated for the past 20 
years (Hollifield, 1992, Cornelius et al., 1994, Joppke, 1998b, Castles, 2004, Boswell, 2007, 
Hollifield and Wong, 2013b). Hollifield (1992) first identified a “liberal paradox” in 
immigration policies based on international economic forces pushing states towards 
openness, while the international state system and domestic political forces are pushing 
towards greater policy closure. This definition of a “liberal paradox” is problematic 
because it does not define liberalism itself. Cornelius et al. (1994) and Castles (2004) 
conceive the immigration paradox as the failure of states to effectively control 
immigration. A third group of authors understands the immigration paradox as the gap 
between policies and political discourses (Joppke, 1998b, Boswell, 2007).  
What all three of these conceptions have in common is the assumption that 
governmental immigration discourses are more restrictive than the corresponding policies. 
This PhD has identified the reverse scenario in South America: political discourses on 
immigration are significantly more liberal than policies in all three case countries. This 
finding questions the usefulness of pinpointing a singular migration policy paradox, and 
rather suggests detecting and explaining different gaps in immigration policy-making. For 
the sake of conceptual clarity, it is crucial to clearly define such gaps, e.g. applying the 
categorisation of discursive, implementation and efficacy gaps (Czaika and de Haas, 2013 p. 
494). It is also essential to conceptually allow space for discursive gaps to exist between 
policies and more and less restrictive discourses. 
The ideological direction of discursive gaps likely influences its size. Here two 
opposing hypotheses can be developed. On the one hand, departing from existing 
theoretical approaches to the constraints of passing restrictive migration policies, it could 
be argued that in liberal democracies, the gap between populist liberal discourses and 
                                                
100 Migration paradoxes have been identified in many other areas from human rights, the social status of 
migrants to temporary migration. See, e.g. HILL, L. B. 1997. Democracy and human rights: a paradox for 
migration policy. African Insight, 27, 188-99. NIESWAND, B. 2011. Theorising transnational migration. The 
status paradox of migration, New York and Oxon, Routledge.  
 158 
policies will be larger than discursive gaps in the opposite direction. This is because liberal 
discourses are not in conflict with international human rights norms but rather propel 
them. As argued in Paper One, the pressure of domestic and international activist groups 
on governments to translate liberal discourses into policies and laws might be more 
effective because such actors don’t have to engage in ideological battles, but can rather 
press for coherence of liberal policies, simply by taking politicians by their word. 
Depending on the strength of such pro-immigration groups this might lead to the 
“rhetorical entrapment” (Schimmelfennig, 2001) of the political actors who formulated 
liberal immigration discourses in the first place. Once they formulate more liberal policies, 
the discursive gap shrinks. 
 
Implications for Explaining Immigration Policy 
 
Linked to the debate about immigration policy paradoxes are theories that seek to explain 
them. The first paper discusses the explanatory leverage of existing theories on migration 
policy paradoxes for the South American case countries. It calls into question Freeman’s 
(1994) neoclassical theory of concentrated group interests (which he developed to explain 
the paradox “why states accept unwanted immigration”) because it overlooks the fact that 
the state is more than a mediator and in fact plays an active and discrete role in defining 
immigration policies (Boswell 2007). The analysis also points out the limited explanatory 
leverage of neo-institutionalist approaches in explaining liberal policies as these likewise 
focus on constraints – whether the state’s own bureaucratic structure, the judiciary, or 
supranational actors – to implementing restrictive policies. 
  The third paper shows for the case of Ecuador that in order to understand 
immigration policy-making it is certainly necessary to disintegrate “the state” and consider 
different, possibly competing political agents within it. However, it is not enough to focus 
on party politics and the administration, as much of the neo-institutionalist literature has 
(Boswell, 2007). The cases of Argentina and Ecuador discussed in Paper One and Three 
rather confirm what has been suggested by Margheritis (2011), that in order to understand 
the liberalisation of South American immigration policy-making it is crucial to consider 
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the role of typically strong executives. 
Paper One also discusses Boswell’s “Third Way” (2007) of conceptualizing 
immigration policy-making in the context of governments’ “functional imperatives”. This 
approach is generally useful to account for governments’ dilemma of wanting to meet 
competing requirements and expectations in the field of immigration policies and thus 
possibly intentionally choosing incoherence. However, Boswell categorizes a “populist” 
policy response towards immigration as a high degree of restriction, whereas Paper One 
has shown that in South America, populist immigration policies have led to discursive and 
policy liberalisation. Paper Three furthermore reveals that racism among domestic and 
international political elites influences immigration policy-making in Ecuador. Taken 
together, the thesis thus challenges established ideas that elite consensus regarding 
immigration policies equals liberal tendencies and populism equals protectionism 
(Joppke, 1998b, Freeman et al., 2013). 
The PhD also questions the assumption made by the literature that public opinion 
necessarily influences immigration policy-making in a restrictive direction (Fetzer, 2012). 
The literature on public opinion on migration in Latin America is only nascent (Meseguer 
and Maldonado, 2012, Wiesehomeier and Sagarzazu, 2015, Meseguer and Kemmerling, 
2016). Yet what seems to be clear is that on average, anti-immigrant sentiment is similarly 
high, or even higher than in the US and Europe (Meseguer and Kemmerling, 2016). At the 
same time, high levels of emigration likely enhance the empathy for immigrants leading 
Latin Americans to be “kind to immigrants yet reluctant to immigration” (Meseguer and 
Maldonado, 2012). Similarly, Paper One suggests that politicians in South America are 
caught in the dilemma of serving somewhat contradictory public opinion. On the one 
hand side, there is public demand for migrants’ rights and regularisation programs for 
emigrants in Europe and the US, which lead to the concurrent acceptance of the 
liberalisation of immigration policies in light of political coherence. On the other hand, 
protectionist, and even racist sentiments are widespread.   
The thesis also holds implications for the “numbers vs. rights” model, which 
suggests that there is a trade-off in immigration policy-making between numbers and 
rights, or put differently, between a receiving state’s openness in terms of access for 
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migrants to its territory (numbers) and the extensiveness of migrants’ access to rights 
granted by a state linked to some legal status granted (e.g., right of residence, right to 
social welfare, right to education, etc.) (Ruhs and Martin, 2008). The thesis indeed suggests 
that extensive rights were formally granted at a time of low immigration and that these 
rights are not necessarily granted in practice to extra-continental immigrants, whose 
arrival has to be seen as the unintended consequence of policy liberalisation. However, 
this relationship between numbers and rights in South American immigration policies is 
complex and needs to be explored further; e.g., Argentina is one of the countries with the 
highest immigration rates in the region and nevertheless pioneered the expansion of 
migrants’ rights. 
Few political scientists would disagree that interests, institutions and ideas – or 
ideology – all matter for understanding political outputs (policies and laws). More 
controversial is the question of the weight assigned to each factor and how they interact. 
In political migration studies, interests-based explanations based on neoclassical political 
economy have prevailed as the dominant theoretical paradigm since the 1960s. Despite 
the merit of such approaches in producing generalisable propositions that are empirically 
testable and have predictive potential, they neglect the conditions under which 
preferences are formed and the formal and informal mechanisms by which these 
preferences translate into policies and laws (see Boswell, 2007). The thesis suggests that 
interests, as well as ideas, ideology and moral considerations of politicians and 
bureaucrats play a substantial role in the immigration policy-making process, and thus 
advocates for combining constructivist and rationalist approaches in the analysis of 
immigration discourses, and policy and law making, i.e., a critical realist approach.  
Paper One addresses the applicability of existing theoretical approaches to 
explaining the South American exception of immigration policy liberalisation. The paper 
provides some explanations for the discursive shift from closure and securitisation to 
emphasizing migrants’ human rights, non-racism, and non-criminalisation; for and 
foremost, the context of mass emigration and diaspora polices, but also, prominent 
human rights discourses in the aftermath of democratisation processes and regional 
integration processes. The paper argues that although the specific political context of 
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liberalised immigration discourses has been South American emigration to Western 
liberal democracies, proclaimed values of the universality of migrants’ rights and the 
necessity for regularisation measures have fed back into the country’s immigration 
discourses based on the logic of coherence and political reciprocity. Overall, the thesis 
suggests that some of the dominant policy determinants discussed in the existing political 
migration literature, such as the state of the economy, the number of asylum seekers, 
refugees and immigrants, and public opinion, matter less in the South American context. 
Additional factors such as comparably strong executives, the impact of socio-economic 
crises and socio-political re-building, and the dynamics of coalition building under 
populist regimes, as well as the connections between migration policy and foreign policy 
seem to matter more.  
 
Implications for Debates on Migration Policies and Racism 
 
This PhD also speaks to the literature on immigration policies and race. Somewhat in 
opposition to the assumption of the more recent trend towards policy restrictiveness in 
the general political migration literature, a group of scholars describes the historic 
development away from ethnic selectivity, i.e. immigration policies that treat immigrants 
according to categories of race, ethnicity, nationality or country of birth (Joppke, 2005, 
FitzGerald, 2013, FitzGerald and Cook-Martín, 2014). When ethnic selectivity in migration 
policies persists today, it is seen as confined to positive discrimination, or the formally 
non-ethnic filtering of immigrants (even if these are correlated to ethnicity). This PhD 
suggests that this judgment is biased because (1) it neglects tourist visas and (2) it 
underestimates the traction of racialised security concerns. Contrary to the prediction of 
the demise of ethnically selective immigration policies in Latin America (FitzGerald, 2013), 
the third paper of this PhD suggests that ethnic selectivity needs to be considered as a 
persistent determinant of immigration policies. The paper implies that “race matters” for 
immigration law and policy scholarship (Johnson, 2000), and suggests linking the 
literatures on the racialised securitisation of migration and ethnic immigration policies by 
more explicitly acknowledging the racialisation of securitisation.  
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Implications for Debates on Tourist Visas and South-South Migration  
 
Scholars have recently started to explore the impact of tourist visas on bilateral migration 
flows (see Paper Two for discussion). However, little theorisation has been done on how 
the interplay of tourist visas of northern and southern countries affects global migration 
patterns through geographical substitution effects (Czaika and Hobolth, 2016). Paper Two 
shows that Ecuador did not attract recent extra-continental migrants from Africa, Asia 
and the Caribbean in its own right, based on economic or socio-political “pull-factors” 
(Massey et al., 1993). Only once it became accessible through the annulment of visa 
requirements, Ecuador turned into an attractive destination – not least for transmigration 
to other countries in the region, for and foremost the US.  
These findings suggest that tourist visa requirements significantly shape global 
opportunity structures, against the background of the “global mobility divide” (Mau et al., 
2015) between relatively free, wealthy and thus attractive destinations concentrated in the 
northern hemisphere, and relatively repressive, poor and unattractive countries 
concentrated in the southern hemisphere. Migration scholars need to break up 
conceptions of static migration systems, which are tainted by the geographic south-north 
bias of the literature, and conceptualise international migration as driven by essentially 
economic motivations but as embedded in global opportunity structures, which are 
significantly shaped by access policies, including tourist visas.  
 As pointed out in the second paper of this PhD, the characteristics and peculiarities 
of south-south migration are only beginning to be appreciated (De Lombaerde et al., 2014), 
and academic studies on recent extra-continental south-south migration to Latin America 
are isolated and descriptive (Narváez Gutiérrez, 2015). Paper Two shows that while visa 
freedom was the main common determinant of new south-south migration from Africa, 
Asia and the Caribbean to Ecuador, there is great variation in migrants’ characteristics, 
agency and motivations, which suggests that formulating overall theoretical predictions 
on the characteristics of south-south migrants might be challenging. 
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In sum, the three immediate theoretical contributions of this PhD are: 
 
1. It shows that theories of the determinants of immigration policies developed for 
major Western destination countries are not readily applicable to the Latin 
American context because they either focus on explaining restrictive policies, or 
on the constraints to implementing restrictive policies. 
2. It suggests linking the literatures on the securitisation of migration and ethnic 
immigration policies by acknowledging the racialisation of securitisation 
processes. 
3. It suggests a reconceptualisation of international migration determinants in the 
context of global opportunity structures, in which access policies, such as tourist 
visas, should figure more prominently.  
 
 
BROADER THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
Populism as Framing 
 
Studying populism is popular. However, what exactly populism entails remains contested 
in the political science literature. In the past decade scholars have defined populism as 
ideology (Canovan, 2004, Mudde, 2007, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013), political logic 
(Laclau, 2005, Panizza, 2005), political strategy (Weyland, 2001), political discourse (Laclau 
and Mouffe, 1985) and political style (Moffitt and Tormey, 2014). The most widely cited 
definition has been the ideological meaning formulated by Cas Mudde who proclaims 
populism to be “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two 
homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and 
which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of 
the people” (Mudde, 2004 p. 543). 
This thesis offers empirical evidence in support of a discursive definition of 
populism as developed by Aslanidis (2016), who promotes the concept of “populist frames” 
as “the systematic dissemination of a frame that diagnoses reality as problematic because 
‘corrupt elites’ have unjustly usurped the sovereign authority of the ‘noble People’ and 
maintains that the solution to the problem resides in the righteous political mobilization 
of the latter in order to regain power” (Aslanidis, 2016 p. 99). Aslanidis rejects 
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understanding populism as ideology because it lacks the single most unchallenged 
dimension of ideology – itself a highly contested concept – in the literature: coherence 
(Gerring, 1997).  
As Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser themselves point out, populism in a pure form 
does not exist. It is always attached to certain other ideological features. Populism “has a 
‘chameleonic’ character: it can be left-wing or right-wing, organized in top-down or 
bottom-up fashion, rely on strong leaders or even be leaderless” (Mudde and Rovira 
Kaltwasser, 2013 p. 153). Based on the findings of my thesis, another important 
shortcoming of Muddle and Kaltwasser’s work (2013) needs mentioning here: when 
contrasting Latin American populism as inclusionary versus European populism as 
exclusionary, this categorization is based on European immigration policies, but the 
authors outright disregard populist social liberal, i.e. open immigration policies in Latin 
America (although this would strengthen their argument). 
Aslanidis further follows Tarrow in seeing frames as “more flexible and 
situationally influenced constructs than formal ideological systems and [as] more easily 
and rapidly communicated to target groups, adapted to change, and extended to blend 
with other frames” (Tarrow, 1992 p. 190), and Hänggli and Kriesi in understanding framing 
as actively constructing the meaning of the reality in question (Hänggli and Kriesi, 2010 p. 
142). This conceptualization of populism differentiates between existing structure, culture 
and individual agency and thus falls neatly within a critical realist approach. Populist 
frames are formal vessels of meaning and have readily contained ideational elements that 
have been mistaken for constituting ideology (Aslanidis, 2016 p. 99). The conscious 
dissemination of frames, which is captured when passing from frames-as-forms to framing 
as a deliberate activity (Benford, 1997) accounts for the strategic implications that many 
authors have discerned in populist politics (cited after Aslanidis 2016).  
The South American cases discussed in this thesis offer convincing empirical 
evidence for understanding populism as framing. Whereas in the United States and 
Europe, populists today are usually linked to the radical right, Latin America has seen 
“unexpected affinities” between neo-liberalism and populism (Weyland, 2003), and more 
recently, leftist populist forces developed a successful “progressive” political platform, 
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centred on the socioeconomic realm in general and on material redistribution in 
particular (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011). Whereas populists in the United States and Europe 
are anti-immigrant and xenophobic, this thesis has identified populist social liberal 
immigration discourses and policies in South America, i.e. populist leaders are promoting 
an open stance on immigration and migrants’ rights. What we see then, is that populist 
frames can be filled with different and even opposing ideological content, as they have 
recently moved from embracing neo-liberal to social liberal and socialist ideological 
stances in South America.  
 
Liberalism versus Populism? 
  
What follows from the above, contrary to common wisdom, is that populism is compatible 
with liberalism. As mentioned in the introduction, the terms ‘liberal’, ‘liberalness’ and 
‘liberalism’ are often used in social science without providing clear conceptual definitions. 
The ostensible incompatibility between populism and liberalism goes back to Riker. In his 
famous work “Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of 
Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice”, Riker differentiates between liberal and 
populist traditions of democracy, and specifically the role of voting in both systems (Riker, 
1982). In the liberal, or Madisonian, tradition voting performs the purpose of controlling 
officials and avoid tyrannical majorities, while in the populist model, which he traces back 
to Rousseau, voting is the mechanism by which the will of the people is translated into 
action of officials.  
Riker defines populism as a two-part belief system, or ideology, which sees the 
people as good, and the will of the people as correct and moral. Second, populism, 
according to Riker, conceives of the people as a whole realizing freedom by exercising 
their general will; thus there is no reason for any constitutional limits to the power of the 
people or the need for the liberal principal of guarding individual liberty. The fundamental 
point of Riker’s book of course is that group choices are generally circular (and thus 
incoherent) and that “the will of the people” simply does not exist. Riker sees 
incompatibility between what he understands as liberal and populist belief systems, or 
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ideologies. In this thesis, I have shown how political leaders use populist frames to 
discursively validate policies based on social liberal ideology, and thus, that populism is 
compatible with liberalism. 
 
ETHICAL CONCERNS AND NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESULTS  
 
Unintended Policy Implications  
 
Research on migration and immigration policies is not morally neutral, as its findings may 
inform policies that impact on the lives of many (Birman, 2006). The main social and 
political responsibility of the migration researcher is to uncover the many myths 
surrounding migration (Acosta Arcarazo and Wiesbrock, 2015) and to strive towards the 
creation of “objective” knowledge about migratory processes, including the effectiveness 
of immigration policy tools.  Whenever researchers find themselves in the role of policy 
advisers, the framing and embedding of research findings in their broader socio-economic 
and political context is very important.   
The most controversial finding of the thesis in ethical terms is the effectiveness of 
Ecuador’s tourist visa requirements to stem extra-continental south-south migration. 
Political decision-makers in Ecuador and beyond might welcome this finding as a 
confirmation for the need of the (re)implementation of tourist visas. However, this 
assessment would largely depend on the political ideology and policy goals of political 
actors. If their policy goal was to impede (irregular) migration from Africa, Asia and the 
Caribbean, the reintroduction of visa policies would have to be considered effective and 
necessary. If, however, their policy objective was to develop and implement policies 
coherent with Ecuador’s constitutional principals of non-discrimination, universal 
citizenship and the right to migrate, the partial reintroduction of visa policies based on 
racialised securitisation processes ought to be rejected. In this case, the findings should 
rather initiate discussions on the development of legal means of immigration or 
transmigration of African, Asian and Caribbean nationals to Ecuador.  
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The Potential Impact on International Migration Norms 
 
The purpose of this PhD has not been a normative acclaim of the liberalisation of 
immigration policy-making in South America. It should nonetheless be pointed out that 
some of these developments, such as Argentina’s new immigration law, are remarkable 
from the perspective of the promotion of migrants’ rights. Unfortunately, there has not yet 
been a sustainable shift in immigration policy-making throughout Latin America, and 
liberalisation processes, even of  “norm pioneers” (Sikkink, 2015) such as Argentina, are 
ridden by internal contradictions. The most optimistic prognosis from a normative 
perspective that seeks the expansion of migrants’ rights might thus be that the ideological 
paradigm shift in Latin America might lead to the reproduction of discourses on migrants’ 
rights in international fora and thus increasingly push international discussions on 
migration beyond the currently dominant paradigms of conceptualising migration as a 
security issue or under the instrumentalist logic of the migration-development nexus.101 
  
 
Immigration Policy Liberalisation and Democracy 
 
At the same time, a word of caution is due regarding the friction between the desirability 
of increased immigration policy liberalisation on ethical grounds, on the one hand, and 
democratic responsiveness and consolidation, on the other. As pointed out above, 
research has shown that public opinion in Latin America is far from unconditionally 
welcoming immigration. Reinforcing policy liberalisation in the area of immigration might 
thus breach the principle of democratic responsiveness of the governments to the 
preferences of their citizens (Dahl, 1973).  
The thesis further suggests that undemocratic developments facilitated the 
translation of liberal discourses into policies and laws. Ecuador’s shift toward “competitive 
                                                
101 The development paradigm, which the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) promotes, is the 
dominant paradigm on the EU level. It considers migration as a “tool” for development and aims at 
harnessing remittances and diasporas in order to maximise their positive impacts on development and 
poverty reduction. GROPAS, R. 2013. The Migration-Development Nexus: Time For a Paradigm Shift. Jacques 
Delors Institute. 
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authoritarianism” (Levitsky and Way, 2010) under Correa increased his discretion to 
implement visa freedom despite security concerns and racist prejudice among 
representatives of the institutions responsible for immigration policy. The research 
conducted for this PhD further suggests that in Argentina, the dominance of the executive 
over democratic institutions (Levitzky, 2005) helped the institutionalisation of the 
liberalised immigration paradigm. While migrant rights activists welcome and demand 
immigration policy liberalisation, the question should be raised whether such 
liberalisation is desirable if it is based on the undermining of democratic institutions. As 
Weyland puts it:  
 
Democracy has been on the defensive in contemporary Latin America; under the cover of 
progressive rhetoric, competitive authoritarianism has emerged. Leftist leaders like Hugo Chávez 
relied on populism to establish their political hegemony, erode institutional checks and balances, 
marginalize the opposition through discriminatory legalism, and severely skew political 
competition. Left-wing populism has done more damage to democracy than the rightist, neoliberal 
populism of the 1990s. Self-styled socialist leaders command more solid, durable support, use 
growing economic interventionism to boost their power, invoke nationalism as a shield against 
foreign democracy promotion, and act as a coordinated group in suffocating democracy (Weyland, 
2013 p. 18). 
 
 
AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Most generally, further research on immigration policy liberalisation and south-south 
migration should be both narrowed down and broadened in scope. On the one hand side, 
both the dynamics of domestic policy-making and the impact of policy liberalisation on 
inter-continental south-south migration, which in this thesis could only be traced in more 
detail for the case of Ecuador, should be further explored in in-depth case studies. At the 
same time comparative studies should expand to other countries in the region (and 
eventually include other predominantly migrant sending regions) to test whether the 
tensions and dynamics between migration discourses and policies, and immigration 
policies and flows, play out in a similar fashion. Further explorative research is needed to 
generate testable hypotheses on the causal relationships that underlie these processes, 
which should eventually be tested in large N studies.  
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Understanding Policy Variation 
 
It is paramount that further research on Latin American immigration policy-making 
addresses the variation of liberalisation in and between immigration and refugee 
legislation in both inter- and intra-regional comparison. In independent research related 
to the PHD project, I coded Latin American asylum policies based on a weighted scheme 
of Best Practices the UNHCR developed for the region (see Freier, 2015). Figure 4 illustrates 
significant variation among the expansiveness of refugee laws within the region.102 
Figure 4: Variation in Latin American Refugee Laws 
 
 
Source: (Freier, 2015) 
 
 
 
 
                                                
102 Brazil’s Refugee Act of 1997 initiated the recent reforms in Latin America has served as a model refugee 
law for the region. The Argentine (2006) and Mexican (2011) laws are even more expansive than the Brazilian 
legislation, incorporating around 80 per cent of the weighted good practices. Another group of countries is 
centred around the regional average, including slightly more than half of the weighted good practices in 
their legislations: Venezuela, Uruguay, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Chile and Bolivia. Paraguay, Peru, Honduras, 
and most recently, Panama and Colombia have the least liberal refugee legislations in the region, 
incorporating around 40 per cent of good practices.  
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Coding Latin American Policy 
 
Massey points out that “more research needs to be done on immigration in different 
countries and systems [outside Europe and the US], and more of it needs to compare 
alternative hypotheses directly within the same statistical analysis” (Massey, 2009 p. 42). 
This is especially true for migration policies. The lack of comprehensive, comparable, 
cross-national and transparent data on immigration policies still hinders debate about the 
nature, causes and effects of immigration policies (Beine et al., 2013).103 Recent efforts to 
increase the quantification of data for the purpose of index building across immigration 
policy areas address this problem. Three large research projects have engaged in collecting 
data on immigration policies across both a large number of countries and longer time 
periods: the Determinants of International Migration (DEMIG POLICY), the International 
Migration and Law and Policy Analysis (IMPALA) and Immigration Policies in 
Comparison (IMPIC). The common flaw of these coding projects is that they reflect the 
south-north bias of the migration literature. Out of the three, only DEMIG POLICY 
samples policies from all world regions, whereas IMPALA and IMPIC code immigration 
policies for OECD countries only.104 DEMIG POLICY only includes four Latin American 
countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico. The empirical findings of this PhD suggest 
that this is not representative of policy-making in the entire region. In order to be able to 
compare Latin American immigration policies across categories and in international 
perspective, policy coding must be expanded to the entire region. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
103 From 1998 to 2008 thirteen studies published the results of immigration and asylum policy indices. 
However, these indices only measured particular immigration policy areas such as labor migration or asylum 
and suffered the trade-off between the span of time and the number of countries covered, see 
BJERRE, L., HELBLING, M., RÖMER, F. & ZOBEL, M. 2015. Conceptualizing and Measuring Immigration 
Policies: A Comparative Perspective. International Migration Review, 49, 555-600. 
104 The Regarding time span and number of countries covered, IMPIC collected data on immigration policies 
for 33 OECD countries from 1980 to 2010, while IMPALA codes 26 OECD countries with net immigration over 
the period 1980-2008. DEMIG POLICY is slightly wider in scope and analyses 45 countries across the world 
between 1945 and 2014.  
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Populist social liberal policies 
 
The phenomenon of populist social liberal policies in South America deserves further 
attention. One key strategy of the populist social liberal approach to migration 
management in South America has been linking the issue of migration to human rights. A 
similar tactic has been identified in Argentina regarding the use of human-rights rhetoric 
to end anti-gay discrimination (Encarnación, 2011). Human rights discourses in Latin 
America emerged out of the resistance to the repressive military dictatorships of the 1970s 
and made a powerful comeback in recent years. Further studies should explore when and 
how leftist (populist) political actors successfully use human rights discourses to legitimise 
policy change.105 Further studies should also explore the relationship between populist 
social liberal policies, immigration policy liberalisation and democracy. Such research 
must address the relationship between progressive rhetoric and competitive 
authoritarianism identified by Weyland (Weyland, 2013 p. 18), and to Cook-Martín and 
FitzGerald’s (2014) work, which questions the antithesis between democracy and racism 
and shows that undemocratic states were the first in the Americas to outlaw racial 
discrimination in immigrant selection. As pointed out before, the research of this PhD 
similarly suggests that undemocratic developments facilitated immigration policy 
liberalisation. 
 
FINAL THOUGHTS 
 
In their seminal work Beyond Smoke and Mirrors Massey, Durand and Malone show that 
restrictive immigration policies enacted in the US between 1986 and 1996 were passed 
largely for symbolic domestic political purposes (Massey et al., 2002). Despite restrictive 
policy discourses, for decades the US government has been accepting the entry and 
residence of substantial numbers of migrants who remain and work in their territory 
                                                
105 Intriguingly, human rights discourses have also been being picked up by right-wing organizers in Latin 
America who claimed they were living under dictatorships of the region’s left-leaning presidents, who were 
attacking democracy and freedom of speech, see LAP 2011. Dangerous Complacencies: Obama, Latin 
America, and the Misconceptions of Power. Latin American Perspectives, 38, 14-28. An even broader research 
question might thus be, which political actors successfully instrumentalise human rights discourses. 
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without authorisation. A similar discursive gap has been identified for European 
immigrant receiving states. In the last fifteen years, the immigration discourses in many 
Latin American countries have become increasingly liberal, with a clear emphasis on 
migrants’ rights and the promotion of free human mobility. These discourses focus on the 
universality of migrants’ rights and on how these apply to all non-nationals irrespective of 
their origin and legal status.  
The South American sub-region has taken the lead in immigration policy 
liberalisation and thus holds an especially strategic position to further reinforce reforms 
on the regional and international level. It is likely that South American governments enjoy 
significantly more autonomy in the development of their immigration policies than 
Central American and Mexican governments because transit migration towards the US-
Mexican border leads to diplomatic pressure to maintain or implement restrictive 
policies. Notwithstanding, even in South America various restrictive laws remain in force, 
and some recent initiatives bare the risk of falling back on securitised notions of migration 
– as Paper Three has shown not least due to US pressure.  
Looking back at the liberalisation of South American immigration discourses and 
laws since the early 2000s, there have been significant advances at the level of agenda 
setting and consensus building but a mixed picture emerges when assessing actual 
legislative change. Significant gaps between discourses and legislative frameworks persist 
in many countries. This leaves governments in the position of publicly proposing and 
internationally demanding progressive immigration policies, without passing and 
implementing such policies at home. At the same time, the thesis has shown that some of 
the region’s new immigration laws are indeed pioneering in expanding migrants’ rights. 
Despite significant variation in the quality and magnitude of these reforms, one can speak 
of a philosophical paradigm shift in the region’s immigration policies, i.e. a new outlook 
on migration that brings the individual migrant and human rights into the centre of 
policy-making. The right to migrate that is now enshrined in Argentine, Bolivian, 
Ecuadorian and Uruguayan migration laws and in various regional declarations 
symbolises this new approach to migration management, but also its inherent 
contradictions and inconsistencies.  
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It is not clear what exactly this right to migrate entails. Paper One has argued that 
if a true right to migrate existed, those who, for one reason or another, irregularly reside in 
the country should have ample possibilities to regularise their status. Even in the most 
expansive legislations, this is not the case for irregular migrants from Asia, Africa and the 
Caribbean, who often are among the most vulnerable migrants in the region. The absolute 
numbers of extra-continental south-south migrants and asylum seekers in Latin America 
are very small. Their increase, which can be partly explained by policy liberalisation in the 
region, such as Ecuador’s policy of open doors from 2008 to 2010, has nevertheless caused 
restrictive policy responses based on racialised securitisation processes. Such restrictive 
reactions stand in stark contrast to populist discourses on free mobility and non-
discrimination.  
In order to consolidate the political paradigm shift in the region, there is a need for 
more widespread legislative reform, effective implementation of already adopted laws and 
a thorough discussion of the meaning of its central concepts, such as the right to migrate. 
A wide array of actors, including national governments and courts, practitioners, 
academics, NGOs, migrant organisations, international organisations and the South 
American Conference on Migration (SACM) will play a role in deciding whether South 
American immigration reforms can credibly challenge established immigration policy 
paradigms in the EU and the US in the near future, or whether liberal reforms are not 
much more than “smoke and mirrors”.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 9: Elite interviews (Paper One) 
Nr. COUNTRY NAME MINISTRY / ORGNIZATION POSITION DATE 
1 Argentina Augusti, 
Féderico  
National Directorate of 
Migration (DNM) 
Director of 
International Affairs 
20.03.2012 
2* Argentina Augusti, 
Féderico  
National Directorate of 
Migration (DNM) 
Director of 
International Affairs 
23.06.2013 
3 Argentina Arenaza, 
Juan Pablo  
Municipal Legislature of the 
City of Buenos Aires 
Legislator for Unión 
para Todos, UPT, 
Buenos Aires 
21.03.2012 
4 Argentina Arias Duval, 
Martín 
Augusto  
National Directorate of 
Migration (DNM) 
Director 20.03.2012 
5 Argentina Artola, Juan  International Organization 
for Migration (IOM) 
Regional 
Representative  
 
6 Argentina Averbuj, 
Gerardo  
Ministry of Education Official  29.03.2012 
7 Argentina Bertini, 
Sergio  
MyRAR (Migrantes y 
Refugiados en Argentina) 
Director 29.03.2012 
8 Argentina Capella, 
Juan José  
National Directorate of 
Migration (DNM) 
Official 
(Departamento de 
Fiscalización 
Terrestre) 
28.03.2012 
9 Argentina Ceriani 
Cernadas, 
Pablo  
Human Rights Centre 
University of Lanús 
Director 30.03.2012 
10 Argentina Contarini, 
Eugenia 
UNHCR Protection Officer 04.04.2012 
11 Argentina Correa, 
Violeta  
National Commission for 
Refugees (CONARE) 
Civil Society 
Representative 
22.03.2012 
12 Argentina Courtis, 
Corina   
Consejo Nacional de 
Investigaciones Científicas y 
Técnicas (CONICET) 
Researcher 21.03.2012 
13 Argentina Figueroa, 
Soledad  
General Directorate for 
Human Rights, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs  
Advisor  04.04.2012 
14 Argentina Filardi, 
Marcos 
Public Protector, 
Commission for Assistance 
and Protection for Refugees 
and Asylum Seekers 
Director  21.03.2012 
15 Argentina Finkelstein, 
Laura  
Civil Society Human Rights 
Activist 
13.04.2012 
16 Argentina Giustiniani, 
Rubén 
Argentine Senate Senator, Partido 
Socialista (PS) 
27.03.2012 
17 Argentina Littieri, 
Martín 
UNHCR Legal Advisor  12.04.2012 
18 Argentina Marcogliese, 
María José  
Universidad de Buenos Aires 
(UBA) 
Researcher 03.04.2012 
19 Argentina Maris 
Martínez, 
Stella  
Public Protector Public Protector   20.03.2012 
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20 Argentina Mármora, 
Lelio  
International Organization 
for Migration (IOM) 
Former Chief of 
Mission / Academic  
28.03.2012 
21 Argentina Mera, 
Carolina  
Universidad de Buenos Aires 
(UBA) 
Professor of Sociology  04.04.2012 
22 Argentina Morales, 
Diego  
Centro de Estudios Legales y 
Sociales (CELS) 
Director 28.03.2012 
23 Argentina Munarriz, 
Deborah  
Universidad de Buenos Aires 
(UBA) 
Professor of Law 23.03.2012 
24 Argentina Novick, 
Susana  
Universidad de Buenos Aires 
(UBA) 
Professor of Social 
Science 
03.04.2012 
25 Argentina Paccecca, 
María Inés  
Universidad de Buenos Aires 
(UBA) 
Researcher 27.03.2012 
26 Argentina Penchasza, 
Ana Paula  
Consejo Nacional de 
Investigaciones Científicas y 
Técnicas (CONICET) 
Researcher 03.04.2012 
27 Argentina Perez 
Vichich, 
Nora  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs , 
Directorate of International 
Migration 
Advisor  12.04.2012 
27 Argentina Tarantino 
Gabriela 
(Comisión Argentina para los 
Refugiados y Migrantes, 
CAREF) 
Programme Director 09.04.2012 
28* Brazil Arcentales, 
Javier 
Casa de la Movilidad 
Humana 
Technical Advisor 09.08.2011 
29* Chile Hernández 
González, 
Pedro 
Directorate of Consular 
Policy, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs  
Director of 
International 
Migration 
13.06.2013 
30* Colombia Calderón, 
Álvero 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  Director of Migration 
Affairs 
01.04.2013 
31 Ecuador Aguirre, 
Andres 
Ministry of the Interior, 
Directorate of Human Rights  
Interinstitutional 
Coordination Officer  
29.07.2011 
32 Ecuador Arcentales, 
Javier 
Casa de la Movilidad 
Humana 
Technical Advisor 09.08.2011 
33 Ecuador Bernal, 
Rogelio 
International Organization 
for Migration (IOM)  
Chief of Mission 02.08.2011 
34 Ecuador Borja, Juan 
Fernando 
International Organization 
for Migration (IOM)  
Programme Officer  02.08.2011 
35 Ecuador Cajtan, Iloh  African Support Foundation Founding Director 17.08.2011 
36 Ecuador Carrión, 
Leonardo  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  State Secretary for 
Migration, Consular 
Affairs and Refugees 
27.07.2011 
37 Ecuador Carrión, 
Leonardo  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  Ambassador to Japan 35.04.2016 
38 Ecuador Chang, Jenit  Misión Scalabriniana Judicial Coordinator 16.08.2011 
38 Ecuador Cortés, 
Lewis  
Refugee Directorate of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Coordinator 03.08.2011 
39 Ecuador Cubile, Erik  Embassy of the Republic of 
Cuba 
Consul 25.08.2011 
40 Ecuador de la Vega, 
Pablo  
El Centro de Derechos 
Humanos “Segundo Montes 
Mozo S.J.”  
Director  02.08.2011 
41 Ecuador Díaz Chong, 
Alejandro 
Confederación y Asociación 
de la Colonia China en 
Ecuador 
Secretary 08.08.2011 
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42 Ecuador Galarza, 
Javier  
National Directorate of 
Migration of the National 
Police 
Adviser 19.05.2011 
43 Ecuador Gonzaléz, 
Ana  
Provincial Migration Agency 
of Pichincha 
Officer  15.08.2011 
44 Ecuador Guerra, José 
Luis  
Public Protector  Lawyer  05.08.2011 
45 Ecuador Hernández, 
Francisco    
National Intelligence 
(SENAIN) 
 26.07.2011 
46 Ecuador Herrera 
Cevallos, 
Mónica  
Fundación Esperanza Founder 05.08.2011 
47 Ecuador Herrera, 
Gioconda  
Facultad Latinoamericana de 
Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) 
Sociology Professor 08.08.2011 
48 Ecuador Herrera, 
Wiliam  
National Secretary of the 
Migrant (SENAMI) 
Secretary for 
International 
Migration Policy  
11.08.2011 
49 Ecuador Herreros, 
Josep 
United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) 
Head of the Quito 01.08.2011 
50 Ecuador Jiafeng, Gu  Embassy of the People's 
Republic of China  
Political Adviser  23.08.2011 
51 Ecuador Jiménez, 
Mery  
Ministry of Justice, Human 
Rights and Religion 
Adviser on Human 
Trafficking  
27.07.2011 
52 Ecuador Lustgartem, 
Sabrina  
Hebrew Immigrant Aid 
Society (HIAS) 
Director  01.08.2011 
53 Ecuador Montagna, 
Fausto  
Fundación Esperanza Volunteer 05.08.2011 
54 Ecuador Mora 
Bowen, 
Patricio  
Peoples' Republic of 
Bangladesh 
Honorary Consul 23.08.2011 
55 Ecuador Muñoz, 
Andrea 
Airport Police  First Lieutenant  14.08.2011 
56 Ecuador Navarro, 
Victor  
National Directorate of 
Migration of the National 
Police 
Legal Adviser  28.07.2011 
57 Ecuador Orellano, 
Laura  
Ministry of the Interior Interinstitutional 
Coordination Officer  
26.07.2011 
58 Ecuador Padre, Peter La Iglesia Remedia Cristiana 
de Díos en Quito 
Priest 22.08.2011 
59 Ecuador Paula, 
Christian  
Ministry of the Interior Interinstitutional 
Coordination Officer  
29.07.2011 
60 Ecuador Roldan, 
Johana  
United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) 
Protection Officer 01.08.2011 
61 Ecuador Sandoval, 
José  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ambassador to Peru*  14.04.2016 
62 Ecuador Sarmiento, 
Karina  
Asylum Access Director  16.08.2011 
63 Ecuador Serrano, 
Alejandra  
Hebrew Immigrant Aid 
Society (HIAS) 
Programme Assistant 
  
01.08.2011 
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64 Ecuador Silva, Hugo  National Directorate of 
Migration of the National 
Police 
Major 28.07.2011 
65 Ecuador Solís, 
Elejandro  
National Intelligence 
(SENAIN) 
 Lieutenant 26.07.2011 
66 Ecuador Vega, Blanca  Casa de la Movilidad 
Humana 
Technical Advisor 10.08.2011 
67 Ecuador Villalba, 
Hiroshima  
Ministry of the Interior Director of Human 
Rights  
26.07.2011 
68 Ecuador Villalobos, 
Juan  
Jesuit Refugee and Migrant 
Service 
Coordinator for 
Advocacy 
08.08.2011 
69 Ecuador Holguin, 
Hernán 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  Former Ambassador  03.06.2013 
70 Ecuador Saldaña, 
Remigia 
National Secretary of the 
Migrant (SENAMI) 
Programme 
Coordinator  
June 2013 
 
* Conducted by Diego Acosta 
 
 
 
Table 10: Treatment Group and Treatment Time Periods (Paper Two) 
Group Sub-group 
t < policy 1 
t < July 2008 
policy 1 <= t < policy 2a 
July 2008 <= t < Dec 2008 
policy 2a <= t < policy 2b 
Dec 2008 <= t < Sept 2010 
policy 2b <= t 
Sept 2010 <= t 
POC POC 
  
PRC 
Always 
Treated     
China 
        
Reversed 
      
      Access: 
     
 
Restricted 
    
 
Unrestricted 
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Table 11: T-test (Paper Two) 
Group Variable Policy t < policy 1 
policy 1 <= t < 
policy 2a 
policy 2a <= t < 
policy 2b 
policy 2b <= t 
Difference 
(se) 
Result 
AT 
Age Open 38.76543 38.4363 
0.329125 
(0.0365849) 
Negligible 
% Male Open 0.6425669 0.6726623 
-0.0300954 
(0.0012796) 
More male 
Distance Open 2812.652 2880.435 
-67.78245 
(6.567555) 
Negligible 
China 
Age Open 36.69347 28.18195     
8.511526 
(0.1363493) 
Younger 
  Restrict   28.18195 36.32053 
-8.13859 
(0.1191833) 
Older 
% Male Open 0.7028493 0.6623546     
0.0404948 
(0.0053032) 
Less male 
  Restrict   0.6623546 0.7641231 
-0.1017685 
(0.0049455) 
More male 
Distance Open 6799.106 10458.55     
-3659.441 
(64.9503) 
Further 
 
Restrict 
 
10458.55 10228.69 
63.7138 
(0.0003093) 
Negligible 
Reversed 
Age Open 35.14213 31.23769   
3.904435 
(0.2520179) 
Younger 
  Restrict   31.23769 36.15297 
-4.915278 
(0.3081876) 
Older 
% Male Open 0.6541572 0.8732849   
-0.2191277 
(0.0083208) 
More male 
  Restrict   0.8732849 0.7639183 
0.1093667 
(0.0122239) 
Less male 
Distance Open 4624.569 5764.633   
-1140.064 
(108.225) 
Further 
  Restrict   5764.633 6365.57 
-600.9374 
(178.3159) 
Further 
         Restricted 
        Unrestricted 
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Table 12: Characteristics of Interviewed Migrants (Paper Two) 
COUNTRY Sex 
Year of 
entry Age Education Migratory Status Port of Entry 
 
Use of people 
smugglers 
Bangladesh Male 2009 44 No schooling Irregular Airport Quito Yes 
Bangladesh Male 2011 33 Primary  Irregular Airport Quito Yes 
Bangladesh Male 2011 31 Secondary Irregular Airport Quito Yes 
China Female 2003* 49 Secondary Resident Airport Quito No 
China Female 2003* 24 University Resident Airport Quito No 
China Male 2003* 49 University Resident Airport Quito No 
Cuba Female 2010 26 University Asylum Seeker Airport Quito No 
Cuba Female 2010 33 University Irregular Airport Quito No 
Cuba Female 2010 44 University Citizen Airport Quito No 
Cuba Female 2009 49 University Citizen Airport Quito No 
Cuba Female 2007 46 University Resident Airport Quito No 
Cuba Female 2011 23 University Tourist Airport Quito No 
Cuba Male 2009 26 Secondary Irregular Airport Quito No 
Cuba Male 2008 28 University Irregular Airport Quito No 
Cuba Male 2009 27 Secondary Irregular Airport Quito No 
Cuba Male 2003* 54 University Resident Airport Quito No 
Cuba Male 2009 35 University Irregular Airport Quito No 
Cuba Male 2009 43 University Irregular Airport Quito No 
Cuba Male 2011 49 University Tourist Airport Quito No 
Cuba Male 2009 56 University Irregular Airport Quito No 
Cuba Male 2010 33 University Asylum Seeker Airport Quito No 
Cuba Male 2011 22 University Irregular Airport Quito No 
Cuba Male 2007* 46 University Resident Airport Quito No 
Haiti Female 2011 31 Secondary Irregular Airport Quito Yes 
Haiti Female 2011 39 Secondary Irregular Airport Quito Yes 
Haiti Female 2011 21 Secondary Irregular Airport Quito Yes 
Haiti Female 2011 16 Secondary Irregular Airport Quito Yes 
Haiti Female 2011 18 Secondary Irregular Airport Quito Yes 
Haiti Female 2011 23 Secondary Irregular Airport Quito No 
Haiti Female 2011 22 Secondary Irregular Airport Quito No 
Haiti Male 2011 24 Secondary Irregular Airport Quito No 
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Haiti Male 2011 26 Secondary Irregular Airport Quito No 
Nigeria Female 2009 24 Secondary Irregular Airport Quito No 
Nigeria Female 2009 25 University Irregular Airport Quito No 
Nigeria Female 2011 47 University Irregular Airport Quito No 
Nigeria Male 2009 24 University Irregular Airport Quito No 
Nigeria Male 2011 26 Secondary Irregular Airport Quito No 
Nigeria Male 2010 27 University Irregular Airport Quito No 
Nigeria Male 2009 27 Secondary Irregular Airport Quito No 
Nigeria Male 1998* 54 University Resident Airport Quito No 
Nigeria Male 2010 28 University Asylum Seeker Airport Quito No 
Nigeria Male 2010 46 Secondary Irregular Airport Quito No 
Nigeria Male 2002* 50 Secondary Irregular Airport Quito No 
Nigeria Male 2011 30 Secondary Refugee Airport Quito No 
Nigeria Male 2010 36 Secondary Asylum Seeker Airport Quito No 
Nigeria Male 2009 23 Secondary Student Visa Airport Quito No 
Nigeria Male 2011 27 Secondary Irregular Airport Quito No 
Nigeria Male 2010 35 University Irregular Airport Quito No 
Nigeria Male 2009 27 University Refugee Airport Quito No 
Nigeria Male 20o5* 50 University Resident Airport Quito No 
Nigeria Male 2009 24 Secondary Irregular Airport Quito No 
Pakistan Male 2008 28 Secondary Irregular Airport Quito No 
Pakistan Male 2008 31 Secondary Irregular Airport Quito No 
Pakistan Male 2009 38 Elementary Refugee Airport Quito No 
Pakistan Male 2009 37 Elementary Resident  Airport Quito No 
Pakistan Male 2010 32 University Refugee Airport Quito No 
 
* Arrived in Ecuador before visa freedom of 2008 
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Table 13: Elite interviews (Paper Three) 
 
Nr. COUNTRY NAME MINISTRY / ORGNIZATION POSITION DATE 
1 Ecuador Aguirre, 
Andres 
Ministry of the Interior, 
Directorate of Human Rights  
Interinstitutional 
Coordination Officer  
29.07.2011 
2 Ecuador Arcentales, 
Javier 
Casa de la Movilidad Humana Technical Advisor 09.08.2011 
3 Ecuador Bernal, 
Rogelio 
International Organization 
for Migration (IOM)  
Chief of Mission 02.08.2011 
4 Ecuador Borja, Juan 
Fernando 
International Organization 
for Migration (IOM)  
Programme Officer  02.08.2011 
5 Ecuador Cajtan, Iloh  African Support Foundation Founding Director 17.08.2011 
6 Ecuador Carrión, 
Leonardo  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  State Secretary for 
Migration, Consular 
Affairs and Refugees 
27.07.2011 
7 Ecuador Carrión, 
Leonardo  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  Ambassador to Japan 35.04.2016 
8 Ecuador Chang, Jenit  Misión Scalabriniana Judicial Coordinator 16.08.2011 
9 Ecuador Cortés, 
Lewis  
Refugee Directorate of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Coordinator 03.08.2011 
10 Ecuador Cubile, Erik  Embassy of the Republic of 
Cuba 
Consul 25.08.2011 
11 Ecuador de la Vega, 
Pablo  
El Centro de Derechos 
Humanos “Segundo Montes 
Mozo S.J.”  
Director  02.08.2011 
12 Ecuador Díaz Chong, 
Alejandro 
Confederación y Asociación 
de la Colonia China en 
Ecuador 
Secretary 08.08.2011 
13 Ecuador Galarza, 
Javier  
National Directorate of 
Migration of the National 
Police 
Adviser 19.05.2011 
14 Ecuador Gonzaléz, 
Ana  
Provincial Migration Agency 
of Pichincha 
Officer  15.08.2011 
15 Ecuador Guerra, José 
Luis  
Public Protector  Lawyer  05.08.2011 
16 Ecuador Hernández, 
Francisco    
National Intelligence 
(SENAIN) 
 26.07.2011 
17 Ecuador Herrera 
Cevallos, 
Mónica  
Fundación Esperanza Founder 05.08.2011 
18 Ecuador Herrera, 
Gioconda  
Facultad Latinoamericana de 
Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) 
Sociology Professor 08.08.2011 
19 Ecuador Herrera, 
Wiliam  
National Secretary of the 
Migrant (SENAMI) 
Secretary for 
International 
Migration Policy  
11.08.2011 
20 Ecuador Herreros, 
Josep 
United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) 
Head of the Quito 01.08.2011 
21 Ecuador Jiafeng, Gu  Embassy of the People's 
Republic of China  
Political Adviser  23.08.2011 
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22 Ecuador Jiménez, 
Mery  
Ministry of Justice, Human 
Rights and Religion 
Adviser on Human 
Trafficking  
27.07.2011 
23 Ecuador Lustgartem, 
Sabrina  
Hebrew Immigrant Aid 
Society (HIAS) 
Director  01.08.2011 
24 Ecuador Montagna, 
Fausto  
Fundación Esperanza Volunteer 05.08.2011 
25 Ecuador Mora 
Bowen, 
Patricio  
Peoples' Republic of 
Bangladesh 
Honorary Consul 23.08.2011 
26 Ecuador Muñoz, 
Andrea 
Airport Police  First Lieutenant  14.08.2011 
27 Ecuador Navarro, 
Victor  
National Directorate of 
Migration of the National 
Police 
Legal Adviser  28.07.2011 
28 Ecuador Orellano, 
Laura  
Ministry of the Interior Interinstitutional 
Coordination Officer  
26.07.2011 
29 Ecuador Padre, Peter La Iglesia Remedia Cristiana 
de Díos en Quito 
Priest 22.08.2011 
30 Ecuador Paula, 
Christian  
Ministry of the Interior Interinstitutional 
Coordination Officer  
29.07.2011 
31 Ecuador Roldan, 
Johana  
United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) 
Protection Officer 01.08.2011 
32 Ecuador Sandoval, 
José  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ambassador to Peru*  14.04.2016 
33 Ecuador Sarmiento, 
Karina  
Asylum Access Director  16.08.2011 
34 Ecuador Serrano, 
Alejandra  
Hebrew Immigrant Aid 
Society (HIAS) 
Programme Assistant 
  
01.08.2011 
35 Ecuador Silva, Hugo  National Directorate of 
Migration of the National 
Police 
Major 28.07.2011 
36 Ecuador Solís, 
Elejandro  
National Intelligence 
(SENAIN) 
 Lieutenant 26.07.2011 
37 Ecuador Vega, Blanca  Casa de la Movilidad Humana Technical Advisor 10.08.2011 
38 Ecuador Villalba, 
Hiroshima  
Ministry of the Interior Director of Human 
Rights  
26.07.2011 
39 Ecuador Villalobos, 
Juan  
Jesuit Refugee and Migrant 
Service 
Coordinator for 
Advocacy 
08.08.2011 
 
* Former Director of Refugee Policy (2011-2012) and State Secretary for Migration (2012-2013) 
 
 
 
 
